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Die vorliegende Dissertation setzt sich mit dem Einfluß ökonomischer Geographie auf die Geschichte des
Heiligen Römischen Reichs deutscher Nation bis zum Deutschen Zollverein auseinander. Die Dissertation
besteht aus drei Kapiteln. Im ersten Kapitel werden die Effekte von Heterogenität in der Beobacht-
barkeit der Bodenqualität auf Besteuerung und politischen Institutionen erläutert, theoretisch betrachtet
und empirisch anhand von Kartendaten analysiert. Es wird ein statistischer Zusammenhang zwischen
Beobachtbarkeit der Bodenqualität und Größe und Überlebenswahrschenlichkeit von mittelalterlichen
Staaten hergestelt. Das zweite Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Einfluß dieses Mechanismus auf die spezielle
Geschichte Brandenburg-Preußens, und erläutert die Rolle der Beobachtbarkeut der Bodenqualität auf die
Entwicklung zentraler Institutionen nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Im empirischen Teil wird anhand von
Daten zu Provinzkontributionen ein statistisch signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen Bodenqualität und
Besteuerug erst im Laufe des siebzehnten Jahrhundert deutlich. Das dritte Kapitel befasst sich mit dem
Einfluß relativer Geographie auf die Gründung des Deutschen Zollvereins als Folge des Wiener Kongresses.
Durch Analyse der Handelsströme und potentieller Zolleinnahmen wird ein Zusammenhang zwischen
Geographischer Lage und der Entscheidung, dem Zollverein anzugehören deutlich. Dies erklärt in Teilen,
wie einnahmemaximierende Staaten dem Zollverein aus Eigeninteresse beitreten konnten.
Summary
This dissertation features three essays on the influence of Economic Geography on the development of
the Holy Roman Empire until the German Zollverein. The dissertation consists of three essays. The first
analyzes the effect of geographically induced heterogeneity of soil quality, which has knock on effects
on the development of taxation and political institutions. These ideas are analyzed both theoretically
and empirically, using a novel dataset of GIS maps. Results indicate a relationship between observability
and states’ geographic sizes and survival probability. The second chapter employs these ideas in the
context of Brandenburg-Prussia, striving to create a centralized state after the Thirty Years War. Empirics
indicate a relationship between observability and provincial contribution during the decades following
the Thirty Years War. The third chapter analyzes the influence of geography on the foundation of the
German Zollverein as a consequence of the Congress of Vienna. By analyzing trade flows and potential
tariff revenues, a relationship between a state’s geographic location and its decision to join the Zollverein is
revealed. In parts, this explains how revenue-maximizing states could join the Zollverein, for their own
interest.
Contents
Questioning Germany’s role in the history of the European continent always provokes the study of the
roots of its development. Its past, becoming out of hundreds of independent states, it’s late unification
under Prussian rule, the ubiquitous heritage of its totalitarian regimes, all these events are already enough
motivation to carefully examine its past. Germany is by some both viewed as a dividing force, for many
aspects held responsible for other European states’ inability to take reasonable steps to solve the recent
economic crisis. To some, Germany is a unifying element on the continent, and an element of stability, and
a driver of European integration. To others, it is a stronghold of democracy against the New Populism
spreading in other parts of Europe and the world.
Recent developments in the theoretical study of economic collaboration, the theory of incomplete contracts,
and the study of the role of geography and transport for the modern economy, can not only be confronted
with empirical tests but also conceptually extended in the context of German history.
It is the privilege of economic history, the ‘big picture’ discipline translating between other fields of
economics, to connect between theory on the individual collaborating under asymmetric information,
economic geography, the development of the state, and the emergence of today’s pattern of international
trade.
Therefore, this dissertation contains three essays that study the development of the state in and around
modern Germany. Arranged in order of historical chronology, the they thrive to connect all the above
questions, to better understand the origins of states in general and the German state in particular.
The first essay “Lord of the Lemons: Origins and Dynamics of State Capacity” (page ) is joint work with
Fabian Wahl of University of Hohenheim and aims to explain the roots of state development in the Holy
Roman Empire 1250–1789. It employs a micro-economic model of incomplete contracts to understand how
small spatial variation in in the quality of geography, more concretely the soil, allowed some states to tax
agricultural output efficiently, and therefore thrive in competition with other states. This paper introduces
the idea of institutional competition to the theory of transparency, or observability, of agricultural output. It
proposes a new geographical index to test this idea empirically, and includes a new data set on the states in
the Holy Roman Empire. The model is tested using various measurements of state capacity.
To further provide evidence for the role of geography for efficient taxation, the second essay “The State
Built on Sandy Grounds: How Geography formed Brandenburg-Prussia” (page ) studies only one coun-
try in the Holy Roman Empire at the historical turning point at which it develops its efficient state, just
after the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). In its attempt to link historical literature on Brandenburg-Prussia
and incomplete contract theory, it analyzes the chronology of administrative reforms undertaken by the
Hohenzollern rulers to efficiently tax its provinces outside of Brandenburg, overcoming the resistance of
local elites. The paper argues that these administrative reforms were made possible by an advantageous
geography of the Brandenburg soil. During the second half of the 17th century, the Hohenzollern adminis-
tration learned how to export this advantage to its other regions, most importantly to its territories in the
West of today’s Germany.
The combination of the Brandenburg-Prussian’s ability to integrate their territories at the Rhine and
historic circumstances allowed them to lead the economic integration of Germany, via the first customs
union in history, the German Zollverein. To make this point, the third essay “How Britain Unified
Germany: Endogenous Geography and the Formation of a Customs Union” (page ), which is joint with
Nikolaus Wolf, offers a theory on the role of geography for the foundation of a customs union. This
theory assumes that state rulers, at the foundation period after the Congress of Vienna, were revenue
(not welfare) maximizing, and were dependent on transit tariffs for their state households. State rulers
take into consideration their relative geographic size and position and compare it to the relative size and
position of a customs union they could potentially join. As such, this paper introduces the problem of
multiple marginalization into the literature on customs unions, and understands state collaboration as
a mechanism to collect tariff revenue more efficiently. This model is then calibrated and tested using a
simulation approach. This tests whether the sequence in which key states joined the customs union can be
explained by revenue maximization. A counterfactual reveals that Prussia’s control over the Rhine was
a sine qua non condition for the formation of the German Zollverein under Berlin’s rule, the economic
predecessor of the German political unification.
Berlin, in December 2017
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Abstract
To better understand the role of taxation in the emergence of states, this article presents an incomplete
contract model of an agricultural society in which information asymmetries cause inefficient taxation, and
hence outmigration, uprisings, and rent-seeking, but also urbanization. We propose a geographic index of
information costs, observability, to test our model. Our case study is the Holy Roman Empire, which had
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across hundreds of observed states, for over 500 years. We find a robust link between observability and
states’ tax capacity, their size, and their survival.
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Origins of State Capacity
What creates a successful state? Current economic debate has stressed the role of efficient taxation
and administration.1 Despite disagreements about the role of the state for economic development,
there is consensus that some level of state capacity is essential to ensure basic public good provision
(Acemoglu, 2005). There is debate about what allowed some states to establish this capacity while
others failed. Long-run studies point at the the self-reinforcing nature of state capacity2, and have
identified important structural changes around and after 1500, from the ‘military revolution’ to the
Industrial Revolution until the emergence of the welfare state3, all of which radically changed the
rules of development. When searching for the optimal point in history to study the development
of state finances, one has to study the period from just before until just after these structural
changes, in order to avoid going back too far in time.4 In this paper, we will trace hundreds
of uniquely homogeneous states that were arranged in a federation, the Holy Roman Empire
(HRE), through these radical changes, 1250–1789. We find evidence for a mechanism that links
observability of (taxable) agricultural output to state capacity. This mechanism explains differences
in state development during the medieval period, but not afterwards.
Our argument is based on the idea that states emerged when there was agricultural output that
needed to be protected (see Bates et al. (2002); North et al. (2009) and more recently Dal Bó
et al. (2015); Boix (2015); Mayshar et al. (2015)). Some believe states emerged from tribal societies
realizing that security could be provided more efficiently in a central way (Bean, 1973). Tribal
societies therefore set-up a voluntary ’social contract’ (Rousseau, Hobbes) between the group
and a ’violence specialist’ (North et al., 2009, p. 20) who was granted the ’monopoly of violence’
1For modern examples and literature review, see Olsson and Hansson (2011). For historical overviews, see Dincecco
and Prado (2012); Johnson and Koyama (2017) and (Dincecco, 2015).
2Examples include Allen (2009); Findlay and O’Rourke (2009); Mokyr (2011); Dincecco (2015); Karaman and Pamuk
(2013); Ang (2015)
3These revolutions include the military revolution (Tilly, 1993; Diamond, 1999; Simms, 2013; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015;
Boix, 2015), urban revolution (Allen, 2009; Bosker et al., 2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; Boix,
2015; Abramson, 2017), the discovery of the Americas (Hoffman, 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2011; Simms, 2013; Hoffman, 2015),
the printing press (Rubin, 2014; Dittmar and Seabold, 2015), the Reformation (Cantoni, 2012; Cantoni et al., 2016; Dittmar
and Meisenzahl, 2017), the Enlightment (Mokyr, 2011), the Financial Revolution (Neal, 2015), the French Revolution and
its consequences (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Boix, 2015), nationalism (Anderson, 1983), and the expansion of public good
provision in general (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bolton and Roland, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Goldin and Katz, 2009).
4The few studies concerned with the determinants of state capacity prior to 1500 AD are primarily those examining,
in the spirit of Diamond (1999) the impact of the different timing of the Neolithic revolution across the world on the
development of statehood (Borcan et al., 2016; Ang, 2015) or those focusing on differences in transparency of agricultural
output and the role of environmental circumscription in ancient states (Mayshar et al., 2017; Schönholzer, 2017). Fenske
(2014) analyses the role of different gains from trade due to differences in ecological diversity for state capacity in
pre-colonial Africa. Exceptions to this are Abramson (2017) and Ko et al. (2016). These papers analyze the determinants of
political centralization and state formation for very early periods or over a very long time (e.g. from the Middle Ages until
today) and, in this, are closely related to our paper in this.
2
Origins of State Capacity
(Weber, 1919). Others do not believe in a voluntary contract, but in states emerging from coercion
by a ’stationary bandit’ (Olson, 1993) stealing from his subjects.5
What both sides agree on is that this ’contract’, either voluntary or involuntary, exchanges violence
(protective or coercive) in return for taxation. Many authors have therefore stressed the role of the
former and view military technology as decisive for state development (see Tilly, 1993; Diamond,
1999; North et al., 2009; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Boix, 2015; Ko et al., 2016). Museums and
arsenals of historic tools, weaponry, and war records from most of human history have guided the
understanding of the role of the horse, the chariot, the canon, or general conscription for political
order. The other side of the contract, efficient taxation, is less prominent, but understanding it
is decisive for modern development economists. At its core aspect is the quality of information
about taxable output. The weaker the information, the more our bandit would find himself
between Scylla and Charybdis. Demanding an excess of taxes, he bites the hand that feeds
him. Demanding too little, less modest rivaling bandits will take his place. Free-riding and
false accusation of free-riding also threatens also the consent of those governed by a voluntary
contract. Both the voluntary and the involuntary contract suffer from the problem of asymmetric
information between the source of the taxes and the provider of ’security’. From the perspective
of a peasant who is overtaxed due to false information, the distinction between these two origins
of a state is, therefore, of purely theoretical nature.
In addition, overtaxation will lead rational agents to hide some parts of the harvest (and spend
effort trying to avoid being caught), just to prevent starvation. States can try to reduce information
asymmetries by creating a political order, a hierarchy, to collect data on agricultural output. This
introduces multiple principal-agent problems and the problem of rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974;
Olson, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, imperfect information about taxable
agricultural output translates to high information costs, undermines political institutions, may
lead to conflict within a state, reduces state capacity, and in the end limits the states development
in general—and precisely because of the information asymmetry, this is true even with the most
benevolent ruler. Unlike winners of wars, rent-seeking tax collectors, lords, and officials did not
5This view of an involuntary agreement is shared by figures as prominent as Marx and Engels, but also Tilly (1985).
See Fukuyama (2011, Ch. 21) for an overview. An addition to this argument is the circumscription theory by Carneiro
(1970). Carneiro noted that early states emerged predominantly in areas surrounded by infertile areas (such as deserts),
and assumed this provided a natural barrier against fleeing from violent rulers.
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boast about their successes. Their relics seldom survived in a form to anything that could be
excavated today and analyzed in a structured fashion today. However, state capacity in an early
agricultural society has to be viewed as an equilibrium solution between military technology and
taxation.
To formalize this argument, we develop a macroeconomic model that links state capacity to
geographic circumstances, namely a combination of the quality, and observability of agricultural
output. This model is inspired by the study of Mayshar et al. (2017), who develop a principal–agent
model of an agricultural state, in which state rulers maximize state revenue under information
asymmetry about agricultural output, which is geographically determined. If output is perfectly
predictable, rulers can extract full effort from their subjects. In a state with a high spatial variation
of soil quality, for example, the actual quality of a single plot is hard to observe, meaning the ruler
will have to estimate the endowment. The lower the observability of soil quality, the lower the
state capacity. The more heterogeneous, and thus less observable the productive potential of each
plot, the higher the costs of observation.6
Our theoretical model extends the work of Mayshar et al. (2017) several respects. Their model
is not empirically testable as they only distinguish between two types of soils, those with low
and those with high observability and provide only two case studies from ancient times. We
generalize their micro-level principal-agent model to a macro-level two-sector output model with
a continuous observability measure. We also extend their model to explain the failure and survival
of feudal states and the changing importance of agricultural and economic determinants of state
capacity over time. Urbanization is now modeled as part of rulers’ optimization problem.
To test our theoretical propositions empirically, we compute a variable that proxies the observability
of agricultural output (and thus the information costs in an agricultural society). This measure
is based on spatial variation of the crop suitability within a region. Output is measured using
the average caloric yield that can be obtained from harvesting crops. We base our measure of
observability on the caloric suitability index developed by Galor and Özak (2014, 2015). This index
denotes the amount of calories that can be produced in a given area, averaging over the individual
6Our reasoning is also based on the fact that medieval rulers, for example Charlemagne, were not only interested
in increasing agricultural output, but also in increasing its observability, uniformity and comparability (Henning, 1994;
Hermann, 1985)
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caloric yields obtained from planting all suitable crops. This index covers the periods before and
after the Columbian exchange. Based on this index we calculate our observability measure as
a ruggedness index of caloric yields, i.e. we measure the variation in agricultural output as the
variance between the caloric suitability of each cell and that of its neighboring fields. Thus, we
capture to what extent the agricultural output of a grid cell diverges from perfect observability
(all cells within a grid have the same caloric yield).
We link this observability measure to the states in the HRE at six points in time (1250, 1378,
1556, 1648 and 1789), which are all decisive moments in Central European history (see p. of the
Appendix). This allows us to abstract from the role of military technology, as this is common
across our sample and has been studied extensively. We obtain information and states and their
size by digitizing historical maps of the HRE (without the Italian parts) by Wolff (1877). After
digitizing these maps, we validated and, if necessary, corrected them using literature on the history
of territorial states in the HRE, such as Köbler (1988) and Sante (1964). We also collected reasons
for the failure of states.
Using this unbalanced, state-level panel data set, we first show a robust and both economically
and statistically significant positive relationship between observability of agricultural output and
taxation. We proxy the taxation by the tributes towards the Empire, the ’Reichsmatrikel’. We then
investigate how differences in observability are related to the failure or survival of agricultural
states. The results suggest that states with low observability are more likely to disappear because
of bankruptcy or war and that observability is positively linked to the probability of state surviving
in the Middle Ages. In the following, we find observability being positively related to state size
when pooling over all states and periods. The relationship also holds when estimating separate
cross sections for each of the six years and when considering the characteristics of neighboring
states. It is also robust to controls for many alternative determinants of state capacity, such as
access to trade routes and rivers; the availability of important natural resources such as iron, gold
or salt; trade fairs; imperial cities; terrain features such as ruggedness and elevation, temperature,
suitability for ploughing; the type of the state (i.e. kingdom, duchy, princedom, county, city etc.);
the number of battles per state area; and the effect of differences in the appropriability of crops.
Results pass various tests of robustness. We use the settled area of a state as dependent variable
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(the area that is not forested or marshland or the like). We take levels of agricultural observability
and state area instead of natural logarithms. We employ an alternative version of the agricultural
observability index (based on the assumption that only the crop with the highest caloric yield is
planted), and another version of the index. The cross-sectional estimates, and alternative OLS
regressions in which the agricultural observability index is interacted with period dummies, are
in line with our theoretical reasoning and historical evidence. Agricultural observability looses
its significance as a determinant of state capacity in the early modern period, more specifically
in the 16th century. As outlined earlier, this is the timing we would expect. In this point in time,
structural changes made the scale effect the dominant factors in predicting state capacity.
Below we provide an overview of relevant historical features, such as the political and societal
structure of the HRE. We continue by developing the theoretical model that connects the principal-
agent problem to state capacity and size. We introduce the data and outline our empirical strategy
to test the theoretical model. This includes a discussion of alternative influences on pre-modern
state capacity, and also how we address them. We will discuss the empirical results, and then
conclude.
I. State Size in an Agricultural Society
We define a state as a geographical unit that competes with fellow states over both territory and
labor supply to generate taxes. We are therefore interested in the tax capacity of such a state, and
its influence on geographic size and survival. Our model state is predominantly agricultural, as
this was by far the leading occupation throughout human history (see Allen, 2000, for estimates).
We assume that land rents are Ricardian, and that a state’s tax revenue is a function of the available
land area and labor force. The general idea that the geographic size of a state is at equilibrium
between increasing returns to scale in providing public goods and increasing obstacles to this
provision 7 is well established (see Spolaore, 2014, for a recent overview). Consider Figure 1.
Following Bean (1973), we view defense of the territory as the predominant public good, which is
provided at decreasing costs per unit of land. During the High Middle Ages changes in technology
7Both Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) view heterogeneous preferences as the obstacle for
modern states
6
Origins of State Capacity
amplified these decreasing returns to scale, in the ’Military Revolution’ (Tilly, 1993; Gennaioli and








Figure 1: Stylized equlibrium area (A∗) of a state
in equilibrium between decreasing marginal costs of
warfare, MW, and increasing, geographically induced
and non-linear marginal cost of taxation MT, before
and after the military revolution that shifts military
costs to MW ′ starting around 1500
Already Adam Smith was concerned with
obstacles to state size and capacity, and pro-
posed a mix between geographic variables
and administrative constraints
”In countries, such as Italy and Switzerland, in
which, on account either of their distance from
the principal seat of government, of the natural
strength of the country itself, or of some other
reason, the sovereign came to lose the whole of
his authority. [...] This is the short history of the
republic of Berne as well as of several other cities
in Switzerland. If you except Venice, for of that
city the history is somewhat different, it is the
history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number arose and perished between the
end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.”8
Concerning distance, Olsson and Hansson (2011) have recently shown that across modern countries
there is a robust negative relationship between country size and rule of law.9 In theory, there
can be three reasons for their finding. First, the complexity of the process upon which that
information is collected (unrelated to distance). Second, the transfer of the information through
the organizational structure of the state (weakly related to distance, depending on circumstances).
Third, the loss of information due to the physical transport of the information, which we positively
rule out for modern times given communication technology.
Regarding the first, more complex processes are harder to understand. Mayshar et al. (2017) show
this with Egyptian agriculture, a fairly simple process. The Nile carried with it fertile soil and
8Wealth of Nations, book III, ch. 3. Quoted edition Smith (1991)
9They also provide an overview of the history of this thought including prominent figures like Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau,
and Montesquieu.
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distributed it evenly across its banks. This means that a primitive tool, the Nilometer10 was a
reasonable indicator for harvest outcomes, in the form of a univariate relationship. By contrast,
agricultural output in Mesopotamia depends on multiple variables, as irrigation was more complex.
The process of agriculture in Western and Central Europe was even more complex, and not well
understood in the Middle Ages. There are some homogeneous landscapes, where properties of
the soil are very uniform, the terrain is even, the wind blows all seeds in the same direction, etc.,
and other landscapes, where none of this is true. Taxation of output from these landscapes will
naturally be based on estimates, and these can vary in their quality. Lacking an objective tool (like
the Nilometer), these estimates relied on self-reporting (van Schaı̈k, 1993; Vogeler, 2005). We will
outline how different levels of variation, which are geographically determined, yield different
qualities of information, and induce information costs.
Information about agricultural output is necessary for taxing an agricultural society. Meteorology,
the science of measuring and predicting weather and climate, was rediscovered during the
Renaissance. Behringer (1999) goes as far as viewing the emergence of meterology to predict
agricultural output as a counter-reaction to witch-hunting—the prevailing practice for overcoming
harvest failures during 1300–1600. We can assume that the state of meteorology was so weak, and
that investment into the understanding of factors that determine the harvest was so costly, that tax
collection depended on adaptive expectations, and also local gentry and officials who were familiar
with subjects and landscape. This explains hierarchies, such as the Chinese bureaucracy, the
Mamluks in the Middle East, and also the feudal system in Western and Central Europe.11
Relying on local knowledge has downsides. In any such hierarchy there is loss of information,
even if the incentives of all participants are aligned. In an analogy to the telephone game, there
would be some loss of information, but driven more by the number of hierarchy levels than
distance.12 The levels of hierarchy in the HRE were however not dependent of its size, but mostly
10A Nilometer is essentially a set of marks to measure the water level (see Mayshar et al., 2017).
11It is important to note that the feudal system was not built from scratch, but relied on existing tribal hierarchies. The
alternative, demonstrated by China, reveals however that these structures could be eroded, if the central power is strong
enough. This in turn allows us to measure information costs half a millennium ago, unlike in other areas of the world.
One can assume that asymmetric information in a bureaucracy would translate to e.g. corruption, which is hard to observe
in a historical context. (see also Mitterauer, 2004; Fukuyama, 2011).
12Consider playing the telephone game. The quality of information is reduced slowly but continuously over time (as
people forget) which would be analogous to the distance in our context. Much faster, and the core of the game, is the
sharp drop in information quality between two players when one player has to listen and repeat the information.
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due to tradition. This could lead us to reject incentive-aligned tax officials if we observe variation
in state capacity despite the same number of levels in the hierarchy. At any level in the hierarchy
there is a principal-agent problem, and these problems combined limited the expansion of the
state.13 In the next section, we will trace these problems through the hierarchy of the HRE and
show how we can measure them in aggregate.
II. Taxation in the Medieval Holy Roman Empire
We follow the literature in regarding the medieval Roman Empire as a chain of bilateral contracts
(North and Thomas, 1971; Volckart, 2002), through which security is provided from the top down
in exchange for goods and services (see Bean, 1973; North et al., 2009; Olson, 1993). In Figure 2,
we see the ends of the chain of bilateral contracts held by the Emperor and the households. Our
element of interest, the territorial states, contracts directly with the Emperor, but only connects to
households through intermediaries. We will outline how the rents that gentry and officials gain
from inter-mediating between state and household are a loss to the rulers, and how rents arise
endogenously from the multi-layer principal-agent problem.
1. Households and the Gentry
The lower end, and the smallest political unit of the HRE was the household (see (Wilson, 2016, p.
508) and (Volckart, 2002, p. 33)). Volckart (2002) distinguishes between three types of contracts
that exchange either services or agricultural goods between the household and the low gentry
and officials. The most prominent of these was the feudal contract, in which a lord (lat. vilicus)
provides security in exchange for agricultural output and compulsory labor for the feudal lord
(corvee). The households had the right to decide the use of the land and the yields of the land
(“usus et usus fructus” (Volckart, 2002, p. 40)), but would never gain property over it. This system,
developed by the Carolingians, had its origins in the Late Roman Empire, when formerly free
peasants were obliged to fill military granaries, and diffused eastwards into the Germanic areas
13The idea of non-aligned incentives in a company-like state, which is true both for a feudal society and a command
economy, is taken from Harrison (2002).
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(Mitterauer, 2004, p. 42ff.). The lord maintains certain rights of deposition over the feudal state,

















Note: This graph shows how agricultural
output and security are exchanged via a
chain of bilateral contracts between the
household on the one side and the
emperor on the other side. The box
’Gentry and officials’ represents multiple
layers of bilateral contracts exchanging
tributes & war services against the
promise of security
Figure 2: Model of the politi-
cal structure of the Holy Roman
Empire
Neither secular nor ecclesiastical states based their taxation upon
tradition, but were flexible about the form and quantity of taxa-
tion. North and Thomas (1971) have argued that whether a lord
would demand goods or services was a question of transaction
costs, and depended on the lord’s ability to market each of the
products. We employ this idea in our model, since we identify
all forms of taxation with their labor input. Inefficiency in ac-
quiring information about the harvest posed a substantial risk
to the lord. Tradition and written contracts certainly did not
impose an upper bound for taxation, especially due to a very
flexible and hence dynamic element: free provision of peasants’
labor services. Labor services were not well codified (Volckart,
2002, p. 9), and allowed rulers to flexibly adjust the quantity of
such services to circumstances. For example, a 1222 source from
the Eiffel provides instructions on how to persuade peasants to
take over new duties, selling them as old traditions (Epperlein,
2003, p. 76).14
One of the most important threats to tax capacity was outmi-
gration. Depending on the demographic circumstances, but
especially following the Black Death, outmigration to another
feudal state or a Free or Imperial city made states compete for peasants (Volckart, 1997, 2002), and
one element of this competition was costs created by incomplete information.15 Rulers’ ability to
14Large and extensive corvees were not unusual (see e.g., the discussion in Blickle (2006) on the particularly repressive
feudal system in the Baltic Sea area).
15The migration from rural areas to cities is considered among German historians to be an important aspect in the
demise of the feudal system. They provide a several detailed accounts about conflicts between rulers and city states about
fleeing serfs. One of the most conflicted topics between territorial states and cities states was the so-called urban dwellers
(“Pfahlbürger”): people who lived outside the area of the city in villages but were citizens of the city—and hence not part
of the feudal system. Emperors forbade this type of citizenship several times during the 14th century but did not succeed
in preventing it (Blickle, 1988). However, as emphasized by (Ogilvie, 2007, 2011) urban labor markets in pre modern times
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restrict this migration depended on features such as state capacity and the size of its territory—as
it was easier to escape undetected from a small state than a large one (Blickle, 2006; Gerteis, 1997).
Thus, some rulers were more successful in preventing emigration than others.16
Another threat arising from information asymmetries and information costs was revolt. Peasant
revolts were common in the HRE throughout the Middle Ages and increased in frequency and
intensity in the early 16th century, culminating in the German Peasants’ War in 1525.17 Although
their overall success (especially in the Peasants’ War) was limited, there are numerous examples of
peasant revolts against (perceived) overtaxation, restriction of free movement and inheritance rules
that resulted in a compromise between the ruler and the peasants. These gradually improved the
situation of the peasants and weakened the feudal system in the long-term.18
Incomplete information about agricultural output also explains a common phenomenon during
the Middle Ages, tax avoidance. The Sachsenspiegel (around 1230)19, a rich historical source of
medieval life in Saxony, allows us to understand how peasants attempted to cheat their rulers. It
explicitly states that the quality of the tithe (an in kind payment to the local church officials of
ten percent of the agricultural harvest of the season) has to be exactly the same as the share the
peasant keeps (2nd book, Art. 48 §6). Rulers had to be informed about the estimated quantity of the
harvest in advance, otherwise they could make their own estimate of their subjects’ dues.
2. Gentry and Nobility
The intermediate level of the feudal societal order was the gentry, i.e. lower-ranked nobles like
knights, officials (“Ministerialen”) of the noble state ruler (like reeves) and also those counts and
barons who ruled over a feudal estate that was not “reichsunmittelbar” (directly subordinate to the
were highly regulated by guilds, and they often successfully limited immigration to cities. Thus, migration to a city state
might not have been possible for everyone or at all times.
16In the south west of the HRE, rulers found arrangements to deal with it, either by demanding several types of fees and
compensation payments for permission to emigrate or by bilateral agreements with neighboring rulers that for each serf
migrating to the territory of the neighbor they get one of the neighbor’s serfs (Blickle, 2006). In the north, by contrast, they
took measures to further punish migrants in order to restrict emigration, e.g. they made agreements with other rulers to
send back strangers from other states who didn’t have a an official dismissal allowance from their former ruler–but with
apparently limited success (Blickle, 2006; Peters, 1995).
17The reader is referred to Blickle (2006) and Buszello et al. (1984) for detailed accounts of the Peasants’ War.
18An overview of the history of German peasant revolts and uprisings in general, including several case studies is given
by Blickle (1988, 2006) and Franz (1976).
19Cited after Epperlein (2003).
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Emperor) but was given to them by a duke or prince. Those medium ranked nobles (the gentry)
usually administered their territory under a higher-ranked noble. For example, counts originally
served as vassals of dukes with responsibility for a particular county of the duchy. As such, they
were responsible for the collection of dues and taxes in their feudal estate. These intermediaries
could engage in rent-seeking (North and Thomas, 1971; North et al., 2009), keeping a certain
amount for their own purposes and passing the rest to the overlord. They had to provide soldiers
for the wars of the overlord in return for his protection. Hence, the principal-agent problem
between them and the households discussed above, was relevant to the relationship between
the overlords and the gentry. If the gentry could not appropriate enough taxes from the serfs
(or overtaxed the households) the amount that the overlord received from the gentry was also
reduced. Furthermore, as the local gentry had better information about the agricultural than the
overlord, there is an additional principle-agent problem between gentry and nobility. The first has
an incentive to cheat the nobility in order to retain a higher share of output for themselves. Of
course, the incentive to conceal tax revenues increases as agricultural output, and the amount that
is available for appropriation, decreases. This increases the severity of the principal-agent problem
between the nobility and the gentry.
Territorial states saw these intermediaries as necessary to collect taxes, but also as a cost factor,
aware that information asymmetries led to rent-seeking. As Bloch (1966, p. 134) wrote, the
emergence of absolutism was “to protect rural communities, ripe material for taxation, from
intemperate exploitation by their landlord”.
3. Emperor and Nobility
At the top of the feudal order was the Emperor of the HRE, who was usually also the king of
Germany. He was the supreme overlord and granted feudal estates to his vassals, the “Fürstliche
Häuser” (princely houses). This originally meant dukes, princes, bishops and archbishops. They
also had the right to ’subcontract’ parts of their estates to lower-ranked nobles for administration
(subinfeudation).20 The Emperor also granted city rights (making cities directly subordinate
20The fact that the vassals had the right to give away parts of their estates to lower-ranked nobles also led to a decrease
in the power of the Emperor over time. This was because, within the feudal hierarchy, a noble was subordinate only to his
immediate overlord and not to those at higher ranks.
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to the Emperor), and had the right to reallocate estates from disloyal or deceased vassals. In
exchange for the feudal estate and troops for war and dues from the nobles (the ’Reichsmatrikel’)
he guaranteed security of their rights over the estate. The Emperor also had territories that he
ruled directly. In those territories, the Emperor usually installed officials like reeves to collect
taxes, administer the law and uphold order. Here again, the relationship between nobility and
Emperor was characterized by a principal-agent problem, and again, the initial information
problem between gentry and serfs determined the amount of dues, taxes and troops the Emperor
could extract from the nobility. Most of the time the nobility had a better bargaining position
than the Emperor as, especially during the Middle Ages, the Emperors did not directly control a
large area. Furthermore, the German king was traditionally elected by the leading princes (the
electors). Hence, he depended on the loyalty and favor of the most powerful territorial rulers. This
allocation of power between the princes and the Emperor lead to a decline in his power during
the medieval period and a decentralized, highly fragmented political landscape.21
III. Model
The purpose of the model is to connect information costs in a completely coercive society to tax
capacity, as in Mayshar et al. (2017), and from there to connect the geographical size of rural states
and migration to cities. We will employ a two-sector model of agriculture and proto-industry.
To be consistent with the historical setting we will not allow for non-coercive institutions (see
Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2011; Boix, 2015), and only a negligible share of agricultural output is
traded via markets (Ogilvie, 2001). We will outline a static analysis before turning to the system
dynamics.
The optimization problem of our states is very complex, so that we constrain ourselves to the most
simple notation, standard letters, omit explicit functional form, and explain our concepts mostly by
comparative statics.22 In general, states maximize tax revenue over an infinite time horizon. They
21The Golden Bull of 1356, the so-called constitution of the HRE, officially settled the election procedure of the king by
the electoral college and confirmed the rights and privileges of the electors. This made those seven (and later up to nine)
electors the most powerful rulers of the Empire.
22Consider any function f (x) that is differentiable twice. We will use a shortcut to ease notation using f (x ↑) if ∂ f∂x > 0
and f (x ↓) if ∂ f∂x < 0.
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aim to extract all of their subjects’ output above subsistence.23 They can do so by allowing their
subjects to move to cities, adjusting their urbanization rate u ∈ (0, 1). States can also conquer other
states’ territories, which will affect their geographic size a, their average Ricardian land rent r, and
the observability of their agricultural output N. Attacking other territories and defending against
attacks come with adjustable costs V. States can also allocate parts of their budget to maintaining
interior order G. These costs include tax administration, but also collecting information on tax
cheaters, quelling uprisings, preventing subjects from fleeing the state or moving around the
state against the state’s interest, acquiring subjects from over states, and rudimentary poor relief.
Decisions of state budgets and strategy are taken discretely for any year t. States have a common











which are described in more detail now.
1. General Model of the Economy
We will drop state and period subscripts for ease of notation, wherever possible. Consider any
state that produces agricultural output R and output from proto-industry P, so that Y = YP + YR.
The state is endowed with common labor L, which is split between rural LR and urban LP
labor stock, depending on the urbanization rate u, LP = uL and LR = (1 − u)L. Agricultural
output depends on common technology AR, factor inputs LR and soil S, which can be substituted
at elasticity α, so that YR = ARLR
αS(1−α). Output of the proto-industry depends on common
technology AP and manual work LP at diminishing returns β < 1, so that YP = APLP
β. There
is a common information technology AT ∈ (0, 1) to collect taxes and assess agricultural output.
States collect these taxes in the form of goods, or via direct labor services (North and Thomas,
1971; Volckart, 2002; Mitterauer, 2004). Subsistence in cities is higher than in the countryside as
cities do not produce food and transport is costly, sP > sR. Therefore, tax income T is a function
23The idea that the taxes were so high that peasants were kept at subsistence can be found both in Smith (1776) and
Malthus (1798), and is also a feature of Mayshar et al. (2017).
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of TP(AT ↑, YP ↑, sP ↓). Subjects naturally prefer to live in cities (which we will show later).
We can therefore solve for the urbanization rate that maximizes tariff revenue, which is found
where the additional tax from a urban labor supply is offset by the loss from its higher costs of
subsistence and the loss to the rural labor supply, u( ∂YP
∂LR ↑,
∂YR
∂LP ↓, (sP − sR) ↓). States face costs
V > 0 to protect their borders using common military technology AV .24 These costs increase
with geographic size a, but have decreasing marginal costs per area (Bean, 1973). The investment
in one period has consequences for the following periods. Castles need to be maintained, and
unemployed soldiers would find employment as rowing bandits, so that Vt(AV ↓, a ↑, Vt−1) with
∂2V
∂2a < 0 and
∂Vt
∂V(t−1)
≥ 0. This explains that there will be some states which will maximize tax
revenue by minimizing the costs of defense, e.g. by building a wall around the city itself, setting
u = 1 and not having any endowment of soil S. These are city states.
2. The Problem of Agricultural Taxation
States having u < 1 use soil as an input factor. Following Mayshar et al. (2017), states have
incomplete information about soil quality and depend on estimates of agricultural output. There-
fore, the state will organize tax collection in its territory by building a hierarchy. This hierarchy
features distinct groups of households, which are groups of individuals. Rural households are
only connected to the state only via a set of individuals, the intermediaries. Any rural household
h is part of a set of households H that owes taxes to the tax official, or lord, g1 at the lowest level
of intermediaries l1, which contracts the land from. In this way, various layers on other layers
l2, .. various intermediaries g2, .. are interposed between the state and all its rural households H,
h ∈ Hl1g1 ⊂ Hl2g2 ... ⊂ H. Using adaptive expectations about the quality of the soil, the lords or
officials parcel this land and assign it to rural households. They can assess average Ricardian land
rent r. However, the complexity of the interaction between weather and terrain affects fields in any






Households naturally learn about their current soil endowment as they harvest. Anyone else
24This argument is in line with coercion, or violence as the source of states, as in Olson (1993). Tilly (1993), North et al.
(2009), Gennaioli and Voth (2015) and Boix (2015) have based their arguments about the dynamics of state building on this
aspect.
25Imagine two farms, one on the hill, and one in the valley, and strong rain for days. The hill farmer will find it sufficient
to dig some temporary channels to help the excess water find its way downhill; the valley farmer will find his crops
flooded.
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has to rely on incomplete information about the soil quality26. Using adaptive expectations, the
most local intermediary will allocate a plot of land to a household that maximizes tax revenue,
depending on the average rent and the subsistence level, ah(rh ↓, sR ↑) as it cannot be optimal to
keep the households below subsistence. This will not assure that households never starve, as the
effects of the weather upon a specific plot are unobserved to anybody but the household, which is
not trusted to share the information. Generalizing this point, due to the principal-agent problem
on each layer, all layers from the lowest gentry l1 up to state level n depend on own estimates.
We assume that any level’s signal about soil quality S∗ is normally distributed around the actual
endowment of rural household h with soil S in period t. The shape parameter N represents noise
(a decrease in the quality) of the signal. From standard reasoning about information asymmetries
back to Akerlof (1970) it follows that the signal gets weaker the further up the hierarchy, so that






while ∀k={1,...,(n−1)} : N
l(k+1)
h ≥ Nlkh . Any level k
will however use this signal as the basis for taxation of household h and wish to leave all levels
below it with subsistence only, TRlkht (Y
∗lk
ht ↑, sR ↓).
What are the consequences of underestimating the soil endowment? Since S∗ht < Sht it follows
that some of the agricultural output cannot be taxed away. If the signal of the lowest level
of intermediaries underestimates the soil endowment, this yields a potential rent y for the
households, yl1ht(S
∗l1







) ≥ 0. This potential rent will be realized by rational
agents depending on the probability of being caught cheating and the punishment (following
the logic of Becker, 1968). Prosecution of households often ended with subjects being injured
and dying, such that prosecution could reduce the supply of labor in the next period. If chances
of being caught are high rural households will reduce their effort during the harvest, leading
to a reduction in L. Lords also had the right to punish ’insubordination, persistent laziness,
26We can neglect Bayesian updating, mostly due to limitations on the tax collector’s learning behavior. How do
states learn about their subjects’ soil quality in any period? A scientific model of the link between weather, landscape
characteristics, and meteorology, was not available. States cannot learn from their subjects’ words, but they can learn
from what they observe, in the form of operant conditioning and social cognitive learning. If tax collectors observe an
unexpected increase in some households’ livestock, physical appearance, and living conditions in general, and increase the
tax, this learning is part of natural human behavior, and therefore common technology. Learning from peers, e.g. if some
intermediary finds out that another intermediary on the same level is richer than he is, the first intermediary might try to
discover the reason. This might help to identify the households that cheat him based on shared characteristics with the
households that his richer peer taxes more efficiently. He will do what his neighbor does, e.g. provide his tax collectors
with better tools to assess, infiltrate his subjects with spies, etc. Soon, all intermediaries on this level will discover the trick,
and the technology will become common. Tax collectors could try to learn by trial and error to retrieve a model on the
effects of weather and taxation on what they can observe. As this is connected to starvation, out-migration, and uprising,
these experiments would be very costly.
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or deliberate neglect of their duties’ (Whaley, 2012, p. 251), so that this labor reduction was
also risky. In any layer, intermediaries therefore have the incentive to keep their agents from
realizing rents, and hold on to them themselves. In the long run, it has different effects on
the society who is the one extracting rents, but for the tax capacity of the state, it has only
negative ones.27. The same principal-agent problem is repeated up to the level of the state n,
which has the lowest quality of information
[
Iht
∣∣ S∗lnht < Sht] = (yl1ht + ∑(n−1)k=1 ylkht(S∗l(k+1)ht − S∗lth )).
Knowing that on average any second period yields rents, long run rents in any state r relate to the
information asymmetries of all rural households in H = {h, h2, ...} on all layers l1, ..l2, .., n, yielding
limt∗→∞ ∑t
∗
t=0 Irt ∼ {Nl1h , Nl2h , .., Nnh , Nl1h2 , N
l2
h2
, .., Nnh2 , ...}. We can conclude that underestimation of
harvests limits the tax capacity of a state by reducing taxes that could be gained from the potential
output of household h in period t under perfect information YR by the rents I
[
Tht
∣∣ S∗lnht < Sht] =
T
(
AT , YRt, st
)
− Iht.
Now turn to the case of an overestimation of soil quality, which at any point in time t can leave
any other element of the chain with agricultural output below subsistence after tax collection. In
the end, this was mostly true for the households. First, assume that households did not want
or could not leave the state—as we will focus on emigration later—so they decided to pay the
taxes. One option would have been working on the side to get the taxes from other sources. This
was dangerous, as it was highly illegal. Lords often sold households’ extra labor supply to urban
traders in form of monopsonies (Ogilvie, 2001). This included many forms of agricultural goods,
and also intermediaries, such as yarn. To uphold Lords’ income from these contracts with traders,
the informal labor market was illegal. The illegal labor market can be characterized as an exchange
of jobs undertaken by desperate households that often came with a health hazard plus a high risk
of capital punishment in case of being caught. Second, households could also resort to violence,
e.g. looting granaries. Third, households could starve. All three options had negative effects
on households’ ability to provide labor, which we will circumscribe with Q. Households could
try to move to a city, or another state. Given that cities also allow their citizens to subsist, due
to complete information on output, subjects living in a city cannot be overtaxed. If we imagine
27Arguing with Malthus, rents sought by households can lead to a higher population, until the returns to the factor
of labor diminish, and emphasize the effect of bad harvests (see also Mayshar et al., 2017, 2015; Voigtländer and Voth,
2013). In case gentry and nobility realize the rents, this can undermine the political stability of the state, and also lead to a
decrease in households’ fertility due to rising prices for staple food following Engel’s Law (Engel, 1857).
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our medieval households to be disutility minimizing, they would naturally prefer to live in the
town. However, as states use u as one of their decision variables to maximize taxes, they will only
allow this up to the point at which it reduces overall tax revenues. This can render within state
urbanization impossible.
Concerning migration to other states, we assume that all states are alike in their aim of extracting all
of their subjects’ taxable output, so that we can neglect tax competition between states. Consider
migration from any state i to the rural area of another state j, which households perceive to




. Migration of households to closer states is more probable than long-distance
migration for two reasons. First, households need to collect information about the state they
contemplate moving to (see Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016). Second, their disappearance is less likely
to be noted if it only takes some hours to reach the border (Volckart, 1997, 2002; Blickle, 2006).
Therefore, fleeing time d, the probability and severity of the punishment when caught, and the
perceived information asymmetries explain why migration from the household to the safe border
of the destination state is central28. The net migration X from any territorial state i to any other
territorial state j can be spelled out as XRijt = ∑h∈i →h2∈j
(
















≶ 0. Destination states could find it either beneficial to stop peasants
from immigrating, depending on their marginal product of labor, by investing in G, but could
also welcome the arriving migrants by investing in G and allocating them to a field to harvest
for future seasons.29 In the absence of labor market regulations, this would only depend on
immigrants’ marginal product and their subsistence needs. Following Domar (1970), emmigration
also increases the ratio of land to labor and further increases states’ reliance on their subjects.
The most recorded form of outmigration was fleeing to cities, especially Imperial cities. As cities
engage in proto-industry using technology AP, and have perfect information about their citizens,
migration to any city j depends on technologies, marginal product of labor in the city compared












28Carneiro (1970) and more recently Schönholzer (2017) go as far as viewing this mechanism as the nucleus of state
formation. They claim that the impossibility of fleeing allowed coercive government.
29What we would today understand as poor relief was not established in German lands before the mid 17th century, nor
was the problem of migrant poverty seen as a field of government action (Whaley, 2012, p. 261).
30Historic literature following Abel (1943, 1953) has focused on these factors, viewing the process of abandoning areas in
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3. Government Under Information Asymmetry
We established that states have room to reduce, or avoid, negative effects of asymmetric information
by spending on interior order G. This would deliver better information on tax cheaters, leading
to a reduction in households shirking, but it could also just lead to more innovation in tax
avoidance. States could also spy on subjects planning to flee the country, or deport unwanted
immigrants. They could use police to suppress uprisings. It has also been recorded that agents
were sent to collect anyone without a master from neighbouring territories (Whaley, 2012, p.
252), which is essentially another form of investing in G. ‘Peuplierungspolitik’ (populationist
policies) (Whaley, 2012, p. 263), most prominently affecting religious minorities, were an outcome
of this problem (see e.g., Hornung, 2014, for a later example). These costs G are the sum
of the costs for all households, Grt = ∑h∈H Grht. For any household h, spending is given
by the characteristics of the household itself, but also all possible migration targets h2, ..., so
that Giht
(
AV , AR, AC, N
l1
h2









, Nl2h2 , .., N
n
h2
, ..., zhj2 , ...
)
. Similar to V,
investment in one period creates maintenance costs for future periods. Collecting information
on emigration and tax avoidance builds on established networks of trustworthy spies, so that
aggregate G is given by Gt(∑h∈H Ght ↑, Gt−1) while ∂Gt∂G(t−1) ≥ 0.
The overall effect of overestimating the soil quality in period t can be given by the possible tax
under perfect information less the negative impacts on the households that stay and the effects of
emigration to all other countries J, so that
[
Tht
∣∣ S∗lnht > Sht] = T(ATt, Rt, st)− ∂Rt∂Q − ∑j∈J XRjt . If
these costs are ignored, they can undermine the state’s existence. The two types of government
spending we identified, V and G both have to be financed by taxes. If they cannot be financed,
states are bankrupt, iff Tt < V + G ⇒ ∑∞t∗=(t+1) T∗t = 0.
This yields that
Proposition 1. States with lower observability of agricultural output are left with a lower amount of taxes,
ceteris paribus.
Central Germany solely as an outcome of wage differentials induced by the Black Death.
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Due to the properties of the normally distributed signal we find that
Proposition 2. States with a lower observability of agricultural output face a higher risk of bankruptcy.
Now turn to the long run implications of this problem. Imagine the survival of a feudal state as a
continuous struggle of the ruling family to raise an heir to marriage age, and to find an adequate
match (Stone, 1961). In the tradition of Gale and Shapley (1962), this matching process requires
a certain number of possible partners, and an ordered list of preferences for all partners. The
German high nobility was relatively closed, which allowed marriage market participants to be well
informed about what is on offer (Spieß (1993) and Hurwich (1998)). This gives us the proposition
that other participants on the marriage market would notice their problems with efficiently taxing
their subjects, moving them down their preference list on the marriage market, so that
Proposition 3. States with lower observability of agricultural output are inferior on the marriage market
4. War Over Territories With Information Costs











Budget i - fix costs








Note: At equal soil quality, state i’s aggregated output from agriculture is perfectly observable, while state j’s signal is distorted.
Therefore i’s aggregated income varies significantly between periods, which allows i to pay for the fixed costs of war and overcome j’s
defense to conquer territory from j after harvest in period 3. State i would do so conditional on the observability of the conquerable plots,
and take over the best plots (indicated in dark red). After war, this would cause i to be larger compared to state i. Both states face a
decrease in their average observability. Also, i faces a trade-off between the potential income, and the added variation of income between
periods. If the conquest of one of the remaining plots would allow i to be attacked by another state (not in the picture), the visualized
’after war’-state is a new equilibrium.
Figure 3: Stylized example of two states competing for territory. The plot on the left shows the income/budget
of the states over time. The right visualization displays the observability of soil quality in two states, before
and after i’s attack on the southeastern plot.
What explains war? Consider state budget, and keep in mind that V comes with increasing returns
to scale. As outlined in fig. 3, under certain conditions, state i will find it profitable to conquer
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territory from i. He would invest in V above the budget the defendant would have to invest in
keeping the territory. If successful, the aggresor would increase its size a, which would also affect
its average Ricardian land rent r. The aggressor would choose exactly the territory that yields
the best combination of land rent, and observability, deduced by the one time costs of the attack
and the recurring costs of defense. Depending on the magnitude of the increasing returns, a
geographically larger state might maximize its long-run tax revenue by taking over territory that
reduces its average land rent, and also its average observability. The higher the information costs
of i, the less funds can be raised for defense. If increasing returns to scale become very large
in magnitude, as implied by (Tilly, 1975; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015) for 16th century onwards,
this allows geographically larger and less observable states to overtake even more observable
territories. In the long run, this yields
Proposition 4. States with poor observability of agricultural output are geographically smaller, ceteris
paribus.
This shows that there are many channels via which information costs affect states, including the
risk of rent seeking intermediaries, mass starvation, outmigration, civil unrest, urbanization, and
war. We have linked this to geographical variables and the state of technology, which we assumed
to be common across states. The central outcome of this model is that it is costly to states to solve
problems caused by asymmetric information, and that in the long run this affects the survival of
the state.
Proposition 5. Any state with a higher observability of agricultural output than any other state also has a
higher probability of survival
Finally, it is well established that asymmetric technological and institutional changes in favor
of proto-industrial technology, accompanied by a period of wars, flight to cities (Dincecco and
Gaetano Onorato, 2016), and also the ’military revolution’ led to an unprecedented urbanization
after 1500 (Tilly, 1993; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2017; Bosker et al.,
2013; Boix, 2015). This hints at a reduction in the diminishing returns to labor in cities, β ↓, and
also in the relative defense costs V for cities vs. territorial states. Territorial states would therefore
increase u (reducing the role of soil, and reducing the need for hierarchy as population decreases),
and city states would allow more immigration.
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Proposition 6. The predictive power of agricultural observability diminishes over time, especially after the
structural changes around 1500.
IV. Data
1. Dependent Variable: State Size
To calculate the size of a state, we digitized maps of the “reichsunmittelbare Territorien” (territories
directly subordinate to the Emperor) of the HRE (without its Italian parts) as provided in the atlas
by Wolff (1877).31 These were the most detailed maps we could find. Furthermore, Wolff drew
maps for the periods of decisive historical events of the HRE. These dates are 1250 (collapse of
the Staufer dynasty) 1378 (peak of political fragmentation), 1477 (Peace of Nancy), 1556 (Peace of
Augsburg), 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), and 1789 (outbreak of the French Revolution)32.
The maps contain the names of the territories, and their borders. It includes all types of states in the
Empire, i.e., city states (Imperial cities), large territorial states (kingdoms, duchies, principalities,
margraviates, counties etc.) and ecclesiastical states (bishoprics, archbishoprics and monastic
territories). However, each map contains white and unnamed territories (either because the
name of the territory was not certain or because the territory or territories were too small to be
included in the map). We tried to populate these white areas by comparing the different maps (as
sometimes a territory is included in one map but not in another one) and we also overlaid the
maps with Google maps. This enabled us to identify the territories based on the cities located
within them. We were also able to considerably reduce the white areas in the maps but still,
especially in 1477—when the map is less detailed than in the other years—some white areas
containing very small states or that were divided between several states in a complex manner,
31To define only territories that were directly subordinate to the Emperor as states seems to be the consensus among
German historians the reason is that only those states had a degree of independence somehow similar to modern sovereign
state. States not directly subordinate to the Emperor were subordinate to a higher ranked ruler of another state (e.g. a
duchy), and the rulers of those state received them as a feudal estate (“feud”). However, their power over the territory
was limited. Another concern with the maps is whether the de jure situation was consistent with the de facto situation.
There could for example be territories that were not directly subordinate to the Emperor but nevertheless were de facto
independent. In Appendix A.1.4. we describe in detail who we decided when this was the case and also discuss some
examples of states where this was an issue.
32A detailed historical overview of these critical points of Central European history is given in section A.1.3. of the
Appendix.
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remain. Nevertheless, as far as we are aware, ours are the most detailed and comprehensive
digitized maps of the states of the HRE currently available.
To validate and cross-check the maps and the included territories, we compared them to several
other maps of historical states in the HRE, including those of Darby and Fullard (1978); Stier et al.
(1956); Andree (1886), or Baldamus et al. (1914). Furthermore, we consulted the “Historisches
Lexikon der deutschen Länder” (Historical Encyclopedia of German States) (Köbler, 1988), a
comprehensive and reliable source that provides a historical overview of each German state from
the Middle Ages until the late 20th century, including their inception and downfall, the reasons
they disappeared, their legal status and name changes. We also consulted the first volume of the
“Geschichte der deutschen Länder” by Sante (1964), a monograph about the history of the German
states during the medieval and early modern period, that also includes detailed histories of all
territories. We used these publications to verfiy their existence and location. We further checked
that they were correctly classified by type, e.g. as a duchy or county.33
Errors as to name, type of state or omission of an existing state occurred sometimes. Such problems
mostly arose in the case of small states on which information is limited even today (typically some
“Herrschaften”, states ruled by a baron or an imperial knight), when there were several territories
with the same name (e.g. “Limburg”) or for a few of Imperial cities in the Alsac-Lorrain region
which Wolff forgot.34 However, we were able to resolve almost all of these issues, sometimes by
consulting additional sources such as books by local historians.
Another difficulty was determining the start and end point of a states’ independence. The latte
was problematic, when, for example, a states was split up between the sons of a ruler and three
family lines ruled over three different parts of the former territory. Here, Wolff not always correctly
recorded the division of the state, which we resolved. Sometimes, after a ruling dynasty died out
due to a lack of a male heir (or after a war about its heritage) a territory was partitioned between
33To validate the city states drawn in the maps we also consulted Cantoni (2012) and the “Deutsche Städtebuch”
(Handbook of German cities) (Keyser and Stoob, 1939–1974) an encyclopaedia containing information on the history of
each German city from its foundation/ first mentioning until the 20th century.
34Another case was that of the Imperial city of Friedberg and the burgraviate of Friedberg, located around a castle next
to the city. The latter was a very small county around the castle of Friedberg that was involved in various conflicts with
the nearby Imperial city. Wolff does not include both territories before the 1789 map, where he drew a territory called
Friedberg and marked it as an Imperial city. We split this territory between the Imperial city and the burgraviate from 1250
to 1378. In 1477 the Imperial city lost its independence (it was under the control of the burgraviate then for most of the
time) and thus, we assigned the whole territory to the burgraviate in the later maps—the burgraviate existed until 1806.
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several other rulers. In this case, we decided whether to assign the territory to the state that had
the majority of rights or whether it remained an independent state (when there was no clearly
dominant party).3536
Overall, we identified 730 independent states, including 81 city states, 89 ecclesiastical territories
(bishoprics, archbishoprics and monastic states), and 560 secular territorial states. The latter group
consists of two kingdoms, Bohemia and Prussia, 48 duchies, 80 principalities 37, 16 republics
(all of them in today’s Switzerland), 217 counties38 and 180 “Herrschaften” (territories ruled by
“Freiherren” (barons)). Furthermore, there were seven Imperial territories (directly controlled
by the Emperor), among them were six “Landvogteien” (Grand Bailiffs) and one territory, the
Staufian lands, controlled by the Staufian Emperors during the 11th to 13th century. There are also
four territories that were occupied by the Swedes after the Thirty Years’ War. Finally, there are
nine electorates (among them three archbishoprics already counted above), which are considered
to be the most powerful states of the HRE and are hence considered an own category.39
Figure A.2 provides an overview of the HRE and its territorial and city states in each of the six
years for which we have a map from Wolff (1877).
35This was the case, for example, for the county of Sponheim which had a constantly changing political history. Details
on this case and how we solved it can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
36A lack of clarity about when a territory ceased to be an independent state typically arose also because Wolff
(and other historians) followed a tradition of drawing important states (like e.g., the duchy of Berg) as independent
(“reichsunmittelbare”) states even when they were de facto ruled by other nobles, as was the case for the united duchy of
Kleve-Jülich-Berg which was split up again after armed hostilities over the different parts, with one part (the duchy of
Kleve and the counties of Mark and Ravensberg) falling in the hands of the margrave of Brandenburg and another part
(the duchies of Berg and Jülich) coming under the control of the duchy of Pfalz-Neuburg. In these cases we diverge from
the map and make these territories part of Brandenburg or Pfalz-Neuburg, respectively.
37Apart from principalities, we also classify the following states into this category: Nine “Landgrafschaften” (landgravi-
ates), 17 “Markgrafschaften” (margraviates) and two Princely counties (the Princely county of Burgundy and the Princely
County of Tyrol). The reason for this is that the rulers of those states (the margrave, the landgrave etc.) were considered to
have the same rank as princes (although their names refer to their origins as counties).
38The 217 counties subsume the following territories with “county” in the name: Four “Pfalzgrafschaften” (county
palatinates). In general, the rulers of those territories (the palatinates) were considered to be of a higher rank than ordinary
counts (in the case of a “Pfalzgraf” (Palatinate)). One of these county palatinates, the “Pfalzgrafschaft bei Rhein” (County
Palatinate of the Rhine) had the status of an electorate from the middle of the 13th century (and was thereafter called
“Kurfürstentum Pfalz” (Electorate of the Palatinate)). Thus, it still was called a county palatinate but actually was one of the
most influential and powerful states within the Empire. Then, there are also six burgraviates and 207 ordinary “counties”.
It is important to note that counties were fairly heterogeneous regarding their size, and political importance. The county of
Württemberg, for example, for a long time the largest county of the Empire (before it became a duchy in 1495), was larger
than some of the principalities or duchies of the time and also had higher tax revenues than some of those higher-ranked
territories. Hence, one should not assume counties to be less important or smaller than duchies or principalities.
39The official title of those states differed. Some of them were called “Kurfürstentümer” (electoral principalities) some
are margraviates or county palatinates and the Habsburg monarchy called itself “Archduchy of Austria”.
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2. Main Explanatory Variable: Caloric Observability Index
To proxy observability, we propose an index that measures divergence from perfect observability
as proposed in the theoretical framework. This measure of observability of agricultural output is
based on the caloric suitability index developed in Galor and Özak (2014) and Galor and Özak
(2015).40 This index provides the average caloric yield per hectare per year for each grid cell
on a resolution of 300 arc seconds (0.083 degrees or around 85 km2 ).41 The average is derived
from the caloric suitability of all 49 crops for which the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
project of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provides global crop yield estimates and
that can be grown in the area of a state (caloric yields¿0). Those estimated crop yields (given in
annual tons per hectare) are converted into calories using information on the caloric content of the
respective crops, available from the United States Department of Agriculture Nutrient Database
for Standard Reference. The commonly used agricultural suitability measures of Ramankutty et al.
(2002), or Zabel et al. (2014), report the fraction of each grid cell that is suitable for agriculture in
terms of probability. Compared to those standard indexes, the caloric suitability index has several
advantages. First, equally suitable land can have very different caloric yields, as land that is
suitable for agriculture will not necessarily be suitable for the crops with the highest caloric yields.
In a Malthusian subsistence society, the main purpose of agriculture is to feed the population, so
the caloric yield is central. Second, the caloric suitability index accounts for the fact that prior to
the Columbian Exchange not all of the 49 crops incorporated in the GAEZ database were actually
available (e.g. potatoes were not available in Europe). Finally, the index is not endogenous to
human activities, since Galor and Özak (2014) calculate the potential caloric yields assuming low
level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture (it abstracts from irrigation methods) and agro-climatic
constraints exogenous to human activities.
Our proxy for information cost, CNoise, is based upon the ruggedness index by Riley et al. (1999)
that is applied to data on the caloric suitability index CSI42 (not elevation). It is therefore defined
40The caloric suitability index can be downloaded here: http://ozak.github.io/Caloric-Suitability-Index/,
accessed on April, 24th 2016.
41We use the version of the index that does not include crops with zero productivity in the respective grid cell for the
calculation of the average caloric yields.
42This allows the usage of tools already implemented in QGIS or other GIS software and makes our results easy to
reproduce.
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for raster data, providing data for row-column-coordinates (r, c). CNoise of any state s is the
average of all CNoise raster values in the state.43 We construct Caloric Observability Index by
linear transformation using the maximum over all states. This transformation has two semantic
advantages. First, it is a positive index that translates to lower information costs, the higher the
index. Second, it captures the idea that observability is a relative measure of comparable states that















|(r, c) ∈ s| ∑
(r,c)∈s
CNoise(r,c))
Caloric Observability Indexs = −1( max
t∈States
(CNoiset)− CNoises)
For each column c and each row r, we derive the variance between the caloric suitability CSI
and that of its neighboring fields. If this variance is zero, measuring caloric suitability of one
field would perfectly predict the suitability of neighboring fields, and caloric observability is
zero. With an increase in between-neighbor differences, the relationship between factor input
and output becomes less observable, and the households’ effort harder to observe. Hence, high
values of the COI correspond to low observability and vice versa. To ease the interpretation of
the COI, we transform it for the empirical analysis to ensure higher values correspond to higher
observability.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the average observability of the caloric yields of each state of the
HRE in each of our six sampling years.
3. Other Explanatory Variables & Controls
To limit concerns about omitted variables bias, we include a number of variables to our data set
that should capture potentially relevant confounders of state capacity and size. Those are:
Agricultural conditions. A vast body of literature has pointed at soil quality as an indicator for
43This can be retrieved using the summary statistics tool in QGIS and ArcGIS, given the raster data and polygons on the
states
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(a) HRE 1250 (b) HRE 1378
(c) HRE 1477 (d) HRE 1556
(e) HRE 1648 (f) HRE 1789
Note: These figures shows the average Caloric Observability Index in each of the territories of the HRE at the different sampling years.
After 1500 New World crops become available due to the Columbian exchange and are included in the calculation of the COI. Increasing
caloric observability corresponds to increasingly darker shades of green; increasing shades of red denote decreasing caloric suitability.
Figure 4: Observability of Agricultural Output in the States of the HRE
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development (e.g., Diamond, 1999; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). For example, von Thünen (1826) and
more recently Lindert (1999) and Kopsidis and Wolf (2012) have pointed at the link between urban
development and soil quality. Furthermore, the vast majority of the population was employed in
agriculture and had to feed the growing urban population which produced all the innovations
and proto-industrial activity. Thus, to account for the effect of the level of soil quality on state
development, we use the caloric suitability index by Galor and Özak (2014, 2015) that we already
have used to construct the observability index. A necessary prerequisite for crop farming was
deforestation, which was mostly finished by the 12th century (Wilson, 2016). We digitized data on
areas still forested (or otherwse non-arable, for example, marsh land) during the Middle Ages,
which is available for modern Germany from Schlüter (1952). With this variable we control for the
share of a territory’s area that was not deforested by the early Middle Ages. Finally, a growing
body of literature is concerned with the effects of specific crops, such as the potato, on various
economic outcomes (Nunn and Qian, 2011) and more recently Berger (2017). We therefore employ
both the pre-1500 and post-1500 specification of the caloric suitability index. The fact that cereals,
which can be stored and transported, are easier for rulers to appropriate could also be a factor
(Mayshar et al., 2015). We control for this aspect with a variable measuring the productivity
advantage of cereals over roots and tubers. Finally, we include the average temperature to account
for climatic variations over time that could affect the agricultural output in each state.
Border States. Recently, economic research has found evidence that state capacity within historical
and contemporary developing countries varies depending on the remoteness of a region (Olsson
and Hansson, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014). Thus, in peripheral areas state
capacity might be weaker. Looking at the HRE, it is evident that many of the border states were
politically unstable and conflict-prone, and eventually gained independence from the Emperor
(e.g. the Dutch Republic, Switzerland, the northern Italian cities etc.). Thus, we created a variable
to identify countries that are located on the outer border of the HRE in each of our sampling years,
to account for this. This also takes into account spatial effects of outward threats, especially the
expansion of France and the Ottoman Empire (see (Iyigun, 2008)).
Disease environment. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) pro-
posed that diseases affect outcomes via political institutions. This makes diseases potentially
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relevant for our study. We collected data on the location of medieval swamp areas as well as prox-
imity to rivers, trade routes, and Imperial cities, which could have spread germs in the Middle Ages
as outlined in Börner and Severgnini (2014) and Voigtländer and Voth (2013). (Diamond, 1999) has
argued that everyday contact between humans and livestock creates resistance against diseases. This
was predominant in all regions of Central Europe (Mitterauer, 2004), but shows some variation
depending on the ruggedness of the terrain. We also include a variable measuring the average
temperature of each state, as it is well known that germs favor higher temperatures.
Heavy Plough. Alesina et al. (2013) and Anderson et al. (2016) document a profound impact
of the introduction of the heavy plough on gender inequality and city development. Thus, it is
very likely that it could also have affected state capacity, e.g. due to significantly increasing the
productivity of agriculture within a state that adopted the plough (or adopted it earlier). Higher
productivity of agriculture increased agricultural output and therefore the absolute tax basis of
a state. We account for the effect of the heavy plough by a variable measuring the fraction of
a states’ area that was endowed with luvisol soils, a type of soil that particularly benefited from
ploughing.
Natural Resources. It is well established that the availability of natural resources such as gold,
silver, salt and copper was a decisive factor determining a country’s state capacity and tax revenues.
Where minerals could have been exploited, mining was an alternative to agriculture, and rulers
could generate high revenues from mining activities (historically particularly true for the Harz
area and Saxony). To account for differences in natural resource endowments, we digitized maps
of the geographic location of copper, gold, lead, salt (rock salt and potassium salt) and silver. Based on
these maps we calculated a variable giving the average distance from 1,000 randomly generated
points within a state to the next deposit of those resources. Additionally, we have data on areas
within contemporary Germany that were still forested in the Middle Ages and hence provided a
supply of wood—one of the most important raw materials in the pre-modern economy.
Outmigration. As discussed above, outmigration to Imperial cities posed a vital threat to the
financial base of medieval and early-modern states. Thus, we compute a variable that proxies the
outmigration opportunities by the average distance from 1000 randomly generated points within
a state to the next Imperial city.
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Pre-Existing Cultural and Historical Differences. We can account for the effect of a priori cultural
differences in the HRE by assigning each of its later states to one of the states existing in 1150 using,
again, a map of European states in 1150 AD by Wolff (1877). The states in 1150 largely reflected
old, traditional borders of the territories of Germanic tribes (like the stem duchies, which reflected
the territories of the Germanic tribes of the Bavarians, Franks, Swabians and Saxons).44 To address
the possibility of pre-existing, deeply rooted factors influencing state capacity in medieval Europe,
we include a variable for the area of each state that was already settled in pre-historic times.
These areas might have a longer history of statehood or other positive characteristics making them
attractive for settlement.45
Terrain Characteristics. We also control for the maximum elevation above sea level and average
ruggedness of a states’ territory, using the digital elevation model provided by thee U.S. Geological
Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS). Both factors could affect
state capacity because they have an influence on the defensibility of the area of a state. Ruggedness
could also have a direct influence on animal husbandry (see (Eder and Halla, 2017)) other than
agglomeration (Kopsidis and Wolf, 2012). Taxation of animal husbandry could be different to
taxation of crops.
Trade and Tariff Income. Trade affects our analysis in many different ways. First, trade was
a source of revenue, as trading cities were usually wealthy and generated large tax revenues.
Furthermore, trade took place along trade routes, rivers and Roman roads therefore rulers could
impose tolls on trade routes and navigable rivers within their territories (Heckscher, 1955).46 Tariff
income from such road tolls could be significant and made some territories e.g., those straddling
both sides of the Rhine, very wealthy.47 Finally, if a lot of rivers or trade routes were located
within a state, it was easier for its citizens (and the ruler) to access commercial centers. Therefore,
44After the Migration Period more than four centuries before, the areas in which different Germanic tribes settled have
been relatively stable.
45We can also rule out nationalism as a unifying element within the HRE and a dividing element between different sub
areas that would not be captured by tribal areas in 1150. There is wide consensus that nationalism cannot be attributed to
Central Europe before the 18th century, if not the French Revolution (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983). We conclude from this
that the sizes of states were too small for heterogeneous preferences in the spirit of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) or Bolton
and Roland (1997) to limit the growth of states.
46There is a growing literature documenting the importance of the Roman road network for the long-run development
of Europe (e.g.Wahl (2017)). This makes it even more important to account for the Roman road network and its possible
effects.
47The small sizes of states introduce competition between them over trade routes, so that any single state can only raise
its overall revenues from tariffs to the level that drives traders to change their routes (Huning and Wolf, 2016).
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these states profited from better market access and lower transaction costs. We proxy for these
advantages with variables measuring the average distance from 1000 randomly generated points
within a state to the next Roman road, trade route or major navigable river. We also control for
trade fairs, which were identified by Milgrom et al. (1990), and more recently Edwards and Ogilvie
(2012) as classic example of medieval trade institutions. With respect to access to financial markets,
the results of Volckart and Wolf (2006) suggest that there is a strong correlation between the spatial
pattern of the integration of commodity markets on the one side, and financial markets on the
other. We therefore assume to have controlled for spatial variation of financial integration with the
above.
War and Conflicts. Several authors have argued that war and conflicts were a driver for state
capacity in Europe, e.g. because of competition between states fostering technological and
organizational innovations (e.g. in taxation technologies) (Hoffman, 2011; Karaman and Pamuk,
2013; Tilly, 1975). We construct a variable measuring the number of battles that had taken place
within a state between 800 and 1378 AD, normalized by a state’s area. Romer (2009) and Acemoglu
et al. (2011) have pointed to the benefits of importing efficient political institutions, which in
our historical setting is captured either via trade as a market for ideas, or conflicts. Radical
modernization occurs well after the period in our study (also see Mokyr (2011)).
A descriptive overview of the variables in the data set can be found in Table A.1. Definitions and
the sources of all the variables can be found in the Online Data Appendix (Appendix A.2). The
maps on which we base our geographic variables are in section A.4 of the Appendix.
V. Empirical Analysis and Results
1. Caloric Observability and the Financial Capacity of States
We expect a significant and positive statistical relationship between caloric observability and the
financial capacity of a state (proposition 1) and test this empirically. Following Cantoni (2012) we
proxy the financial capacity and economic and military power of a state by its contribution (in
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guilder) to the Imperial war tax (“Reichsmatrikel”) in 1521.48 The Reichsmatrikel contributions
are taken from Zeumer (1913). We have matched the territories mentioned in the Reichsmatrikel
with the states in our data set.49 If a state existed in 1521 and 1556, we assigned its Reichsmatrikel
contribution to the year 1556 in our data set. If a state existed in 1521 but not in 1556, we assigned
its contribution to the year 1477 in our data set. Overall, we could match 236 states.50
We then run a cross-sectional regression where each state’s Reichsmatrikel contribution is explained
by its caloric observability and different sets of control variables. Thus, we estimate the following
equation using the Poisson method, as the Reichsmatrikel contributions are left-skewed:
IMPERIAL TAXic = α + β(COIi) + γ′Xi + λc + εi (1)
Where IMPERIAL TAXic is the contribution of state i of type c in the Reichsmatrikel of 1521.
COIi is the caloric observability of a states’ agricultural output. Xic is a vector of different set of
controls comprising of the variables introduced above. The set of basic geographic controls is
made up of: of the following variables: average distance to a major river, maximum elevation,
average terrain ruggedness and a dummy for states located on the outer border of the HRE in that
year. Variables controlling for soils and climate are caloric suitability, average temperature, share
of luvisol soils, and the productivity advantage of growing cereals instead of roots and tubers.
The set of “Economic Factors and Resources” variables includes the average distance to the closest
trade route, trade fair, Roman road, Imperial city, copper, gold, iron, lead, potassium salt, rock
salt or silver deposit. λc are state type dummies (for Kingdoms, Electoral States, ecclesiastical
territories, Duchies, Princedoms, Margraviates, Counties, Republics and “Herrschaften”), capturing
unobserved shocks that might have affected different types of states in a different way and also
unobserved historical factors making a certain state a kingdom and another one only a county.51
48There are three types of contributions: states had to contribute mounted and foot soldiers as well as a certain
contribution in guilders. To monetize the whole contribution we follow Cantoni (2012) and assume—in line with the
historical literature—that the pay of a mounted soldier was 12 guilders and that for foot soldiers was 4 guilders and
multiply for the number of each type of soldier.
49It is known that the Reichsmatrikel list has errors, i.e. it contains states that were not or no longer independent
(“reichsunmittelbar”) or for which this status is doubtful. Furthermore, our maps give us information about the states in
1477 and 1556 but not for 1521. Thus, we have to rely on information from Köbler (1988) and other sources to match the
states in our maps to those of the Reichsmatrikel.
50The average Reichsmatrikel contribution was 629.4 guilders with the minimum being zero and the largest contribution
being 11,940 guilders (from the states controlled by the Habsburgs).
51The base category remaining are states occupied by the Swedish after the Thirty Year’s War and Imperial territories
directly controlled by the Emperor (i.e., bailiffs and Staufian territories). The electoral states are not double counted as they
are not coded as e.g., Duchy, Margraviate, Kingdom, or County Palatinate.
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εic is the error term.
Results are shown in Table 1. They show that, reassuringly, there is statistically and economically
significant positive relationship between the Reichsmatrikel contributions and caloric observability.
This relationship—while being statistically significant— is almost unaffected by the inclusion
of different sets of control variable. This positive relationship does not depend on the Poisson
method. Figure 5, shows a partial regression plot, but instead of Poisson using OLS to explain the
natural logarithm of the contributions, as in by Cantoni (2012). The main explanatory variable is
the natural logarithm of caloric observability, all other controls as in column (4) of Table 1.
Table 1: Caloric Observability and Financial Capacity of States
Dependent Variable Reichsmatrikel Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Observability 0.243** 0.247** 0.291** 0.289**
(0.115) (0.120) (0.114) (0.115)
State Type Dummies    
Caloric Suitability    
Basic Geographic Variables    
Caloric Suitability    
Soils and Climate –   
Economic Factors and Resources – –  
Battles per Area – – – 
Observations 236 236 236 236
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.615 0.651 0.653
Notes. Heteroskedasdicity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is
statistically different from zero at the *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regres-
sions include a constant not reported. State Dummies are dummy variables indicating electoral
states (“Kurfürstentümer”), kingdoms, margraviates, duchy, princedoms, counties, republics,
“Herrschaften” and ecclesiastical states. The set of basic geographic controls comprises a vari-
able measuring the average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state to the
closest major river, its maximum elevation above sea-level, its average ruggedness and a dummy
for states adjacent to the boundary of the HRE. Soil and climate controls include the natural
logarithm of a state’s average caloric suitability index, the average caloric suitability for grow-
ing cereals relative to grow roots and tubers, the fraction of a state’s area with luvisol soil that
benefits most from plowing and a measure for the average temperature in a state. The control
variables in “Economic Factors and Resources” include variables measuring the average distance
of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state to the closest Roman road, major medieval
trade route, trade fair, gold, copper, silver, iron, lead, potassium salt or rock salt deposit.
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Note: This figure shows a partial regression plot of ln(Caloric Observability) for the regression in Table1, column (4)
Figure 5: The Relationship between Caloric Observability and Financial Capacity of States
2. Caloric Observability and the Failure and Survival of States
To investigate our theoretical propositions 2, 3, and 5, regarding the relationship of observability
and the fate of states, i.e. whether and how a state disappeared, we were able to collect data on
367 events leading to the failure (dissolution/ disappearance) of states, mostly from Köbler (1988)
and other sources on regional history.52 We grouped these reasons for failure into seven categories
(see Figure. 6. In case a ruler died without a legal male heir, and the territory was either inherited
by other parts of the family, partitioned within the family, or inherited by female heir and became
part of her husband’s territory, we classified state failure as in family. If the state was bought by,
gifted to, or voluntarily joined another territory after the last ruler’s death, it was grouped into ex
family. As bankruptcy we classified all state failures in which the state was pawned and the state
ruler failed to pay back the debt, so that the state changed owners while a legal ruler was still
alive. We also classified all events of Federal Rule (the Emperor takes away the right to the feudal
estate), and joining the Swiss Union. The category War we used when the territory was conquered
by one ore more foreign rulers. To provide descriptive statistics of the link between observability
and state failure, we provide box plots separated box plots of the COI for different categories of
52The territories that are lost in each of the maps as well as the reason for their disappearance are shown in Appendix
Figure A.3.
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reasons for failure. They are shown in Figure 6.
In general, the most frequent—and probably most unsystematic—reason for state failure was the
death of a ruler without a male heir. This is not surprising, given that fertility of the nobility
was generally low.53 The probability of anybody dying of an accident or a common infection
was high.54 Adam Smith was right that the geography of Switzerland set it on a different path.
Consider Figure 6a on the period before 1500 (reasons of state failure in 1250, 1378 and 1477). Most
prominently, bankruptcy is the leading reason for failure of states with bad observability, which
is in line with proposition 2 from the model. When the ruling family of a state ended without a
single male heir, partition or inheritance by other states/noble families could be the consequence,
which also includes inheritance by the first daughter’s husband (in the plot: in family). States that
were sold or given away, leading to the departure of the ruling dynasty (plot: ex family), were
associated with about the same observability, with a few outliers displaying low observability.
States that were conquered in wars were on average endowed with lower observability, which
points towards the role of the decreasing marginal cost of protection on the victorious side.
Federal rule leading to the end of a state was rare, and so was secularization before the Reformation.
After 1500 (Figure 6b), sorting by observability becomes more prominent, distinguishing within and
out-of-the-family inheritance. Furthermore, bankruptcy is even more prominently associated with
bad observability. However, those states that were conquered show a high observability pointing
towards the direction of a regime change, which is a puzzle we will investigate further.
Is observability of agricultural output significantly positively associated with the survival of states
during the Middle Ages? States with a high observability of agricultural output should be capable
of remaining independent for a longer time due to better defensive capacities, more effective
abilities to restrict outmigration, etc. To test this empirically, we run Cox proportional hazard
models including all the baseline control variables (but, of course, no year dummies).55 The results
53See e.g., Schröter (2007) for an overview.
54Cummins (2017) shows that during the Middle Ages, nobles regularly died on the battle field and their life expectancy
was about 50 years.
55We estimate the Cox proportional hazard model using the Breslow method for ties. Other methods to handle tied
failures like those proposed by Efron would yield very similar results. Those estimations are not reported but available
uponn request. The results would also hold if we exclude the states who exit the data set because they left the Empire and
became part of another state entity (like Switzerland) and because their ruling family extinguished (what arguably should
be a random event in most cases). Results are available upon request.
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are in Table 2 and suggest that, indeed, caloric observability was significantly positively related
to state survival during the Middle Ages, but in the 17th and 18th century. To be precise, during
the medieval period a ten percent increase in caloric observability raised the probability of a state
surviving by around 0.6 percent.
(a) Before 1500 (N=257) (b) After 1500 (N=110)
Note: This figure distinguishes different reasons for failure of a medieval state. From left to right these are that a single heir was not
present, and another branch of the family took over via marriage, partition, or inheritance rules (in family). If this was not the case, the
territory was sold, given away, or left the dynasty (ex family). Bankruptcy was a reason for a living dynasty to loose their territory, war
was another. Federal ruling leading to the loss of a territory was rare. The states to form the Swiss Confederation left the Empire. Some
territories were secularized, mostly after 1556.
Figure 6: Descriptive statistics of observability by different reasons states failed
Table 2: Observability and the Survival of States
Dependent Variable Periods a State Exist
(1) (2) (3)
All Periods Until 1477 After 1477
ln(Caloric Observability) 1.424*** 0.94** 1.026
(0.0563) (0.0237) (0.0371)
Baseline Controls   
Observations 1,925 1,083 842
Wald Chi2 961.82 1183.61 2523.85
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. The tables
reports hazard ratios obtained from running a Cox proportional hazard model using
Breslow method for ties. Hazard ratio is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5
% and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state.
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3. Caloric Observability, the Size of a States and the Dynamics of Statehood
We now test our theoretical proposition about the relationship between state size (proposition 4)
and observability and the temporal evolution of this relationship (proposition 6). We run pooled
OLS regressions using the unbalanced panel data set of states in the HRE as explained above.
Our data set includes information on 730 states and for six points in time amounting to 1,925
state-year pairs being our observations. As observability of agricultural output is orthogonal
to economic activities, political institutions and human activity—at least in the period studied—
reverse causality should not be a critical issue. Nonetheless, there still could be a third (and
unobserved) factor positively correlated with both caloric observability and political fragmentation.
We address this potential bias by including several control variables, which were introduced
in the previous section, in the regression specification. In addition to the control variables, we
include year fixed effects to account for temporal shocks that affect all of the HRE equally, and
we also include eight state type dummies. Thus, to identify our effect we only exploit variation
in observability and state size within the same year and within the same types of states. To be
precise, we estimate variants of the following regression equation:
ln(STATEAREA)ic,t = α + βln(COIi,t) + γ′Xi,t + δt + λc + εi,t (2)
Where ln(STATEAREA)ic,t is the natural logarithm of the area in km2 of state i of type c in year t.
δt are year dummies. The rest of the equation is defined as in equation 1 In robustness checks, we
include dummy variables for the states to which a certain territory belonged in 1150 AD, dummy
variables assigning each historical state to its modern-day equivalent, and variables reporting
certain characteristics (e.g., area, soil quality or observability of agricultural output) of neighboring
states.56
Later in the empirical analysis, we want to identify the temporal evolution of the effect of
observability of agricultural output on state size. We estimate equation 2 as cross-sectional
equation, separately for each year. Furthermore, we interact the caloric observability with the year
56We assigned a state to those state in 1150 or contemporary country in which the majority of its area is located.
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dummies and estimate equation 3:
ln(STATEAREA)ic,t = α + ∑
t∈Γ
β′tln(COIi,t) · δt + γ′Xi,t + δt + λc + εi,t (3)
Where ln(COIi,t) · δt is the interaction of the COI with year dummies, and all other variables
match those in equation 2.
First, we estimate equation 2 to statistically test the relationship between observability of agri-
cultural output and state size. Results of the estimations are reported in Table 3. We start with
a simple baseline specification only including year fixed effects and basic geographic control
variables.
Caloric observability is highly statistically and economically significant with a one percent increase
in observability increasing state size by around 0.5 percent. From columns (2) to (6) we add
progressively more sets of control variables, to look how the coefficient reacts to the inclusion
of covariates. In column (2) we add soil and climate controls, and the coefficient only decreases
slightly. In column (3) we add variables proxying economic factors and resources. These variables
decrease the coefficient of observability, but it remains economically and statistically significant.
The inclusion of battles per state area in column (4) has virtually no effect on the results and the
battles themselves are not significant. In column (5), nine state type dummies are added to further
reduce unobserved heterogeneity.
However, this again leaves the coefficient of caloric observability almost unchanged.57 In columns
(7) and (8), we lose some observations, as we restrict the sampling area to the extent of the HRE in
1150. We do this, by including dummy variables that assign the territories of the HRE to the state
to which they belonged in 1150 AD. As explained in the previous section, this is to account for
pre-existing cultural differences, as the states in 1150 largely reflected the traditional territories
57With regard to the control variables, several interesting results emerge from this specification. For example, distance to
the closest Imperial city is significantly positively associated with state size, pointing to the fact that outmigration may
indeed have played an important role for the tax capacity of feudal states. Another interesting result is the significant
positive effect of battles per state area and the negative and significant coefficient of distance to copper, iron, lead and
potassium salt deposits. These indicate the importance of natural resources and war for the capacity of states. The
significantly positive effect of maximum elevation also points towards defensibility of the area as an important factor.
Finally, caloric suitability itself is positively related to state size, although the estimated coefficient (0.091) is much smaller
than that of observability. Thus, it is not only the observability of agricultural output, but also the productivity of
agriculture that matters, but observability seems to be much more important.
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of Germanic tribes. The coefficient of caloric suitability further decreases but remains significant
suggesting that a one percent increase in observability raises state size by around 0.13 percent.
Finally, in column (7), the sample is restricted further to historical states within the borders of
contemporary Germany, as we control for the area (in m2) within a state that was already settled
in pre-historic times (and hence, might have a longer history of statehood) that was still forested
or consisted of swamps and flood plains in the Middle Ages. None of these variables stop caloric
observability from being significant, although both forest areas and early settled areas show a
significant positive effect. The coefficient remains about 0.25, and hence, increases again, when
compared to column (6).
Table 3: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.529*** 0.500*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.259*** 0.141** 0.27***
(0.0740) (0.0727) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0532) (0.0527) (0.068)
Year Dummies       
State Type Dummies – – – –   
1150 State Dummy – – – – –  –
Basic Geographic Variables       
Soils and Climate –      
Economic Factors and Resources – –     
Battles per Area – – –    
Early Settled, Forest & Swamp Area – – – – – – 
Observations 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,866 990
R2 0.329 0.386 0.522 0.522 0.682 0.709 0.67
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and
*10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant not reported. State Dummies are dummy variable indicating
electoral states (“Kurfürstentümer”), kingdoms, margraviates, duchy, princedoms, counties, republics, “Herrschaften” and ecclesiastical states.
The set of basic geographic controls comprises of a variable measuring the average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state
to the closest major river and city state, its maximum elevation above sea-level, its average ruggedness and a dummy for states adjacent to the
boundary of the HRE. Soil and Climate controls include the natural logarithm of a state’s average caloric suitability index, the average caloric
suitability to grow cereals relative to grow roots and tubers, the fraction of a states area with luvisol soil that benefits most from plowing and
a measure for the average temperature in a state.The control variables in “Economic Factors and Resources” include variables measuring the
average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state to the closest Roman road, major medieval trade route, trade fair, gold,
copper, silver, iron, lead, potassium salt or rock salt deposit.
We then conduct checks to ensure that our baseline results are sufficiently robust. The results are
in Table 4. First, we investigate the effect of modern country dummies on the preferred baseline
specification (Table 3, column (5)).58 The estimated coefficient, including those contemporary
58The HRE spanned 13 contemporary countries. These are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany,
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countries is reported in Table 4, column (1) and shows that the coefficient of observability only
decreases slightly when these dummies are included. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity
connected to larger political entities (some of which were created during the existence of HRE e.g.,
Switzerland) does not decisively influence the effect of caloric observability.
Second, in column (2), we account for the fact that not all land in a state was either settled or
suitable for agriculture, so considering the whole area of a state might introduce bias. Thus,
we subtract from the overall area of each state those areas with forests, swamps, flood plains,
lakes, estuaries and coastal marsh, to use this variable ”Settled area” as dependent variable. As
information on these areas is only available for contemporary Germany, the sample is again
reduced to historical states within modern Germany. Again, the coefficient becomes smaller in
magnitude but remains significant.
Third, in column (3) we show what happens if we take into account that, due to the different size
of the states, some variables, like ruggedness, or caloric observability, that are calculated based on
differences between the data points of the underlying raster data, could be mechanically higher
in larger states. Thus, we inversely weight each observation by the number of ruggedness data
points that are located within the state. Results are virtually identical.
Fourth, in column (4) we include a variable measuring the number of separated territories that
make up a state. The medieval HRE was made up of non-contiguous areas. States with highly
fragmented territory will have higher tax collection costs, information and defense costs might be
larger, and it could be less susceptible to take over. However, this does not change the coefficient
estimate significantly. The next three columns (5-7) show what happens if one estimates the
preferred baseline specification using different variants of the caloric observability and state size
measure. In column (5), we employ caloric observability and state area in levels instead of natural
logarithms. The resulting coefficient is statistically and economically significant. Therefore, the
results are not driven by taking the natural logarithms of both variables.
In column (6) we estimate the baseline regression using a caloric observability index also taking
into account plants that become available only after the Columbian Exchange.
France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Lichtenstein, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. In the regression we include 12
modern country dummies, with Austria being the omitted country.
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Origins of State Capacity
In column (7) we use a version of the caloric observability index computed under the assumption
that only the crop giving the highest caloric yield is actually planted. This is winter barley in all
states. Both times, the estimated coefficient is similar to that obtained in Table 3, column (5).
Finally, in column (8) we conduct a placebo-test. We only consider the years prior to 1556 (that
is 1250, 1378 and 1477) and test if the difference in caloric observability before and after the
Columbian exchange has explanatory power—which should not be the case. Reassuringly, these
differences do not explain state size prior to 1500, making it unlikely that our results emerged by
chance.
Another concern with the baseline estimates could be that not only characteristics of a certain
state itself matter for its capacity. As states compete for labor and territory, characteristics of
surrounding states are relevant. Thus, we take the baseline regression specification and add
variables capturing relevant characteristics of a state’s neighbors. Results are reported in Table 5,
where we add an additional set of neighbor characteristics to the baseline specification in each
column. All in all, while neighbor characteristics somehow reduce the size of the coefficient of
caloric observability to about 0.16, this is still a large and economically and statistically significant
effect. Interestingly, the results imply that neither the caloric suitability nor the caloric observability
of the neighbor states has a significant impact.
However, states surrounded by small states are significantly larger than states surrounded by
large states (as shown by the negative and significant estimate of the neighbor states area and
the positive coefficient of the number of neighbor states). It also seems to be the case that states
were larger when their neighbors did not have access to nearby major rivers while the opposite
is true for access to resources. Thus, states have profited from having resource-rich states as
neighbors, but were better off if their neighbors were further away from important transportation
networks.
One important implication of our theoretical argument is that caloric observability should only
matter for state size during the medieval period as later on, the scale effect becomes more and
more important. To see whether this is the case, we run two types of regressions.
First, we interact the caloric suitability index with year dummies and look at how the effect of
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caloric observability develops over time (Table 6). We find that, while the interaction terms are
predominantly significant, in line with our expectations, the coefficient notably declines after
1556.
Table 5: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size—Controlling for Neighbor Characteristics
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.238*** 0.204*** 0.194*** 0.171***
(0.0564) (0.0527) (0.0518) (0.0504)
ln(Neighbor Caloric Observability) -0.0561 0.0304 -0.0169 0.0722
(0.0758) (0.0684) (0.0708) (0.0791)
ln(Neighbor Caloric Suitability) 0.409*** 0.182 0.208 -0.357
(0.145) (0.135) (0.135) (0.251)
ln(Neighbor Area) -0.0592*** -0.0468** -0.00534
(0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0235)
Number of Neighbor States 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.110***
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Trade Routes -0.00377* -0.00242
(0.00201) (0.00231)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Roman Road -0.00294*** -0.00184
(0.00110) (0.00185)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Large River 0.00559* 0.00575*
(0.00291) (0.00293)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Gold 4.37e-06
(2.69e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Silver -1.19e-06
(1.33e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Copper -4.53e-06**
(2.28e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Iron -2.96e-06
(2.02e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Pottasium Salt -3.11e-06**
(1.27e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Rock Salt -2.26e-06
(1.39e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Lead Resev 7.48e-07
(2.16e-06)
Neighbor Mean Relative Cereals Suitability 9.97e-05***
(3.45e-05)
Neighbor Share of Luvisol Soils -0.110***
(0.0415)
Baseline Controls    
Observations 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842
R2 0.679 0.735 0.738 0.746
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at
the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant not reported. Baseline
controls include year and state type dummies, the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors and resources controls
as well as battles per area.
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Table 6: Temporal Evolution of the Effect of Observability on State Size
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COI*1250 0.256*** 0.144** 0.179** 0.232***
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0824) (0.0593)
COI*1378 0.250*** 0.153** 0.317*** 0.226***
(0.0626) (0.0620) (0.0751) (0.0608)
COI*1477 0.319*** 0.192*** 0.327*** 0.297***
(0.0668) (0.0649) (0.0947) (0.0663)
COI*1556 0.293*** 0.149** 0.322*** 0.238***
(0.0639) (0.0668) (0.0921) (0.0634)
COI*1648 0.187** 0.0692 0.253** 0.176**
(0.0767) (0.0777) (0.104) (0.0768)
COI*1789 0.201** 0.0484 0.225** 0.166**
(0.0846) (0.0838) (0.100) (0.0832)
Baseline Controls    
1150 State Dummies –  – –
Share Early Settled & Forest Area – –  –
Modern Country Dummies – – – 
Observations 1,925 1,866 990 1,925
R2 0.683 0.709 0.671 0.693
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All
regressions include a constant not reported. Baseline controls include year and state type dummies,
the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors and resources controls as well as battles per
area.
Table 7: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size—Cross Sections
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1250 1378 1477 1556 1648 1789
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.209*** 0.213*** 0.252** 0.358*** 0.120 0.104
(0.0763) (0.0737) (0.106) (0.0811) (0.118) (0.135)
Baseline Controls      
State Type Dummies      
Observations 368 402 313 367 255 220
R2 0.665 0.688 0.704 0.698 0.736 0.751
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different
from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant
not reported. Baseline controls include state type dummies, the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors
and resources controls as well as battles per area.
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Second, we run separate cross-section regressions for each of the six years in our data set (Table 7).
Here, the coefficients of caloric observability are highly statistically significant and vary between
0.2 and 0.33. Again confirming our theoretical reasoning, in 1648 and 1789 the coefficient of caloric
observability is not significant and is notably smaller in size.
Table 8 reports a horse race between the scale effect (measured by a states average area in the
two last periods) and caloric observability. We compare the times before and after the structural
changes to the end of the Middle Ages, using our data points 1477 and 1789. Geographic area
in earlier periods predicts state size in both estimations. However, in 1477 caloric observability
determines state size significantly, and even has a larger effect than lagged area. In 1789, the
lagged area shows a very high coefficient of around 0.9 while caloric observability is insignificant.
These results confirm that state size at the end of the Middle Ages depends on caloric observability,
but it explains modern state size only indirectly—via the state size achieved in earlier periods,
presumably locked in by increasing returns to scale.




ln(Caloric Observability) 0.247** 0.0493
(0.101) (0.0694)
ln(Average Area 1250-1378) 0.0444***
(0.00786)




Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in paren-
theses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5
% and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions
include a constant not reported. Baseline controls include state type
dummies, the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors
and resources controls as well as battles per area.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of tax capacity in medieval Central Europe. Because
the HRE was a federation of states for hundreds of years, we have been able to connect the
location, history and geographic circumstances of hundreds of states via our model. We have
shown theoretically and empirically that the observability of agricultural output, via its impact on
taxation capacity and the political structure of states, was a primary determinant of state size and
survival in medieval Central Europe. We employed the theory of incomplete contracts to shed
light on the dynamics of state capacity, before revolutionary social and economic events, from
1496 onwards, changed the game.
Our results provide evidence for the interaction of agriculture, climate, and geography in ex-
plaining political outcomes such as state capacity or regime. This adds a new perspective to the
existing large and influential literature that links geography, climate and agriculture to long-run
differences in economic outcomes (Diamond, 1999; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). We have proposed
a GIS measurement of observability of agricultural output that actually measures the degree of
information asymmetry in an early society. As this index is well grounded in theoretical economic
reasoning, it is potentially useful for other research endeavors in economic history, and long-run
development.
This paper is a starting point for important further analyses—for example, why agricultural
observability lost its explanatory power for state capacity during the early-modern period. This
step would improve our understanding of the dynamics of state capacity in Europe over the last
1000 years. Potential factors to examine are the increased impact of technological innovations
(e.g, De la Croix et al., 2017), or advances in education during the Reformation (Dittmar and
Meisenzahl, 2017)), which led to increased urbanization and reduced a state’s dependence on
agricultural output for revenue. There are also opportunities for further study of the role of this
observability mechanism in single states and other regions of the world.
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A.1. Dependent Variable
A.1.1. The Underlying Maps
The area of a state (“reichsunmittelbares Territorium”) is calculated based on shapefiles created
from maps of the non-Italian parts of the Holy Roman Empire printed in Wolff (1877). One of those
maps, “Deutschland beim Tode Karl des IV. im Jahre 1378” (“Germany at the death of Charles
IV. in the year 1378”) is shown below in Figure A.1. Note that this map incorrectly includes the
state of the Teutonic Order, so when digitizing the map we excluded this area. The maps are
available here: http://gei-digital.gei.de/viewer/javax.faces.resource/pdf-icon32.png.
xhtml?ln=images/ (accessed on January 22, 2016).
Note: This figure shows the original map of the HRE as printed in Wolff (1877). For our empirical analysis we digitized this map using
GIS software.
Figure A.1: Germany at the Death of Charles IV. in the Year 1378 (Wolff, 1877)
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A.1.2. States in the Holy Roman Empire 1250–1789
(a) HRE 1250 (b) HRE 1378
(c) HRE 1477 (d) HRE 1556
(e) HRE 1648 (f) HRE 1789
Figure A.2: The Holy Roman Empire and its territorial states (gray) and city states (red) at our sampling
years
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A.1.3. Historical Background of the Sampling Years
(i) 1250 was the year of the death of Frederick II., the last Emperor of the Staufer dynasty. The
Staufer dynasty had ruled the Empire as kings and emperors for more than 110 years. The
whole dynasty (and with them central power) collapsed soon after, in 1254, when his only
son Konrad IV., who was King of Germany but never Emperor, died. Following the collapse
of the Staufer dynasty, a 20 year period called the “Great Interregnum” began, in which there
was no elected Emperor but four elected kings. The kings were not universally accepted by
the powerful princes, and so did not rule the Empire. In this period, known as an age of
insecurity, violence and anarchy, many of the numerous city state (free and imperial cities)
emerged and political fragmentation increased further59.
(ii) 1378 was the year Emperor Charles IV died. This year marks the peak of the political
fragmentation of the Empire—a situation that was made permanent by the Golden Bull of
1356. Furthermore, while considered by some as one of the greatest and most influential
medieval German Emperors, he failed to preserve the powerful position of his dynasty, the
Luxembourgians, as he pledged away a lot of the territories under his control, in order to pay
his large debts. This further weakened central authority and helped to increase the political
fragmentation of the Empire.
(iii) 1477 was the year in which Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy died. With his death,
the Duchy of Burgund, one of the largest states in Europe, which could be considered an
independent, middle-sized power (although de jure part of the HRE), collapsed and was
split after violent hostilities. Some parts of the Duchy fell to France and the remainder was
integrated into the HRE as smaller political entities (like the Duchy of Brabant). Furthermore,
through marriage, the Habsburgs gained control over the remaining parts of Burgundy and
thus, the death of Charles the Bold was the decisive event in the ascent of the House of
Habsburg to world power. A period with slowly declining political fragmentation began.
59Political fragmentation in the 13th century was already much higher than during the 12th century. This was due to the
fact that, as a consequence of the struggle between Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Emperor Frederick I., the old and
quite large stem duchies (“Stammesherzogtümer”) were dissolved and partitioned into smaller (and even further divisible)
territories. This should have weakened the position of dukes and princes towards the Emperor and hence strengthen
central power, but in the long-run, had the opposite effect.
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(iv) 1556, the year after the peace of Augsburg settled the confessional division of Germany for the
next decades and ended the first wave of religious wars in the Holy Roman Empire. However,
it also was the year when Charles V, probably the most powerful European monarch after
the fall of Rome, abdicated from the throne due to his setback against the protestant princes
and his lack of loyal vassals within the Empire. His reign marked the peak and turning point
of the power of the House of Habsburg as his resignation from the throne and its defeat by
the princes of the Empire was the starting point of the slow decline of the Habsburg’s power.
(v) 1648, the year when the Thirty Years War ended, with the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. This
lead to notable territorial changes, as some large and powerful states like Brandenburg or
Hesse integrated smaller territories into their states. Furthermore, several imperial cities
disappeared, becoming part of France or of Switzerland (whose independence was officially
acknowledged). Finally, it settled the confessional question within the Empire.
(vi) (vi) 1789, the year when the French Revolution began and triggered a series of events and
wars, resulting in the demise of the HRE and the most significant reshaping of the landscape
of states in Central Europe since the dissolution of the stem duchies in the 12th century.
A.1.4. De Facto vs. de Jure Independence of States in the Maps
City states are often among those territories for which it was not absolutely clear what degree
of independence they had, regardless of their de jure status. It is well known that some cities
had gained certain independence from their rulers, while never being officially considered as
imperial cities. By the same measure, there were imperial cities that were never truly independent
of their former ruler although they were granted “Reichsunmittelbarkeit” by the Emperor. We
consulted standard sources on the history of German cities such as Köbler (1988) or Keyser and
Stoob (1939–1974) and other studies on imperial cities, including Cantoni (2012) and followed their
judgement about whether a city was de facto, and not just de jure, an imperial city. This is also an
issue for several territories that were ruled by the Emperor or another high-ranked noble (like an
elector) but where never part of their core territory. Two of these territories were the magraviates
of Ober- and Niederlausitz (Upper and Lower Lusatia). Hence, some historians argue that the
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power of those rulers over the territory was limited if non-existent. Therefore, we decided to treat
the Lausitz territories as independent states.
A.1.5. Coding Example of a Difficult Case
A difficult of a different case to code is the county of Sponheim which consisted at the beginning of
the 14th century, of two separated territories, the “Vordere” and “Hintere” Grafschaft of Sponhein.
When the dynasty ruling the “Vordere Grafschaft” (the front county) died out, one fifth of the
County went to the Electoral Palatinate and four fifth to the Count controlling the “Hintere
Grafschaft” (the back county). After 1437, the Margrave of Baden and the Count of Veldenz
inherited both parts of the County. Both rulers decided not to split the County but to rule it
together as a condominium. Another change occurred in 1559, when the Princedom of Pfalz-
Simmern (who had inherited the part of the County of Veldenz) bought the Electoral Palatinate’s
shares in the “Vordere Grafschaft”. Simultaneously, it decided to give away the half of the “Hintere
Grafschaft” to the Duchy of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. This resulted in the following situation: the
“Vordere Grafschaft” belonged three fifths to Pfalz-Simmern (since 1559 Electoral Palatinate) and
two fiftha to Baden. The “Hintere Grafschaft” belonged half to Baden and half to Zweibrücken.
Finally, in 1707, the Margraviate of Baden-Baden and Electoral Palatinate split up the “Vordere
Grafschaft” and in 1776, the “Hintere Grafschaft” was split in half by the Margrave of Baden
and the duke of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. After 1815 the territory was integrated into Prussia and
disappeared. In 1477 and 1555, i.e. during the condominium, we decided to consider the whole
territory as county of Sponheim. Wolff, in his 1556 map has assigned the four separate territories
of the county to either Pfalz-Simmern or Baden-Baden, Pfalz-Zweibrücken and the Electoral
Palatinate. One cannot be sure whether he has assigned it to Pfalz-Simmern or Baden-Baden as
both have the same color. In addition, this does not reflect the actual situation in 1556 (according
to our sources), rather this is the situation in 1559 (when one assumes that he has assigned the
“Vordere Grafschaft” to Baden and not to Pfalz-Simmern). For 1648 and 1789 we follow Wolff,
who no longer included the county of Sponheim but assigned its territory to Pfalz-Zweibrücken,
Electoral Palatinate and Baden-Baden (or Baden, respectively).
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A.2. Control Variables
The spatial datasets were each converted into WGS 1984 UTM 32N projection. State type and
”State in 1150” dummies are calculated from the shapefiles of Wolff’s maps (1877). This is also
the case for the variable “Outer Boundary” reporting the share of a states’ border that is an outer
boundary of the HRE.
Area Types. We have computed the (natural logarithm of the) area within each state that consisted
of forests, swamps and floodplains (in m2) in the pre-modern period and hence was very likely
not settled or used for agricultural purposes. Floodplains and swamps might also have played a
role as source of germs and diseases. Data is taken from a map by Schlüter (1952) that we have
digitized. His map only covers the area of contemporary Germany.
Average Terrain Ruggedness. Following Riley et al. (1999) average ruggedness of a states’ territory is
calculated as the negative value of the derivative of the ruggedness index of a digital elevation
model. The calculations are based on the elevation raster of Nunn and Puga (2012) (see above).
Terrain ruggedness was calculated using QGIS.
Average Temperature. Historical average temperature for a state is taken from the data set of Guiot
and Corona (2010). They constructed a grid cell database of historical European temperatures
and their deviations from the average temperature in 1960–1990. We use this data set to calculate,
for each state, the average temperature deviation in the period from 800 to 1378. To calculate the
average temperature deviations for each grid we follow the interpolation procedure of Anderson
et al. (2016) by filling in missing values with the inverse distance weighted average temperature of
the twenty-four nearest neighbor grid points.
Battles. Number of battles per km2 that have taken place in a state in the period between two
of our maps (e.g. between 800 and 1250 between 1250 and 1378, between 1378 and 1477 etc.).
Information of the date and location of the battles is taken from Bradbury (2004), Clodfelter (1992)
and Darby and Fullard (1978).
Distance to City State. Distance to city states is calculated as follows: Points with random location
were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euclidean distance
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from each of the 1,000 points per state to the closest Imperial city was calculated. In a last step,
these distances were aggregated by state. The location of city states follows the maps of Wolff
(1877) but we have corrected/ supplemented them—if necessary—with information from Köbler
(1988), Keyser and Stoob (1939–1974) and Jacob (2010).
Distance to Major Rivers. Distance to major rivers is calculated as follows: Points with random
location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euclidean
distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest major river (see Figure A.5) was
calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by state. For the location of the rivers,
we used the dataset for ’WISE large rivers’ shapefile, which can be downloaded here: http://
www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/wise-large-rivers-and-large-lakes(last accessed
May, 30th 2016).
Distance to Natural Resources. We have calculated seven variables reporting the distance to natural
resources (copper, gold, iron, lead, potassium salt, rock salt and silver). Distance to natural
resources is calculated as follows: Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points
fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euklidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per
state to the closest deposit of the respective natural resource was calculated. In a last step, these
distances were aggregated by state. The location of natural resource deposits is taken from Frenzel
(1938) and Elsner (2009).
Distance to Roman Roads. Distance to (minor and major) Roman roads is calculated as follows:
Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second
step, the Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest Roman
road was calculated. These distances were aggregated by state. Locations of Roman roads (minor
and major) originate from a shapefile included in the “Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval
Civilizations” (McCormick et al., 2013). The shapefile is based on the map of Roman roads
in the Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World (Talbert, 2000). It can be downloaded
here: http://darmc.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k40248&pageid=icb.page601659 (last
accessed September, 24th 2015).
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Distance to Medieval Trade Road. Distance to medieval trade routes is calculated as follows: Points
with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. The Euklidean
distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest medieval trade route was
calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by state. Location of trade routes are
obtained by digitizing a map on “Medieval Commerce” from Shepherd (1923). The map can
be downloaded as pdf from here: https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/
europe_mediaeval_commerce.jpg (last accessed July, 10th 2017).
Distance to Trade Fairs. Distance to trade fair is calculated as follows: Points with random location
were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. The Euclidean distance from each of
the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest trade fair city was calculated. These distances
were aggregated by state. The locations of the fairs were taken from Ditchburn and Mackay
(2002).
Maximum Elevation. Maximum elevation of each state in meters. Data is based on the Digital
Elevation Model (DEM) of the U.S. Geological Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation
and Science (EROS), namely the GTOPO30 dataset, which can be downloaded here https:
//lta.cr.usgs.gov/GTOPO30 (last accessed May, 30th 2016). The GTOPO30 has a spatial resolution
of 30 arc seconds.
Plough Suitability. Plough suitability of a states’ soils are measured by the share of its area
which has luvisol soils. Data on location of luvisol soils is taken from the European Soil
Database version 2 provided by the European Soil Data Center (ESDAC). We used the 1km*1km
raster data set downloadable here (upon request): http://esdac.jrc.ec.europa.eu/content/
european-soil-database-v2-raster-library-1kmx1km (last accessed June, 20th 2017).
Pre-Historic Settlement Area. We have computed the (natural logarithm of the) area within each
state that was already settled in pre-historic times (in m2). This information stems from Schlüter
(1952).
Latitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates a states’ centroid (mid-point) in meters. Calculated
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using QGIS.
Longitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates of a states’ centroid (mid-point) in meters. Calcu-
lated using QGIS.
Relative Cereals Suitability. An index of caloric suitability of cereals relative to roots and tubers for
each states was generated according to the logic of Mayshar et al. (2015) using data from Galor
and Özak (2015). This index measures the difference between the maximum yield from plants that
are appropriable, and the maximum yield from roots and tubers. Appropriable plants (“cereals”)
included alfalfa, banana, barley, buckwheat, cabbage, canary grass, chickpea, citrus, coconut, cow
pea, dry pea, flax, foxtail millet, greengram, indigo rice, jatropha, miscanthus, oat, oil palm, olive,
pasture grass, pasture legumes, pearl millet, pigeon pea, pulses, rape, rye, sorghum (subtropical),
sorghum (tropical highland), sorghum (tropical lowland), soybean, spring barley, spring wheat,
sugar cane, tea, wetland rice, wheat, winter barley, winter rye, and winter wheat. Roots and tubers
were carrot, groundnut, onion, yams, and white yam.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Area 1,925 2250000000.000 8470000000.000 4948171.000 193000000000.000
Average Temperature 1,925 0.150 0.054 -0.011 0.355
Battles per km2 1,925 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015
Belgium 1,925 0.040 0.196 0.000 1.000
Caloric Observability 1,925 399.880 475.622 0.000 4160.717
COI Post-1500-COI Pre-1500 1,925 3619.769 181.221 2145.383 4284.983
County 1,925 0.265 0.442 0.000 1.000
CSI Post-1500-CSI Pre-1500 1,925 1474.386 181.221 0.000 2139.601
Czech Republic 1,925 0.010 0.101 0.000 1.000
Distance to Copper Deposit 1,925 136088.000 62582.970 8989.408 394265.800
Distance to Gold Deposit 1,925 93655.510 70641.920 0.000 457256.300
Distance to Imperial City 1,925 65288.080 93232.030 0.000 509783.900
Distance to Iron Deposit 1,925 79611.300 54619.310 0.000 377603.900
Distance to Large River 1,925 33.660 23.005 0.888 143.924
Distance to Lead Deposit 1,925 116992.100 63723.760 8277.119 441320.800
Distance to Potassium Salt Deposit 1,925 121460.000 96965.100 0.000 597686.800
Distance to Rock Salt Deposit 1,925 130085.100 86606.360 18.912 376318.100
Distance to Roman Road 1,925 81.126 118.883 0.650 656.984
Distance to Silver Deposit 1,925 397472.600 140633.700 18386.710 810327.000
Distance to Trade Fair 1,925 231385.200 131436.600 3159.897 843413.800
Distance to Trade Route 1,925 45.722 37.628 1.169 236.214
Duchy 1,925 0.063 0.244 0.000 1.000
Ecclesiastical State 1,925 0.202 0.401 0.000 1.000
Electorate 1,925 0.025 0.158 0.000 1.000
France 1,925 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000
Germany 1,925 0.707 0.455 0.000 1.000
Herrschaft 1,925 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000
Hungary 1,925 0.001 0.032 0.000 1.000
Italy 1,925 0.008 0.088 0.000 1.000
Kindom 1,925 0.002 0.046 0.000 1.000
Lithuania 1,925 0.001 0.023 0.000 1.000
ln(Area) 1,925 20.067 1.650 15.415 25.988
ln(Caloric Observability Post-1500) 1,925 5.768 0.885 0.000 8.078
ln(Caloric Observability) 1,925 2.832 1.007 0.000 8.334
ln(Caloric Suitability Post-1500) 1,925 7.266 0.637 0.000 7.786
ln(Caloric Suitability) 1,925 7.431 0.679 0.000 7.897
ln(Floodplains) 990 2.069 6.712 0.000 23.821
ln(Forest Area) 990 6.220 8.415 0.000 17.594
ln(Optimal Caloric Observability) 1,924 6.662 0.975 0.000 9.716
ln(Optimal Caloric Suitability) 1,925 8.947 0.638 0.000 9.430
ln(Pre-Historic Settlement) 990 9.092 8.736 0.000 17.477
ln(Settled Area) 827 19.122 1.313 12.666 22.857
ln(Swamp Area) 990 2.145 6.666 0.000 22.836
Luxemburg 1,925 0.002 0.046 0.000 1.000
Margraviate 1,925 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000
Maximum Elevation 1,925 767.721 766.672 5.000 4366.000
Netherlands 1,925 0.020 0.139 0.000 1.000
Outer Boundary 1,925 0.047 0.137 0.000 0.890
Poland 1,925 0.034 0.181 0.000 1.000
Princedom 1,925 0.054 0.225 0.000 1.000
Relative Cereals Suitability 1,925 17279.220 3039.148 0.000 20795.540
Republic 1,925 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000
Share of Luvisol Soils 1,925 4.085 2.577 0.027 16.823
Slovenia 1,925 0.009 0.096 0.000 1.000
Switzerland 1,925 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
Terrain Ruggedness 1,925 112.777 141.549 2.212 858.629
Territories 1,925 1.722 1.755 1.000 21.000
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A.3. Failure of States
(a) Territories missing in 1378 (b) Territories missing in 1477
(c) Territories missing in 1556 (d) Territories missing in 1648
(e) Territories missing in 1789
Note: The data on the failure of the states was collected from Köbler (1988) and completed from other sources on regional history
Figure A.3: Failed states
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A.4. Geographic Controls
Note: Data on Roman Road was taken from McCormick et al. (2013), medeval trade routes were digitztized from Shepherd (1923). Trade
fairs were digitized using modern positions and the towns from Ditchburn and Mackay (2002).
Figure A.4: Roman & Medieval Roads, Trade Fairs, and Hanseatic Towns
Table A.2: Inclusion of the trade fairs
Name 1250 1378 1477 1555 1648 1789
Antwerp –     
Bar sur Aube   – – – –
Bergen ob Zoom –  – – – –
Bozen – –    
Bruges      
Chalons sur Saone   – – – –
Frankfurt –     
Friedberg –  – – – –
Geneva –     
Lagny   – – – –
Leipzig – –    
Lille      
Lyon –     
Provins   – – – –
Skanes      
St. Denis      
Troyes   – – – –
Ypres      
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Note: Accessible via http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/wise-large-rivers-and-large-lakes (last accessed May, 30th
2016)
Figure A.5: Large and Small Rivers
Note: These data were digitized from Frenzel (1938) and Elsner (2009)
Figure A.6: Mineral Resources
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Note: Areas were digitized from Schlüter (1952).
Figure A.7: Settlement in the Early Middle Ages
Note: Own calculation on the basis of Mayshar et al. (2015) and data from Galor and Özak (2014, 2015). The lighter the colors, the higher
is suitability for growing cereals relative to growing roots and tubers.
Figure A.8: Cereals vs. Roots and Tubers
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Note: The instrument from Alesina et al. (2013) shows only minor variation within our sample. We employ the idea by Andersen et al.
(2016) based on data from Panagos (2006) and Van Liedekerke et al. (2006).
Figure A.9: Usage of the Heavy Plough Alesina et al. (2013); Andersen et al. (2016)
Note: Information of the date and location of the battles is taken from Bradbury (2004), Clodfelter (1992) and Darby and Fullard (1978).
Figure A.10: Battles
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Note: Digitized from Wolff (1877)
Figure A.11: Regions of the HRE in 1150
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To further understand the link between taxation and the formation of state capacity, this paper employs an
incomplete contract model of an agricultural society. Using province-level data of Brandenburg-Prussia
from 1650–1697, I argue that the origins of it’s success lie in 17th century institutional reforms and
geography, rather than the genius of its princes. These reforms affected predominantly the rural parts of
Prussia, integrated the provinces outside of Brandenburg, reduced the rents of the landed-nobility, and
shaped their relationship towards the central state.
JEL Codes: O42 · D73 · Q15 · N93 · D82
Keywords: State capacity · observability · principal-agent problem · taxation · Prussia
—————————————————————————————-
Is Prussia1 today a role model for the development of an effective state? Some have highlighted
∗Thilo R. Huning is doctoral candidate at the Institute for Economic History, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, School of
Business and Economics, Spandauer Str. 1, 10997 Berlin, Germany; email: huningth at wiwi.hu-berlin.de. He would like to
acknowledge very helpful comments and review by Nikolaus Wolf and Kappe Kappner.
1The nomenclature for different Hohenzollern territories is very confusing when writing from a long-term historical
perspective. For example, Clark (2007) is subtitled ‘The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947’, while Prussia only became
the name for the whole Hohenzollern lands in 1701. To fix terms, to the whole lands under the rule of the Hohenzollern, I
will refer to as ‘Brandenburg-Prussia‘ or ‘the Electorate’. ‘Prussia’ stands for the Kingdom of Prussia 1701–1947. When I
refer to the original Prussia, the most eastward province of the Hohenzollern lands, I will use the term ‘Eastern Prussia’,
which is ahistoric but avoids confusion with the later Kingdom of Prussia.
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the ability of the Prussian state to provide public goods, especially security, and education2. Some
have described Prussia’s role as a shelter for outcasts, like the Huguenots (Hornung, 2014). Clark
(2007) discusses the ‘enlightened’ values that the Prussian princes were guided by, pointing at the
influence of spirit on economic outcomes (McCloskey, 2006; Mokyr, 2011). Others draw the picture
of an authoritarian state that crowds out private investment and is inherently undemocratic (see
Beck, 1997; Rosenberg, 1958). Gerschenkron (1966) famously blamed the Prussian authoritarianism
for the rise of the Nazi party and was followed by a whole school of historians assessing a German
’special path’3 that began in autocratic Prussia. What unifies both positions is the legacy of a
strong state (Acemoglu, 2005). How did this state emerge?
Theories on the origins of states are based upon the idea that there is agricultural output that
needs to be protected (Bates et al. (2002); North et al. (2009) and more recently Dal Bó et al. (2015);
Boix (2015); Mayshar et al. (2015)). States are more efficient in providing security, or violence
(Bean, 1973; Weber, 1919; North et al., 2009) than an individual. Therefore, either states emerge
from stationary bandits (Olson, 1993) or a voluntary ‘social contract’. This basic state collects taxes
from its subjects and spends them on the provision of security. The effective provision of security,
and the influence of military technology and its development on public order has been subject of
many studies (Tilly, 1975; Boix, 2015; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). Mirabeau’s quote “While most
states have an army, the Prussian army has a state” and today’s memorial of Prussia’s military,
with its annual peak in New York City’s Steuben parades, seem to underline the role of a strong
military for a strong Prussian state.
Craig (1955) famously argued that it was the role of the army, first in Prussia and then in the
German Empire, that inhibited the development of a German representative democracy in the
Western tradition, destabilized the Weimar Republic, and supported the rise of the Nazi party.
While refusing simplistic explanations for their success, “the theory that Germans are by nature
subservient to authority, militaristic, and aggressive, and that there is very little that any one
can do about this except deprive them of the means of making themselves dangerous to their
neighbors” (p. xiii), Craig does not provide a theory of the origins of this military state. He argues
2Studies that argue for a strong effect of education for Germany’s catch-up in the 19th century include Cinnirella and
Hornung (2016), while Edwards (2013) has a critical view on this. Qualitative studies include Beck (1997), who argues that
authoritarianism and the welfare state are interlinked and begins his historical narrative in the 1830s.
3Relevant studies include Jarausch (1983); Wehler (1987), among many others.
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Note: This map, based upon the dataset from (Huning and Wahl, 2017) extended by the provinces out of the Holy Roman
Empire from (Wolff, 1877) shows the position of the provinces legally part of the Hohenzollern lands
(’Brandenburg-Prussia’) within the Holy Roman Empire. The most Western province Mark-Kleve, originally two counties,
borders today’s Netherlands, while Eastern Prussia is today a part of the Russian Federation.
Figure 1: Map of the provinces of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1672
that the strong role of the military in Brandenburg-Prussia directly after the Thirty Years War
survived the French Revolution and its aftermath, it also survived 1848, it united Germany in the
heart of its enemy in 1871, it also survived the defeat of 1918, and it was the German military
power and the people that dreamed of its renaissance that Hitler’s speeches addressed. Therefore,
the central aim of this paper is to find the origins of these developments. What explains the role
of Brandenburg-Prussian army in the 17th century?
Historians agree that the time after the Thirty Years War saw an unprecedented increase in the
regulation of society by states (see Whaley, 2012). It remains however in doubt why Brandenburg
was more successful in creating such a strong state while other German princes failed. Ruling
out a favorable geography as an explanation, many have highlighted the role of individuals. To
provide a representative quote, Wilhelm von Humboldt assessed that “Prussia cannot be compared
to any other country; it is bigger, and it not only wants to be bigger, than provided by its natural
strength. There has to be an extra. [...] In the times of Fredrick II., it was his genius.”4. Was the
4Own translation cited after (Haffner, 1998, p. 132)
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strong Prussian state an outcome of its princes’ genius, or preferences?5
The answer to this question potentially lies in regarding the other side of state finances, their
income, taking advantage of the theory of incomplete contracts. Mayshar et al. (2017) have argued
that Egypt could build a stronger state than Mesopotamia because its agricultural output was
easier to assess. While the Nile brings with equally fertile soil, the influence of the Mesopotamian
private channels on agricultural output are more complex. The more complicated tax assessment,
the larger the information asymmetry between state and subjects, and the more costly tax admin-
istration. Central Europe’s geography is yet more complicated. Huning and Wahl (2017) propose
a geographic index, caloric observability, to quantify the extend of information asymmetries. It is
based on geographic variation in the output of soil in terms of calories. The paper includes a model
that links bad observability to uprisings and outmigration, but also to urbanization. This model
is tested on a new data set on the Holy Roman Empire 1250–1789, and it finds that states with
less observability are more prone to bankruptcy, are more long-lived, and in the long-term also
geographically larger than states with bad observability. How do the idiosyncratic explanations
for the Prussian state look in the light of this theory? What allowed the Hohenzollern to create the
country with the highest taxes in Europe (Haffner, 1998, p. 95)?
The legacy of Prussian state capacity and its ability to reforms are almost exclusively built around
the early 19th century reforms. In today’s Germany, the names of Stein, Hardenberg, Humboldt,
and other reformers of the 19th century are ubiquitous, while the legacy of the reformers of the
17th century, which I will argue are key to the development of the state and a prerequisite for
all following reforms, are forgotten. This general notion holds for recent economics literature.
While Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Kopsidis and Bromley (2016) discuss whether the reforms in
the Western part of Brandenburg-Prussia are a result of French shock reforms, Cinnirella and
Hornung (2016) investigate empirically the effects of the nineteenth century reforms. In contrast, I
am unaware of any quantitative studies on earlier reforms, which are essential to the becoming
5Many studies view the origin of Prussian militarism in the reign of prince Frederick William (1688–1740) (Clark, 2007,
p. 95). He is usually associated with a fetish for uniforms in general, but especially with tall men in uniform, the ’Lange
Kerls’ (’tall lads’) which were conscripted all over Europe. Other highlight the role of Friedich II., especially his shift from
enlightened ideas presented in his book ’Antimachiavell’ (1740) to the exact opposite politics in the unlawful annexation
of Silesia in the same year. Some go as far as regarding these wars as a way of emancipating from childhood traumata,
including the execution of his friend Hermann von Kathe, which he had to witness (see Clark, 2007, p. 110). Building
upon the study of the vast autobiographic material, others have assessed his general suicidal and risk-seeking behavior.
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of an administration and state. The genius of Frederick ‘the Great’ becomes less staggering once
one regards the war chest he inherited from his father (Haffner, 1998), and in parts our hindsight
knowledge on the influence of human capital accumulation on growth (Galor, 2011; Becker and
Woessmann, 2009) shifted our focus away from the creation of efficient taxation towards state
expenditure on schooling as well as structural change, and blocks our view on the inheritance the
19th century Prussian bureaucrats retrieved.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I will outline some theoretical considerations
that extend the model from Huning and Wahl (2017) and guide the descriptive and comparative
analyses. This is followed by an overview of the development of state capacity in Prussia 1600–1804.
The influence of geography upon Prussia is then studied in light of this model using break points
in Prussian history, before concluding.
I. Theoretical Considerations
Huning and Wahl (2017) extend the closed economy model in Mayshar et al. (2017) by introducing
interstate competition. They argue with Carneiro (1970) and Volckart (1997, 2002) that this
competition was not only about war, but mostly about who could attract most migrants, increasing
the population of their country. They highlight the role of Imperial cities, mostly in the South and
West of the Holy Roman Empire, which were a common destination for outmigration, and could
not be pursued to send fleeing peasants back to their home lands.
In the largest territory of the Holy Roman Empire, Habsburg-Austria, the level of this competition
differed enormously within its provinces. While the vast Austrian hinterland was far away from
Imperial cities and also other states to compete for migrants with, their Western border faced
strong competition (Ogilvie, 2001). Due to the fact that many Imperial cities have Roman roots
and were therefore far away from the Germanic and Slavic settlements that became Brandenburg,
competition with Imperial cities was rather low. However, the large supply of land in the territory
of the German order imposed the risk that Brandenburg peasants outmigrated if they felt treated
unfairly and hear about a ‘better’ place. Unfair treatment, as already argued by Mayshar et al.
(2017) does in the long-run not depend on personal characteristics of rulers, but on their ability to
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observe output correctly. If they overestimate the outcome of the harvest due to a screwed signal
induced by complex geography, which may cause rulers to overtax their subjects. This might force
subjects to starve (if they do not migrate).
1. The Military State?
A central swift for the development of the European states has been attributed to changes in tactics
and military administration, as a consequence of the introduction of gun powder (see Rogers
(1995) for an overview). These led to decreasing marginal costs of the provision of defense as
a public good, and therefore favor larger states. As outlined in Blanning (2007, p. 289f.) when
comparing the army sizes in the 150 years after the Thirty Years War, a bifocal development
becomes apparent: While smaller German states, including Saxony and Bavaria experience a
decrease of their army sizes, the largest states in Europe experience a sharp increase. Saxony
reaches its peak at the beginning of the 17th century, at 30,000 soldiers, and is left with only
around 6,000 in 1792. Bavaria’s army was halved in the same period. In the same time, the army
of Brandenburg-Prussia, only 4,650 men strong in 1643 would rise to 45,000 in 1678, and no less
than 30,000 in peace time 1688. These numbers would be rising steadily. In 1786, just before the
French Revolution, the Prussian army was almost 50,000 men stronger than the French. Before the
First Silesean War (1740–1742), Prussia would be able to spend 80% of its state revenue on military
purposes, more than any other state in Europe (Hassinger, 1971). How was this possible, given
the smaller population, the heterogeneous political traditions and internal rivals of a central state
(burghers, nobility) and competition with other states?
The model in Huning and Wahl (2017) represents state capacity as an equilibrium outcome
between efficient provision of security (using military technology) and taxation. Security is the
origin of state, and therefore the first public good to be provided (Bean, 1973; Olson, 1993; Boix,
2015). I understand the term ‘Military State’ as a government, a stationary bandit, or a voluntary
agreement who institutionalized an administration independent and impersonal of the actual
ruler, so that a minimal level of state capacity has been reached, but public goods are almost
exclusively provided by the military. Such a military state, by outsourcing the provision of public
goods other than security can transform into other forms of a ‘strong state’ for example a welfare
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state (Beck, 1997), but also autocracy (Rosenberg, 1958). As argued by Frost (2000), the idea of a
strong, centralized state based on central provision of security was a Swedish invention which
has been imported during the Thirty Years War. Frost argues that Sweden in the 1600’s suffered
from a low agricultural productivity, and a large but impoverished nobility. This poverty, he
goes on, had two consequences. It allowed the Swedish king to exploit the weak position of the
nobility to muster them into his army. Second, it forced Sweden into a spiral of wars in search of
revenue. Frost concludes that the paradox of poor Sweden becoming a premodern power has to
be interpreted as a sign of struggle rather than glory, and also as the nucleus of the premodern
military state. The conditions under which Swedish troops entered Brandenburg-Prussia allowed
the export of this military state, first in areas with a weak nobility (as in Sweden). There was no
land under Hohenzollern rule, and no other German land of considerable size, which was more
apt to introduce these reform than the Mark of Brandenburg. Its plain, and uniform geography
prohibited large rents by nobility, and eased the import of this new form of state.
A state with a favorable geography would be able to afford the initial payment to start a self-
reinforcing process of the military state. Jones (2003, p. 105) argues with Ardant (1975) that
the core of such state has to be its most fruitful area, such as the Paris or London Basin, or the
Po Valley. Following Mayshar et al. (2017), we see that a soil generating surplus is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for a tax base. It might be, and I will argue how this idea has
explanatory power for the developments in Prussia-Brandenburg, that a high observability of
output compensates the effect of a bad soil. Once a certain level of state capacity, due to military
spending and administration, is reached, it can under circumstances extend using recursive
reasoning. As summarized by Haffner (1998, p. 103), militarism drove both Prussia’s demand for
immigration and an increase in taxation; high military spending called for high taxes, immigration,
and administrative capacity, which allowed further militarization, and so on. The observation that
taxes introduced to finance one time expenditures remain, especially wars, has been coined the
‘ratchet effect’ of public finance (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Rasler and Thompson, 1983). In line
with theory, this effect should not only relate to the level of taxes raised from a region, but also
the effect of observability on regions. If a state, in desperate need for finance for defense, creates a
larger administrative capacity, this capacity might survive the war. Since defense from outsiders is
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the most basic government function (Bean, 1973), spending on fighting an existing danger faces
the lowest resistance.
2. The Way to the Central State
Brandenburg-Prussia emerged from the fusion of Prussia in Poland, the princedom of Brandenburg
in the Holy Roman Empire, and also other territories scattered across the Empire. They featured
distinct political orders which existed in parallel, and affected each other with the increasing role
of central administration. Huge increases in land, came with a jump in population, potential
revenues for taxes, but also an enormous increase in the length of the border to be defended. For
the perspective of a single province that enjoyed relative independence before, giving up this
independence comes with trade-offs indicated by literature on the sizes of states (see Alesina and
Spolaore (1997); Bolton and Roland (1997), and Spolaore (2014) for an overview). Some provinces
might find it beneficial to continue paying for their own defense, and also collect taxes to do so
autonomously. This matter becomes increasingly interesting once the existing tax collection is
also legitimated via representative assemblies. If these assemblies’ interest would be perfectly
aligned with the interest of all citizens of their province, any centralization of authority in Berlin
would lead to a decrease of the legitimacy of taxation in general. Wahl (2015) argues that some
German cities indeed had strong participative institutions already in the Middle Ages, which also
fostered these cities’ development. Therefore, a strong central outside government replacing tax
collection and provision of public goods would lead to a reduction of participation. On the other
hand, if assemblies suffer from a principal-agent problem, and their representatives have their
own motives leading them to obstruct centralization. They would do so even if security could be
objectively better and more efficiently provided from a central government. In such state, a more
centralized state would not face a decrease in objective legitimacy. We would expect this kind of
representatives of rent-seeking nobility in rural areas. The question of whether the centralization
efforts in the 17th century set Brandenburg-Prussia requires therefore a distinction between rural
and urban areas. When we analyze the empirical results, a discussion of local differences in the
structure of the economy is therefore essential to the discussion.
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3. The Missing Urbanization
Huning and Wahl (2017) argue with Volckart (2002) that the urbanization rate is an endogenous
variable. Rulers can allow, or forbid, their subjects to settle in cities, depending which would
return the larger mount of taxes. State rulers would agree to their peasants to move to the cities,
depending on their marginal product of labor, but also on the observability of their agricultural
output. If Brandenburg was endowed with a soil that was exceptionally uniform and well to
observe, it would not be surprising in the light of this theory to find that the urbanization of
Brandenburg was relatively low, and is low to the day relative to other German regions. On the
one hand, this reduced resistance from urban population and urban political entities, which would
become a problem in other provinces. On the other, the low urbanization rate had negative impact
on the development of Brandenburg, so that the Electors actively contracted so-called ‘Locatores’
to found towns (Abel, 1953). Other regions were more sparsely settled in general, such as Eastern
Prussia, but included traditional trade-hubs (such as Danzig and Königsberg). These hubs, much
in the way of Imperial cities, established their own forms of government, and would resist any
form of intervention. Therefore, a careful analysis of the structure of settlement is important
when assessing the effect of centralization for different regions of Brandenburg-Prussia with each
other.
4. Hypotheses
Bringing these ideas of a state attempting to centralize taxation by administrative measures to the
data, there are two main hypothesis to be tested.
H1. The role of observability for taxation increases. In this paper, I argue that the Hohenzollern
administration collected military contributions from their provinces that were increasingly
linked to their economic potential. Since provinces which could be taxed more effectively
due to their favorable and more homogeneous geography, we expect that while caloric
observability does not explain contributions at the beginning of the period, it does so at its
end.
H3. A good observability assists the central government to centralize. A central government with
83
How Geography formed Brandenburg-Prussia
a better ability to observe agricultural output due to a favorable geography, should be more
able to extract taxes, given that the resistance by the old estates is weak enough. In this case,
the historical narratives of resistance that the Elector faced should be partly discounted. If
this hypothesis holds, resistance by the old elites could have been overstated by national
history, presumably to celebrate the Hohenzollern’s vision on their mission to unifying
Germany. This hypothesis seems plausible in the light that estates’ savings from formerly
extracted taxes should be depleted through the vast devastation of the Thirty Years war.
Empirical results indicating higher contributions from the more observable regions would
support this hypothesis.
II. Historical Background
1. Not An Empire?
When Voltaire famously assessed that the Holy Roman Empire was “neither Holy, nor Roman,
nor an Empire”, he pointed at the peculiar political fragmentation of German lands, surrounded
by seemingly centralized European Great Powers. Its cause has been subject to long-standing
debates.
One school, in the line of German nationalist historians like Treitschke (see Clark, 2007; Wilson,
2016, for an overview), view the cause in external powers creating a weak and impoverished
German people in their aim to capture the European ‘heartland’ (Mackinder, 1904) (a reasoning
that is going to reappear in the discussion on the Treaties of Versailles, the Dawes Plan, the NATO
membership of reunified Germany, and the abolition of the Deutsche Mark. (Simms, 2013, Ch. I)
lines out how first the Ottomans, then the French, followed by the Swedish, have invaded German
lands, while the Habsburg failed at creating a unified home front.
To question this school’s narrative, consider the heterogenous effects war had on the development
of states. Many states, and these include Prussia-Brandenburg, were well able to centralize their
power not despite, but because of war with outside forces points at internal problems of the
Habsburg empire. The empirical analysis can attribute some of this difference to the weaker
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starting position the Habsburg Empire had compared to their northern rival. The Habsburg rulers
always faced a stronger resistance by their own nobility, found it harder to introduce institutions
that would centralize their powers, and could therefore not take advantage of all their belongings
as much as Brandenburg was able to bring them to the table.
A part of this failure becomes apparent as the Habsburg dynasty was never successful in uniting
the Holy Roman Empire. Recent literature has reappraised the Holy Roman Empire in this
light and saw the high fragmentation as economically advantageous. Some have highlighted
the positive effects of interstate competition which was not limited to destruction through wars,
but on the contrary productive, in terms of immigration, technology, not to forget institutional
competition (Volckart, 1997, 2002; Wilson, 2016). Its structure circumvent wars, and the massive
potential for war was only revealed when it failed altogether, such as in the Thirty Years War
(Wilson, 2016). Wilson also argues that the Holy Roman Empire was indeed successful at being
not-centralized. Neither any outside power, nor the Habsburg Empire, was able to reduce princes’
freedom before Napoleon. In the end, the decrease in market integration (Wolf, 2009) might have
come with an increase in innovative power (Jones, 2003; Ko et al., 2014).
An indicator for princes’ resistance against further centralization and a stronger Habsburg govern-
ment was also their dealing with uprisings. While ‘Lutheran before Luther’ (Cahill, 2014, p. 24)
John Ball faced the united action of English nobility, Luther himself was hidden and supported by
some princes. This eventually lead to a coalition against the Habsburg monarchy, the Schmalkaldic
League, and the two single most bloody wars before 1900, and a permanent schism of the Roman
Catholic church6.
2. The Hohenzollern lands
2.1 Brandenburg
The Hohenzollern dynasty, originally from the South of the Holy Roman Empire, acquired
Brandenburg in 1417, first only a small territory around Berlin. The uniform, empty, and boring
nature of the lands, the poverty of the soils, and the low state of population have inspired poems,
6For example, (see Wilson, 2009, p. 41) for a discussion on the link between Imperial Law and the hope for a reunification
of the churches after the Peace of Augsburg 1555
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accounts, and even canonical German literature, most famously by Theodor Fontane (see Clark,
2007, for an overview). (Clark, 2007, p. 3) has questioned the stereotype of a totally infertile land,
as some regions could indeed only be sown very seldom, and also infertile water-land, while other
regions were intensively cultivated. Also, Brandenburg came with one of the seven electoral votes.
What is often retold as a prestigious, but economically hopeless endeavor, became the core of one
of the five European super powers in the 17th century. This process was mostly a long sequence
of land accessions. Their integration however was a story of the aftermath of the Thirty Years
War.
Table 1: Development of Hohenzollern lands. The
county of Wernigerode was part of Brandenburg ever
since 1268. The year names the year full control over
the province was gained.
Year Province(s) HRE
1417 Electorate of Brandenburg and
County of Wernigerode
Yes
1525 Eastern Prussia No
1614 Counties of Mark-Kleve, Ravens-
berg
Yes
1648 Archbishoprich of Magdeburg,
Abbey of Minden and Counties
of Mansfeld and Halberstadt
Yes
1657 County of Lauenburg-Bütow No
1659 Pomerania No
1660 County of Draheim No
The later province Wernigerode was already
connected to Brandenburg ever since 1268.
This tiny, rugged, but populous and mineral
rich area in the Harz region, back then the
most important deposit for potassium salt,
but also metals, added a domestic source
for these raw materials. Its terrain as such
was complementary to the plane Branden-
burg, and therefore stayed an independent
province over many centuries. For an anal-
ysis of the effect of geography on taxation,
however we should bear in mind that this
province, an outlier in sectoral structure,
ruggedness, and also a rather small territory,
would behave differently than others.
After the Black Death, a first goal of the Ho-
henzollern was to repopulate the country,
additionally facing the threat of outmigration towards the East. Still in 1450, almost 30% of farms
in the Mittelmark where still left unpopulated, and hundreds of towns were left behind (Carsten,
1964). To contain this and its effect on tax revenues, Estates agreed that migrating peasants would
be sent back to the region they came from. Starting in 1445, peasants needed to provide permits to
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leave (Carsten, 1964). The original model proposes migration to independent city states as a main
driver of urbanization, and therefore limits the tax capacity of territorial states. Imperial cities were
a major destination for subjects willing to flee, so that the state of Brandenburg benefited from
the absence of Imperial cities in its proximity. In addition, political fragmentation in the North
East of the Holy Roman Empire was much lower than in its south west, so that this channel of
urbanization is expected to be much weaker. Also, the role of agriculture for taxation diminishes
later, compared to other states in the Holy Roman Empire. Preexisting urban centers founded by
the Romans were non-existent. The results of the absence of competition with other states’ were
mixed. First, the absence of competition from imperial cities reduced the threat of emigrating
subjects. Second, the positive effects of an increase in proto-industry and the role of trade could
not be taken advantage of. When this was realized, towns and cities were founded in a planned
fashion, by ’locatores’ (see Brenner, 1976). This is especially true in Brandenburg. Ellenberg
(1990) shows that the predominant town model in Brandenburg is the linear village, or street
village. This points at a rather late settlement, compared to village models in the rest of today’s
Germany. Prioritizing the rural areas, cities were forbidden to shelter fleeing peasants, some cities
resisting these demands for years, e.g. Anklam in 1458, or Köpenick in 1483, but eventually gave
up resistance (Carsten, 1964).
A state with strong Estate representation was also never developed in Brandenburg. High nobility
never existed, the share of lands that belonged to the Elector was higher than anywhere in Europe.
The view of Carsten (1954) who argued that the Hohenzollern were ‘primus inter pares’ between
lower nobles in Brandenburg before the 17th century has provoked a strand of literature showing
the opposite (Baumgart, 1969). One should not confuse the idea of a central administration with
administrative modernity. As pointed out by Willoweit (1982), Brandenburg was certainly not a
forerunner in constitutional development that eventually lead to today’s democratic constitutions.
He argues that only with the introduction of a privy counselor (Geheimrat) in 1603 Brandenburg
caught up to constitutional standards established elsewhere in Europe, mostly Austria and also
smaller German states. Already then, however small beginnings of the central administration
rivaling estates interest is more successful then elsewhere. The estates were not called for decades
already in the 1500s. They had no right to gather on their own demand, and they would also
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never be called after 1653 except to applaud at official events. (Baumgart, 1969)
Scheuner (1965), among others, has argued that the expansion of Brandenburg-Prussia to coun-
tries both inside and outside the Empire, being ethnically diverse, lacking a uniform cultural
background, language, or even religious confession, called for a strong state to substitute other
ties. This is in line with economic literature finding that the provision of public goods becomes
more costly with more ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 1999). These divisions could also affect
subgroups to lobby for more autonomy (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bolton and Roland, 1997),
which needed to be countered in the attempt to centralize the state.
The region that eventually lent its name to the whole of the Hohenzollern’s belongings, Eastern
Prussia, was gained in 1525, when it was secularized, expropriating the German order. Like
Brandenburg, this province’s geography is plane and uniform. This already had consequences for
the defense structures built, including Europe’s largest Medieval castle, Malbork castle. Rugged
terrain elsewhere in Europe provided castle builders with both elevated grounds to built upon and
rocks to use as building material. The German order had to turn to bricks, and the plane lands
allowed a single castle design to be copied across the country without having to adjust the plan to
the building ground. Featuring important Medieval trade hubs with a legacy in the Hanseatic
League, such as Danzig and Königsberg, Eastern Prussia included cities with a strong urban elite.
This was especially so after the Thirty Years War, in which both cities were able to increase their
trade, also due to the war involvement of other sea harbors, such as Rostock or Bremen (Zorn,
1971, p. 533).
The 17th century repeatedly brought the Hohenzollern lands at the verge of collapse, but eventually
came with huge additions to its land. This started in 1614, when a quarrel over inheritance lead
to the acquisition of the Counties Mark-Kleve and Ravensberg. These territories which were not
geographically connected to the core regions not only resulted in the country spanning from
the Dutch border to Prussia, but also increased its heterogeneity immensely. Especially, these
very urban and commercialized regions of Mark and Kleve, the core of today’s Ruhr area and
densely populated also back then, promised both a high potential for tax revenue, but also a high
resistance against it.
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The case of Pomerania was more complicated, and full of ambitions and drawbacks from Ho-
henzollern perspective. In 1648, Pomerania was split into one Swedish and one Hohenzollern
part. During the Northern War, the Electorate gained control over the whole Pomerania until
1659 (Clark, 2007, p. 50), but would then loose it again due to French and Habsburg intervention,
before regaining it after the Brandenburg-Swedish war.
From the Peace of Westphalia, the Hohenzollern received significant regions due to secularization,
the Archbishopric of Magdeburg (which included the County of Mansfeld), and Minden Abbey.
The Bishopric of Halberstadt, again extending the Electorate into the mineral-rich Harz region. The
last Brandenburg-Prussian extension in before the seventeenth century was the one of Draheim in
1660.
Population estimates for the time are hard to find, especially due to the Thirty Years War itself.
Pfister (2011) argues that the urbanization rate between 1600 and 1700 is actually decreasing, since
the number of city inhabitants recovers slower than those of the whole population. Following
the data by Franz (1979), war casualties in Kleve-Mark would be relatively low (under 20% of
population), while it was 40–50% in Brandenburg, and over 50% in Pomerania. Around the
Northern War, following the estimates by Fay (1917), Brandenburg would represent around a third
of Hohenzollern’s subjects , followed by Prussia (30%), Kleve-Mark (around 15%), Minden and
Ravensberg jointly 7%, and Halberstadt 5%.
III. Empirical Analysis and Results
1. Brandenburg and Its Competitors in the Long Run
To conduct a long run comparison between Brandenburg and its closest competitors, the Electorate
of Saxony and of course the Habsburg monarchy, I use the data set on the Holy Roman Empire by
Huning and Wahl (2017) which allows to compare the geography each of these regions contained
within their respective borders 1250–1789. Since large parts of the Hohenzollern’s estates were
never part of the Holy Roman Empire, I extended the data set by these territories to capture the
whole of Brandenburg-Prussia.
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Table 2: Development of observability and basic geography of Brandenburg-Prussia and its closest competi-
tors 1477–1789
Year State Indexed Observability Caloric Suitability Area in km2
1477
Brandenburg 1.000 2056 32031
Habsburg 0.200 1714 37852
Saxony 0.451 1802 19894
1555
Brandenburg-Prussia 0.861 1980 22970
Habsburg 0.269 1619 137965
Saxony 0.365 1716 16530
1648
Brandenburg-Prussia 0.726 1876 99866
Habsburg 0.192 1458 193456
Saxony 0.425 1810 24870
1789
Brandenburg-Prussia 0.670 1835 164233
Habsburg 0.169 1393 181861
Saxony 0.469 1862 37354
Note: The caloric observability was normalized by dividing the caloric noise of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1477 by the
caloric noise (see Huning and Wahl, 2017)). Caloric suitability denotes the average caloric yield using data was taken
from (Galor and Özaka, 2016; Galor and Özak, 2015) and generated using the maps of (Huning and Wahl, 2017). For
1378–1477, fruits that arrived in Europe during the Columbian exchange were excluded.The numbers for Saxony exclude
Poland, as this was never a part of the Electorate.
The descriptive statistics of Brandenburg(-Prussia) and its closest competitors provided in table 2
support a very long run perspective on geography’s role for these states’ development.
Consider the caloric suitability, and the area controlled by the dynasties in 1477, 1555, 1648, and
1789. Any changes are due to composition of the territories, except that the suitability data in 1477
excludes sources of nutrition that were only available in Europe after Columbus. Taking control
over parts of today’s Austria in 1278, the Habsburg dynasty leads in terms of area controlled.
Given the increasing returns to scale (Bean, 1973), amplified by the Military Revolution (Tilly, 1993;
Gennaioli and Voth, 2015), the dominance of the Habsburg Empire is in this light non-surprising.
We also see that the expansion of the Hohenzollern is a question of the time after 1555, while the
Habsburg lands increased in size much earlier, especially due to increasing control over Austrian
lands. Brandenburg’ area is decreased in 1555 because of its partition 1535–1571.
Two findings can be drawn from comparing the caloric suitability of the three lands. First, the
Habsburg lands are constantly expanding into regions that reduce its average suitability. In
the light of the stories of the bad agricultural conditions in Brandenburg, it is surprising that
the Hohenzollern lands have indeed the highest yields, and are also able to keep a high state.
Following the literature (Nunn and Qian, 2011; Galor and Özaka, 2016; Galor and Özak, 2015),
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it is assumed that fruits and grains from North America can be grown in Europe where this is
beneficial right after 1500. This reveals that the Columbian exchange, mostly the potato, could
have had an impact on the development of the Hohenzollern’s land. However, Frederick II. and his
1742 acquisition of Silesia, with a suitability only slightly below Brandenburg’s previous average,
seem to have a more traceable impact the legend about the King himself introducing the potato to
the peasants of his country with his own hands (see Clark, 2007)).
Regarding our key measure, the observability, when one indexes everything using Brandenburg’s
value in 1477, one sees a steady decrease in the observability of the Hohenzollern’s land. From
1535 to 1571, a part of Brandenburg was an independent princedom, Brandenburg-Küstrin, which
controlled the Eastern territories. The decreasing number in average observability indicates that
the most observable Brandenburgian lands have been to in the Odra region. After reunification
and expansion via Kleve, Minden, Ravensberg, and secularized Magdeburg, the Hohenzollern
‘controlled’ de jure a much larger territory in 1648, which was on the downside way complicated
to tax. However, once comparing their number of 72, 6% of their initial observabiliy index of
1477 with Saxony or even the Habsburg lands, their observability is outstandingly high. For
example, the Saxonian Electors already started with a much lower observability in their very
rugged core lands around Dresden and Leipzig, but were able to grow into regions that were better
taxable until 1789. The regions around the Electorate of Saxony were very politically fragmented.
Speaking with Huning and Wahl (2017), this could indicate that these areas were also hard to
tax. Concerning Austria, controlling larger the Sterymark and Tirol came with an increase in
observability, but the additions after 1555 reduce average observability. Any increase in area from
1555 onward is associated with a decrease in observability, so that taxation of the new belongings,
considering the resistance of the old elites, was also occupied by simple geographic constraints. We
can argue that if technology in administrative means, even if it was common, must have yielded
less success than in terrain that was much easier to assess. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that the reforms that did take place all over Europe, including Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia,
found less grip in the Emperor’s land than in the Brandenburg plains.
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2. The Development of Military Contributions after the Thirty Years War
To trace the development of military contributions after the Thirty Years war, I digitized data on
the Hohenzollern’s provinces from 1650–1681 from Wolters (1915). These data are based upon
the official military statistics that provide itemized data on military spending of the time, which
Wolters aggregates to one number per province per year. The author himself coins this endeavor
a ‘trial’, however the data set seems to be relatively consistent in longitudinal direction, across
provinces, but also with the more detailed data provided in other tables in the same book.
In the first year reported, 1650, only five provinces pay any contributions. These are of course the
Mark of Brandenburg, which pays 150,000 Taler, followed by Halberstadt (50,000), Ravensberg and
Mark-Kleve (each 40,000), and Minden (36,000). While it may not be surprising that Brandenburg
has to pay the bulk of the military spending, the other numbers, especially their proximity in
levels, is stunning. The first reflex upon consulting the map, that territories so different in size
would contribute so similar numbers, is supported by closer inspection of these provinces. How
can an economically advanced Kleve, a core of today’s Ruhr Area, almost untouched by the Thirty
Years War, contribute the same amount as the much smaller Minden, which is so less urbanized
and also much smaller in size? The reader is tempted to see these contributions as arbitrary, or
symbolic, as the background on economic diversity in these regions would lead him to expect
a different picture. The impression of arbitrary contributions is further strengthened looking at
the next two years, in which Kleve-Mark first raises its contributions by the factor of three, falling
back to only 30,000 in 1652. Pomerania is reported as contributor in 1653, starting at 50,000 Taler,
Eastern Prussia the year after with 6,000. This number can be explained by the fact that Eastern
Prussia was not under Hohenzollern control for the complete year.
The beginning of the Little Northern War, more precise the conclusion of the Treaty of Rinsk im
1655, induces a rise in the sum of contributions from 335,465 to 1,440,802 Taler. In this treaty,
concluded in November 1655, the Eastern Prussian nobles called upon the Brandenburg Elector
to defend them against the Swedish invasion. The bulk of this increase was carried by Eastern
Prussia itself, which due to its contributions of 600,000 Taler (compared to 360,000 of the Mark of
Brandenburg) became the leading contributor. What is intriguing is that Kleve and Mark, on the
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other side of the Electorate and not endangered by Swedes, adjusts its contributions from 50,000
to 250,000. The war time contributions seem to reflect better the expected ability of provinces to
contribute given by their economic credentials. However, when regarding the relative increase
between the last year in peace and the year after, its questionable how Ravensberg more than
doubles its numbers while Halberstadt remains at the same level. In 1660, Draheim (2,500 Taler)
and Lauenburg-Bütow (4,000) start contibuting.
Are the increases of the first war years sustainable? Contributions dropped from a peak of over
2 Million in 1658, to around 850,000, and would never down to prewar levels again, also when
excluding the new provinces. Does the trend of a perceived convergence of economic potential
and contributions persist? Already during the war, Eastern Prussia reduces its contributions to
slightly less than a 100,000 in 1663, which is less than Pomerania in the same year. Indeed, both
provinces faced a large destruction during the time, however Eastern Prussia being much more
urban. Eastern Prussia’s low contributions can be apologized by the large contributions it paid the
years before but can also be interpreted as a successful attempt reduce the Hohenzollern’s grip
once the danger is over. Many provinces after the war go back to their prewar contributions, some
to the exact same sum, as Minden and Ravensberg. Eastern Prussia would contribute as much as
120,000 in 1667, but increase this share to 280,000 in 1672 before reaching a 240,000 equilibrium
that it would keep also through the Swedish-Brandenburg War. Pomerania would continue to pay
around 100,000, which indeed reflects also their relative economic potential. The small provinces
Draheim (2,500 Taler) and Lauenburg-Bütow (4,000 Taler) would continue to pay the exact same
contributions until 1679, the end of the Swedish-Brandenburg War.
During the Swedish-Brandenburg War (1674–1679), although never as costly as the Little Northern
War (peak of contributions 1,717,231 Taler in 1678), the bulk of the contributions is paid by the
Mark of Brandenburg. As it is also the target of the Swedish invasion, this is not surprising.
Looking closer at the other provinces, there seems to be indeed a higher contributions of provinces
that are less affected. Eastern Prussia in 1672 contributes as much as 420,000, almost as much
as the Mark of Brandenburg (549,125 Taler). Pomerania also contributes almost 200,000, and the
contributions of Magdeburg sum up to 120,000. Mark and Kleve peak at 226,000 in 1678. At the
end of the war, the numbers appear much more to reflect economic potential, as they show also a
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large heterogeneity. This pattern would also not disappear after the war, as contributions oscillate
around 200,000 for Eastern Prussia, stay at 144,000 for Pomerania, increase to a stable 200,000 for
Magdeburg, 30,000 for Mansfeld (which started contributing as late as 1680), around 90,000 for
Halberstadt, 10,000 for Wernigerode, around 60,000 for Minden, 44,088 for Ravensberg, 120,000 for
Kleve and Mark, and 454509 for the Mark Brandenburg in 1697.
The assessment of ‘symbolic’ contributions of the first years in sample seems to have been replaced
by numbers that do reflect some variance in provinces’ ability to contribute. To study whether this
change in pattern can be linked to geographic fundamentals, in the next step I will connect these
data to the theory of observable agricultural output, and will also use data on city population to
account for heterogeneity in the urban economy.
3. The Role of Caloric Observability for Contributions
To insure coherence with the data set from Huning and Wahl (2017), I digitized the shape of the
Prussian provinces from the same source, Wolff (1877), and employ the map of 1648 for over the
whole sample period. This is the consequence of trading off the changes due to redrawing of the
maps during the times, and fitting and adjusting maps from other sources to create a historically
‘correct’ map introducing new sources of inaccuracy. Most importantly, we would expect the
province of Pomerania to be most viable to this limitations, as here lies the core of the fights
with the Swedish. When interpreting the results, keep in mind these untraceable and continuous
changes to the geography and its initial division and repeated unification.
To run my regressions, I exclude all provinces from the data set for all years in which Berlin did not
have control over them. Should there be debates7 on the exact timing, I referred to Köbler (1988)
for reference. Therefore, the data set allows me in parts to abstract from regional denominations,
and compare territories that could be controlled by a central government. The process of actually
centralizing is at the core at this paper, so that the success of realizing these potentials can be
illuminated.
In order to understand the role of the aftermath of the Thirty Years War for the development of a
Prussian central state, I will first provide some description of the development of the absolute
7See also the discussion in Huning and Wahl (2017).
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contributions, before assessing the effect of obervability econometrically. Over the whole period,
the main contributor after Brandenburg 150, 000 Taler was the secularized Archbishopric of
Halberstadt (50,000) closely followed by Minden, Ravensberg, and Kleve (around 40,000 each), all
the other provinces not contributing. A central task of a centralized government is to asses the
amount each province is able to contribute. This should result in more heterogeneity in payments,
as in any effective contribution system, one would not expect rich and urban Kleve and the rural
and minor Ravensberg to pay about the same contributions.
There are overall 501 observations of contributions in the sample I constructed. Wolters (1915)
does not distinguish between provinces that were part of Brandenburg-Prussia and those that did
not. In order to exclude all observations of provinces that were not part of the country, I exclude
Eastern Prussia until 1655, Lauenburg-Bütow until 1658, and Draheim until 1665.
The twelve provinces in my sample vary considerably in size. Their existence was not an outcome
of administrative arrangements (which might lead to equally sized territorial units) but a historical
process in which tiny provinces, such as Wernigerode (see fig. 1) stands on the same level as
Brandenburg. In order to account for this initial difference, we can not compare the absolute
level of contributions. Given the difficulty to find valid estimations for the rural populations, the
analysis is limited to the contributions per area as the most reasonable indicator. In order to justify
this, we need to bear in mind that the actual quality of the soil has to be accounted for, and also
control for some degree of urbanization. The histogram of the contributions per square kilometer
(fig. A.1 of the appendix) first indicates that there is no normal distribution, especially due to
the many observations with zero or very small contributions. This is an important part of the
proposed development to a state in which provinces’ contributions are related to their economic
credentials. The histogram does not propose the existence of distinct processes, one that decides
whether states pay at all and then a second process that decides on the level, there doesn’t seem
to be such a hurdle. I propose that the overall distribution of the data can be caught at best by a
Poisson estimator. The small number of observations does not allow a legit panel exercise, so that
I pool all data and run a single regression with robust standard errors clustered at the province
level.
Consider table 3. In column (1), we learn that there exists a significant linear time trend of
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rising contributions. Caloric observability is significant, and its estimate propounds a positive
and economically significant relationship between how well the geography allowed the central
government to assess agricultural output and the contributions it received. The caloric suitability
of a province has a zero and insignificant effect. This is in line with the theoretical argument of
Mayshar et al. (2017). To control for the Eastward settlement direction of Central Europe (and also
the Roman legacy in the West of the territory) I control for the longitude. To control for the idea
that proximity to the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic could have had ample effects on the regions, I also
control for elevation. In column (2) I include the sum of all cities’ population within the region. I
use the data set from the Centre for Global Economic History8 and hold the population constant
at its 1650 level. Following Pfister (2011), I assume that the absolute level of city population is
rather constant, while the rural population increases in absolute number after the Thirty Years
War. The estimate from column (2) suggests that city population is not statistically significant by
itself, at least not across the whole sample.
Once I include ruggedness as an instrument for the opportunity costs of agriculture, especially
mining in the Harz regions and proto-industry in Mark-Kleve, in column (3), city population
is indeed significant. Ruggedness itself has a positive effect. The downside of the ruggedness
measure is that it is highly correlated with our main explanatory, caloric observability. Ruggedness
is, among others, a reason why crop yields should vary. Also by construction, using the same
GIS procedures of generating the variable, ruggedness and caloric observability are related. The
correlation across the sample is 0.81. However, they are conceptually two different things, so
that a closer investigation in the driver of this behavior is necessary. Among the top contributors,
especially in the beginning of our sample, is Halberstadt, which is also very rugged. Controlling
for this particularity in column (4) attributes a highly significant, and even stronger effect to
caloric observability. When controlling for the other Harz region in our sample, Wernigerode,
in column (5), the significance of the caloric observability prevails, but its effect is back at the
estimate from column (2). However Wernigerode is as rugged as Halberstadt, in contrast to
Halberstadt it is not a top contributor. The exercise from columns (4) and (5) indicates that the
correlation between ruggedness and caloric observability is highest in these two regions, and that
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ruggedness and observability have discrete explanatory power controlling for the particularities of
any of these two regions. Another region that is naturally interesting to look at is Brandenburg,
the core of the state. The statistically insignificant estimate suggests that Brandenburg is indeed
not different to the others, at least not in the time we are looking at.
Finally, to control for other geographic variables which could potentially alter the results, I control
for distance to oceans, to Medieval trade routes (using the data from Huning and Wahl (2017)), to
Berlin, and also Potassium salt mines. All these variables are robust to the area of the province
under investigation, as distance is calculated as the distance of 1,000 random points within the
territory to the closest ocean, road, or Berlin. The distance to the oceans aims at capturing ease
of trade access which is not already captured by the elevation variable. Distance to trade roads
is relevant for the inland provinces and their legacy of being connected to the European trade
network during the Middle Ages. Distance to Berlin in column (9) could measure an alternative
explanation for observing agricultural output other than the one proposed in this paper (see e.g.
Olsson and Hansson, 2011)). Potassium Salt in column (10) could be an exogenous instrument
for the existence of urban trade cities which resisted centralization due to their established
representatives (see Wahl, 2017). I included the distance to the closest Hanseatic town which
were digitized digitized from Andree (1886). The estimates in column (11) indicate that the
Hanseatic tradition of proposedly more independent cities did not have a significant effect on the
contributions, at least not as far as I can show it with this limited sample.
The above cross sectional analysis points at some positive and significant relationship between
how well a province’s agricultural production can be observed and its contribution to the central
government. However, the historical narrative suggests that during the period 1650–1693, the
administrative system of Brandenburg-Prussia underwent substantial changes. We are interested
in whether small or symbolic contributions at the beginning that are presumably unrelated to
economic credentials increasingly relate to the potential of provinces to collect taxes. Two sources
of income can be distinguished: City population and rural population.
Consider table 4. I interacted both the caloric observability and the urban population with year
dummies. All other controls were included as in the regression (4) from table 3, which I trust most
as it features ruggedness and accounts for the particularity of small but mineral rich Halberstadt.
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In this table, I present the results grouped by four year periods and report only the first and last
of these periods. The regression yields no significant linear time trend, but the passage of time
is explained by the interaction between time and observability and time and urban population.
Consider the estimates for caloric observability. The estimate for 1650–53 is larger, and regarding
the standard deviation also in a statistical significant way. However, at the beginning of our period,
the contributions do not depended on the observability of the soil in a statistical significant way.
At the end of the period, this is indeed the case. Now focus on the estimates for urban population.
It is significant at the beginning and the end our our period. The number below one indicates
that city population indeed resisted and/or complicated contributions, so that their net effect
was negative. However, the amplitude of the effect is decreasing. All other controls show similar
results as in column (4) of table 2.
The fact that the significance of observability increases with the passage of time demands some
explanation. Huning and Wahl (2017) argue that for the long run, due to the advances in military
technology, urbanization, and other historic developments, the relevance of agriculture on taxation
decreases. The historical narrative suggests that Brandenburg-Prussia was a late-comer relative to
the other states in the Holy Roman Empire, given its low competition from other states and also
Imperial cities. When the Elector started to collect taxes from the provinces that were reluctant
before, there were only two options: Taxing the rural population (facing resistance from the
nobility) or taxing the city population (facing the resistance of their representatives). Taxing
agricultural output is easier in areas which are well observable. The significant estimate suggests
that the central government took advantage of their geographic property. Those provinces were
taxed higher than others, as these provinces could not hide their real output as well as others.
Presumably, the landed nobility was weaker in defending their rents in these areas. Combining the
long-run and short-run perspective, we would expect the effect of rising significance to disappear,
at latest when the urbanization of the 18th and the Industrial Revolution shift the balance between
rural and urban production. The urban population, rather stagnant in absolute numbers during
this time (Pfister, 2011), was presumably better in defending their privileges in 1650 as they
were in 1697. However, the effect of an additional citizen for the contributions should become
positive in the long run. The reforms under Frederick William, following the Swedish role model,
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Linear Time Trend 1.003
(0.00977)
Caloric Observability 1650–53 1.000
(0.00211)
...
Caloric Observability 1694–97 1.002∗∗∗
(0.000356)
Urban Population 1650–53 0.967∗∗
(0.0118)
...















Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Robust standard errors clustered by
province in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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were aimed at breaking the resistance of a landed nobility, and not at cities. Reforms raising the
contributions from cities were mostly left to Frederick William’s successors. For example the
indirect tax collected at all city walls, the Accise, which followed a French blueprint, was only
introduced by Frederick William I., King of Prussia (1688-1740).
Concluding the empirical exercise, these data hint at a development of Brandenburg-Prussia’s
provincial contribution to be increasingly linked to actual economic potential. Therefore, hypothe-
sis 4 is supported. For the case of cities, these data support the idea that they were more resistant.
For the rural areas, a higher observability is increasingly linked to higher contributions, which
supports refhyp:positive. This hints at a decrease in the rents of landed nobility. This in turn, as
suggested in the theoretical section, might have had multiple implications for their attachment to
the state. These results might indicate that the Swedish blueprint of concentrating the reforms
on the rural population and rural elites were rather successful. The overall increasing effect of
caloric observability adds a short run twist to the long run mechanism outlined in Huning and
Wahl (2017), and by doing so also contributes to a more complex understanding of the role for
geography on taxation.
IV. How Brandenburg-Prussia Increased Taxation and Centralized its
State
To inspect the mechanism, the following historical outline provides further evidence to interpret
the results.
The reforms and Brandenburg-Prussia have to be viewed in the context of other European
states, especially France, Denmark, Sweden, but also other German states (including of course
Austria), that increasingly create absolutist governments. What distinguishes the experience in
this Electorate is however the rigidity of these changes (Oestreich, 1971, p. 84).
Public finance in Brandenburg until the Thirty Years War was organized collaboratively between
Elector and estates. In the 16th century, the estates had agreed to take over the Elector’s debt,
themselves founding a state bank issuing bonds to finance these debt (Baumgart, 1969, p. 532).
As collateral, Estates supervised the collection of direct and indirect taxes of that time, mostly
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Hufsteuer (hidage, a tax on horses and lifestock) and Giebelsteuer (a land tax) (Baumgart, 1969,
p. 531). At the end of the war, not only was the bank bankrupt (Baumgart, 1969, p. 534), but
also the changing scope and organizational necessities of wars in general, and precisely the
geographic span of the Elector’s land and the idea of centralizing authority, initiated a process of
reforms that lead to a sharp decrease in the role of the old elites. These reforms, under Elector
Frederick William (1620–1688), had three main consequences. First, the recruiting system of the
Thirty Years War would be replaced by a standing army. During the Thirty Years War, states
contracted the organization of recruitment to officers, who would independently muster, pay, and
train mercenaries. This lead to huge discrepancies between the number of soldiers ‘ordered’ and
how much would be ‘delivered’ on the battlefield (Fay, 1917; Frost, 2000). Second, the finance
of the standing army was centralized, depriving existing estates of their powers. Third, central
commissions and administration would organize the collection of these contributions, facing
resistance from existing elites, to reduce (or overcome) the multi-layer principal-agent problem of
tax collection.
A central figure in initiating these reforms was Kurt Bertram von Pfuel (Oestreich, 1971). During
the Thirty Years War, von Pfuel had spent several years in the administration of Sweden, where he
witnessed the system of military organization, but also taxation and administration. The main
aspects of his reform were a standing army, and a tax system that would collect taxation from all
sources, a strong central administration, as well as the collection of statistics, but also an officers
corps that would consist mostly of nobility, so that this group would be attached to the central
state (Oestreich, 1971, p. 36). When von Pfuel passed away in 1649, these reforms have not been
implemented yet, but pointed the way into the direction they would steer in.
An important precondition for centralization were constitutional changes in the Holy Roman
Empire. After holding the legal role of the nobility relatively constant over centuries (Wilson, 2016),
this changed with an Imperial edict in 1654. Whether this law would serve as the ‘Magna Carta of
absolutism’ (Clark, 2007, p. 58) not only depends on its legal content, namely all subjects had to
assist princes in their war efforts, but also princes’ ability to enforce their claims against resistance.
The local estates defended their rents and privileges. Given that all of these three territories have
their own outer border, Estates could also put in doubt the effect of a common provision of defense
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(Fay (1917), see fig. 1), and were probably right in assuming that the central provision of the
public good security could be followed by the other public goods, questioning their privileges, and
reducing their rents. Especially for Kleve, this very dense territory with a relatively small border,
elites were not only rational for their own sake, but also for their subjects refusing to subsidize
other provinces, pointing at economic literature on the size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997;
Bolton and Roland, 1997). This however is not very plausible in the light of the external threads to
Kleve. It had been occupied by the Dutch during the Thirty Years War, and it would be occupied
and looted by the French in 1672 (Clark, 2007). Schmoller (1877) goes as far as stating that Estates
were more willing to accept directions from Amsterdam, Vienna, or Warsaw, than from Berlin. In
this light, it seems plausible that Fay (1917) was right when pointing at a principal-agent problem,
in which the old elites are trying to save their privileges, risking a lower level of protection. To
provide an exemplary quote, Fay (1917, p. 765) describes the situation after 1648 in Brandenburg,
East Prussia, and Kleve:
“In each of these territories the real political power was in the hands not of the ruler, but of
the local Estates. These were composed of the privileged feudal nobility and the selfish burgher
aristocracy. In each territory theses Estates thought only of their own local interest and class
privileges. They refused to raise taxes except such as would spent for local purposes under
their own local control. They refused to raise troops for any purpose except local defense. They
refused to recognize as officials of the Elector all persons who did not belong to the native-born
of the territory.”
In order to create a standing army, and allow planning over years of war and peace without
constant renegotiation with the estates, the role of the six year plan of 1653 was a break through
(Schmoller, 1877). In return, Estates were given the right to introduce serfdom in regions it was
formerly not allowed (Schmoller, 1877). On the one hand, due to stronger limitations on the
mobility of peasants, reduced the Elector’s room to foster urbanization and proto-industry, which
was certainly his aim. On the other, as Schmoller correctly assesses, long-term financial pledges
for a standing army also allows to institutionalize administration.
A central mechanism of these institutionalization was the creation of central institutions in
competition with existing ones, eventually replacing them. These were mainly the nomination
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of commissioners (Kommissare) by the Elector. Following the above quote by Fay, constituting
commisioner’s foreign to the provinces faced strong resistance, but eventually succeeded. As
outlined by Otto Hintze in his 1910 compendium on state and constitution9, they fulfilled the
Elector’s expectations of reducing the old elites’ role,
“The commissioner’s authorities have no roots in old estates’ constitutions nor common law;
they face the old order without understanding, but with determined hostility: they are the main
instruments of shattering the old corporate state and the creation of a new absolutist military
state.”
The most important of these officials was the General War Commissioner (Generalkriegskommisar),
who was introduced in 1655, following a French blueprint (Clark, 2007, p. 43).
It was during the Little Northern War (1655-60) that these reforms were more aggressively pursued.
Following the slogan “Not kennt kein Gebot” (necessity knows no law)10 estates were forced to
agree on contributing to the defense of Brandenburg, which they heavily resisted, especially East
Prussia, telling him to ‘seek refuge in good’11 if the current defense would not be suffice. Clark
(2007) points at the parallels with England, and the Country Whigs advocating for militia under
the rule of local nobility. But unlike in England, the East Prussian nobility was forced to change
their minds. Right when the Northern War came to an end, the Elector ordered 2,000 soldiers into
Königsberg, arresting the leader, Hieronymus Roth, a representative of urban corporate rights
(Clark, 2007, p. 59f.). It was also the Northern War when the General War Commissioner extended
its scope from supervising military expenditure to trade policy, and even manufacturing policy
(Neugebauer, 1981).
After the Northern War, the standing army was never revoked, and Estates’ formal right to approve
the budget became a formality (Baumgart, 1969, p. 524). Glorifying Frederick William, German
nationalist historians have regarded this as a visionary move. Questioning this, Fay (1917) points at
the fear of a resumption of war in combination with opportunistic behavior that led this behavior.
< Some historians have pointed out the biography of Frederick William as an explanation for his
actions. Especially, the years from 1634–1638 which Frederick William spent in the Netherlands
9Quoted from Hintze and Oestreich (1970, p. 245), own translation.
10Cited after Fay (1917, p. 770)
11quoted after Clark (2007, p. 56)
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have been argued to be the origin of the reforms he would pursue. As outlined by (Tallett, 1992, p.
209f.) the Dutch system, with outstanding provincial independence that each had representative
assemblies on the contrary was able to create high revenues due to the legitimacy such a relative
inclusive and democratic system establishes. On the contrary, under Frederick William such local
authorities lost power which Clark (2007, p. 43) traces to a French model. During the times when
parliaments, however yet excluding the majority of the citizens, gained ground in Britain, it was on
retreat in Prussia, when existing local assemblies of the nobility (Landtage) were actually abolished
(Clark, 2007) due to an increasing centralization.
An important stepping stone on this way was also to reduce nobility’s sovereignity within
the military. The Electorate’s new war rules from 1656 (‘Kurfürstlich großbrandenburgische
Kriegsrecht und Artikelsbrief‘) included the abolition of judicative elements outside of the Elector’s
reach, but also allowed his administration a tighter grip on the mustering of the troops and
promotions (Oestreich, 1971, p. 81). After having ensured that the military, given the diminishing
ability of the nobility to extract rents from agricultural output, this second step increased their
dependence on the Elector himself.
Koyama (2010) has argued that expulsion of minorities is not a parallel process of a more inclusive
government with better representation. To the opposite, he shows that more parliamentarian
states can be more oppressive. Expulsion is, so his argument goes, an indicator for a lack of state
capacity. In 1671, Frederic William lifted the ban against Jewish immigration to Brandenburg
which was about a century old, a move followed by his other provinces (Oestreich, 1971, p. 92).
This did not mean that all discrimination stopped, e.g. Jews entering the Berlin gates would still
be subject to pig tax (Nirenberg, 2013), but the lift of the ban itself speaks for an increase in the
Elector’s central power.
The success of centralization however was not completed under Frederick William. Kleve main-
tained own diplomatic relations in The Hague until 1660 (Clark, 2007, p. 55), and would also its
own estate meetings (Landtage) until the 18th century (Neugebauer, 1981, p. 547). The process
of centralization and decrease of old Estates’ power was also not linear. Frederick William tried
to exclude the estates from all sovereignty over public finances in 1687, but passed away while
these efforts were still going on, followed by an episode of slightly more power over revenues for
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credits to its successor Frederick III., who would eventually become Frederick I., King in Prussia
(Baumgart, 1969, p. 532).
The move of of nobility into position of public offices and the military had long-run consequences,
also for the German Empire. Demeter (1962) provides data for the heritage of students of German
officer candidate schools. In 1860, 65% of the students were coming from the nobility. This was
decreasing due to demographics and the increasing size of the military as a whole. However, in
the eleven years before the First World War, 49 % of the students were still of noble descent, and
the career of an officer was also rather hereditary—33 % of all students were sons of military
officers. On first sight, this is a sign of a strong nobility with political influence. On the other, it
speaks for the old elites’ acceptance of the central government, and it is a sign of adaption to their
new role. If Estates were not able to extract rents from their lands, and given that the German
nobility was also a relative looser of the Industrial Revolution (Wehler, 1987; Lehmann, 2010),
where else than in public institutions, where their social capital has not been devalued, would
one expect the nobility? The key contribution of this paper is to root the key argument by Craig
(1955), that the military had negative effects for the development of the German state and that
these emerged already shortly after the Thirty Years War, to geography—the soil of Brandenburg,
in interaction with historical circumstances, shaped some important part of German and European
history.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigated further the effect of geography for effective taxation. Based upon the
theoretical model by Mayshar et al. (2017) and in contrast to the very long-run approach taken by
Huning and Wahl (2017), this paper zoomed in to a relatively short but eventful period after the
Thirty Years War. Doing so, it decomposes a very long-run effect into a more digestible line of
research. It employed the original idea and data from Prussia to show that geography is indeed not
a destiny, and states with a ‘bad geography’ are not trapped in their development. State capacity
can be imposed via short-run changes, and not only in the very long run. The effect of warfare
on state development (Tilly (1975, 1993) and more recently Ko et al. (2014) hold, assuming that
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military spending itself was a forerunner of other centralized government activities. The positive
message of the result is that reforms, although based upon very-long run and steady events of
state development, can introduce changes in rather short periods. It seems plausible that both
very long-run effects of state development, the very long-run advantage that the Brandenburg soil
provided the Hohenzollern’s with, and radical events, such as the ‘radical’ reforms introduced
under the reign of Frederick William, indeed work together and enlighten our understanding of
political institutions and their role for economic development.
Geography provided Brandenburg-Prussia with a head start in the development of an effective
taxation, but it did not shape its destiny altogether. Ex post, we can understand better why the
nexus of military and nobility created a society that was different to other German and European
counterparts. However, it is not the aim of this paper to support the claim of a direct link between
the developments of the Prussian militarism to the further path of German history, as also Hitler
himself tried to create it on the ‘Day of Potsdam’ in March 1933. In 1949, Prussia was sentenced
to disappear from the map, in absence, as its institutions were already a victim of the Great
Depression. This paper shed light on how it became a strong state in the seventeenth century. But
as it ends there, and covers only a minority of the German population, there were plenty of other
paths that German history could have chosen afterwards.
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count mean sd min max
Year 576 1673.5 13.86544 1650 1697
Contribution 554 94848.39 122253.5 0 600000
Contribution per Square Kilometer 554 21.52166 22.12231 0 99
Caloric Observability 576 -673.1845 231.6276 -387754.3 0
Caloric Suitability 576 1712.639 189.9811 1464.293 2048.509
Square Kilometer 576 8798.169 13159.48 165.1159 39286.55
Longitude 576 753786.2 260683.4 370343.7 1290058
Elevation 576 125.7935 57.6802 58.41158 247.4892
Ruggedness 576 37.25671 18.49699 17.74061 80.57219
Distance to Pottasium Salt 576 122.7333 148.353 3.191954 508.6799
Distance to Trade Roads 576 63.38237 82.52005 0 239.4516
Distance to Berlin 576 207207 122494.8 0 379521.1
Distance to Hanseatic Town 576 27.03602 21.83832 7.867209 87.36568
N 576
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Trade costs are large and highly persistent. Under fairly general assumptions can trade costs be
decomposed into physical transportation costs, political border related trade barriers and retail
and wholesale margins (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). However, as argued by Head and
Mayer (2013) in their survey chapter in the Handbook of International Economics, the underlying
determinants of trade costs remain poorly understood. A better understanding of those determi-
nants is important, because the potential gains from a further reduction of trade costs depend on
their nature. If for example a large part of trade costs stems from trade taxes, then a positive level
of taxes may be optimal for some regions (Costinot et al., 2015). Instead, a reduction in physical
transportation costs could benefit all regions. A recent literature has improved our understanding
of physical trade costs, notably Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017). Both
show in a general equilibrium framework how geography gives rise to a topography of physical
trade costs. However, both do so under the assumption of a single central planner, hence no political
trade costs.
In this paper, we ask how physical trade costs interact with political trade costs. Our starting point
is that a country’s trade cost are to some extent its neighbor’s profit. To keep things as simple
as possible, we use a partial equilibrium framework following Irwin (1998) with many revenue
maximizing states. In contrast to Irwin (1998), states are not only constrained by demand but also
by their physical trade costs. Some states have low physical trade costs (e.g. due to direct access
to the sea), while others face high physical trade costs (e.g. if they are landlocked). Under very
general assumptions of the underlying geography this gives rise to the issue of double or multiple
marginalization, known from the literature on supply chains (Greenhut and Ohta, 1979) and spatial
competition (Mathewson and Winter, 1983). We show first, that some states can increase their
tariff revenue at the expense of their hinterland, depending on their respective physical trade costs.
Second, we show that a customs union can be beneficial for a group of states, because it solves
the problem of double marginalization. Finally third, we show that small changes in geography
can have large, persistent effects on trade policy and institutions. We illustrate this mechanism
with a prominent historical example, the formation of the German Zollverein in 1834. We show
how changes in Prussia’s geography after the congress of Vienna in 1815, which were imposed by
Britain, forced the smaller German states into a customs union with Prussia. In this way, Britain
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unintentionally helped to unify Germany.
The basic idea is not new. Already Adam Smith noted that“(t)he commerce besides which any
nation can carry on by means of the river (...), which runs into another territory before it reaches
the sea, can never be very considerable; because it is always in the power of the nation to possess
that other territory to obstruct the communication between the upper country and the sea” (Smith,
1776, p. 19). In a nutshell, a state’s sea and river access can lead to control over trade, revenues, and
growth of other states in the hinterland. A major source of state revenue well into the 19th century
originated from tariffs on trade flows. Until the Barcelona Statute of 1921 (Uprety, 2006, p. 48ff)
these tariffs were levied on all trade flows passing a customs office, including transit trade. A state
ruler, aiming to maximize tariff revenue therefore had to anticipate how tariffs would affect not
only trade flows but also trade routes and tariff rates abroad, depending on geographic position.
For example, if a transit tariff was set too high, traders attempted to use other routes and bypass the
state. While transit tariffs have been abolished in 1921, states with a locational advantage continue
to benefit from transit flows of third countries as service providers and locations with good access
for industrial production. More recently, the growth of containerized trade since the 1970s has led
to the emergence of hubs, which attract large volumes of transit shipments. We argue that then and
now the resulting dependencies between states can increase the benefits from political cooperation
between them.
Specifically, we show how our theoretical model can explain the economic and political unification
of Germany during the 19th century, which fundamentally changed the European balance of power
(Simms, 2013). It is remarkable that several small sovereign states such as Bavaria or Saxony, which
had just escaped their elimination during the Napoleonic wars, started to give up parts of their
sovereignty little more than a decade later to cooperate under Prussian leadership. We argue
that this rise of Prussia to become the dominating power within Germany can be explained with
our theoretical framework. With the new borders after 1815 Prussia held sway over both large
continental transport systems before the age of the railway - most of the rivers Elbe in the East of
Germany and the Rhine in the West feeding into the North Sea. This put other German states under
pressure to follow Prussia into the Zollverein, a customs union under Prussian dominance. After
Prussia formed a preliminary union with Hesse-Darmstadt in 1828, this pressure increased again
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and by 1835 all German states placed between the two Prussian territories or to the South of them
had joined into the Zollverein.
Our theoretical model can explain this result and the sequence of decisions that led to it. How-
ever, in the model with many states, the selected equilibrium is typically not pinned down by
fundamentals but depends on the sequence of decisions. This is why our empirical strategy rests
on a calibration and simulation exercise. We calibrate the model to historical and GIS data on
territories, infrastructure, population and tariffs and show how the incentives of state planners
changed in response to a change in state boundaries and varying coalitions. The key here is a
thought experiment with counterfactual borders. We compare the factual borders of Prussia after
1815 (with two separate territories in the East and West of Germany and small gains from the
northern part of Saxony) to a counterfactual with historical validity: a Prussian state in alternative
borders according to the original plan of count Hardenberg, Prussia’s negotiator at the congress
of Vienna. According to this plan, a new Prussian state would have consisted of Prussia’s eastern
territories and the entire former Kingdom of Saxony, while the latter would have formed a new
sovereign state on the territory of Westphalia and the Rhineland. We show that many German
states had an incentive to join a customs union with the factual borders of 1815. Instead, with
a counterfactual Rhineland state, the situation would have been very different. The same states
would have had higher incentives to form a customs union with such a Rhineland state than with
Prussia, while in turn a counterfactual Rhineland state would not have joined a counterfactual
Prussia in a customs union. A customs union that would have encompassed both the eastern and
western parts of Germany would not have formed. We also provide evidence that the result is
robust to various alternative customs unions that were discussed at the time. As recently shown by
Keller and Shiue (2014), the formation of the Zollverein had very large effects on the integration
of markets. It prepared the monetary unification of German states within the boundaries of the
Zollverein Holtfrerich (1993) and helped to pave the way to Germany’s political unification in
1871 under the leadership of Prussia, if only by fostering Prussia’s industry (Wehler, 1989, pp.
125ff).
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature, notably on trade costs and trade agreements,
economic geography, nation building, persistence in economic development and not at least
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the historical literature on the formation of the Zollverein. To start with, a recent literature has
improved our understanding of trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004). Important
new contributions have considered physical trade costs, notably Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and
Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017). Both show in a general equilibrium framework how geography
gives rise to a topography of physical trade costs. However, both abstract from political trade
costs, because they assume a single central planner. Our paper explores how physical trade costs
shape political trade costs. Related to this is the large literature on trade agreements, including
Ossa (2011, 2012) and Antràs and Staiger (2012). These papers argue that trade agreements can
reduce negative externalities from tariffs due to profit-shifting, firm-delocation or trade-volume
externalities, beyond the older arguments based on terms of trade effects. For example, Antràs
and Staiger (2012) discuss the implications of offshoring and resulting lock-in effects for buyers
and sellers for trade policy. In their case, the fragmentation of production and trade into upstream
and downstream firms gives rise to a hold-up problem that can be remedied by trade agreements.
Instead, we abstract from fragmented production but focus on the relative geographical position of
states and show how this affects incentives to coordinate tariff policy. Our setting also pioneers a
more complex understanding of geography than what is typically considered. While the role of
geographical distance and market access have been fairly well understood since the theoretical
advances on the gravity model (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003;
Redding and Venables, 2004), the routing of trade has been typically ignored in the recent literature.
In contrast, routing plays an increasing role in the literature on operational research and logistics
in the face of increasingly fragmented production processes (e.g. the survey by Nagy and Salhi
(2007) on the so called location-routing-problem). In our framework, trade routes are crucial for
tariff policy.
The literature on economic geography in the wake of Krugman (1991) has analyzed how ‘first
nature geography’ such as access to the sea or climate can affect ‘second nature geography’ such
as the emergence of economic agglomerations and patterns of core and periphery. But these
models remained highly stylized and were of limited use for empirical research. The more recent
application of quantitative models of international trade (notably Eaton and Kortum (2002)) to
the study of economic geography allowed to derive new hypotheses on the spatial distribution
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of economic activity and directly test for them (e.g. Donaldson (2016), Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); see
the survey by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2016). Related to this, we derive a theoretical model
that can be calibrated to historical data and simulated to assess its explanatory power. Moreover,
trade costs are typically treated as exogenous in the recent literature on economic geography. In
our framework, exogenous physical trade costs lead to much larger endogenous political trade
costs.
Next, our paper is related to the recent literature on nation building and endogenous political
borders in the wake of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997). Both papers
argue that there is a basic trade-off between the benefits of larger jurisdictions and the costs of
that size. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) show that the benefits from economies of scale and scope
of larger jurisdictions have to be balanced against the political costs of heterogeneity. Bolton and
Roland (1997) also consider the benefits from economies of scale and weigh them against the loss
of control on political decisions at the local level. An emerging literature analyzes the factors
that changed these trade-offs in the long-run, notably military rivalry (Aghion et al., 2012) and
war-related institutional change Acemoglu et al. (2011). We add to this literature by showing how
geographical constraints can affect the cooperation between sovereign states and induce long-run
institutional change.
Another strand in the literature on which we draw and to which we contribute is on the role of
history for economic development. In his survey on the topic Nunn (2009) stresses the prominent
role of geography for economic outcomes via its impact on past events. As argued by Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), differences in soil quality and climate may have shaped the incentives of
elites to foster education systems. Related to this is the argument that variation in the suitability of
land for growing potatoes affected the growth of population and cities, with persistent effects until
today Nunn and Qian (2011). We extend a long-standing argument that access to waterways and
relative geographic position affected the incentives to cooperate between states and their ability to
impose certain policies on each other (Mahan (1890); Mackinder (1919) and more recently Simms
(2013) and Kaplan (2012)). Our paper is therefore related to Redding et al. (2011) and Bleakley
and Lin (2012) on geographical lock-in and Michaels and Rauch (2013) on the long-run effects of
geographical fundamentals for the dynamics of urban networks.
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Last but not least, several authors have tried to explain the emergence of customs unions and in
particular that of the Prussian Zollverein. In his work on the economics of customs unions Viner
(1950) already considered the Zollverein to be the “pioneer and by far the most important customs
union”. There is a small but prominent historical literature on the formation of the Zollverein.
In his seminal work on the Zollverein, Dumke (1976) considered several possible motives for
joining the Zollverein. He argued that by joining the Zollverein German states could hope to
benefit from economies of scale in the collection of tariff revenues, benefit from a larger market
for industrial products (i.e. Smithian growth), while simultaneously staying in control over these
revenues. Dumke (1976) provides several pieces of descriptive evidence to support his argument
but he cannot directly test it. Next, Ploeckl (2010) explores in an insightful study the negotiations
over Zollverein membership and argues that Prussia could act as an agenda setter in a bargaining
game. In particular he provides descriptive evidence for the hypothesis that Prussia negotiated
sequentially with German states over their membership in order to maximize coalition externalizes
on states still outside the union. Finally, Keller and Shiue (2014) estimate the effect of the Zollverein
on the integration of grain markets, taking into account that the incentives to join were endogenous
to ex ante trade, similar to Baier and Bergstrand (2007). They use a state’s average distance to the
coast relative to average distance to the coast of non-member states as an instrument to control for
the endogeneity of Zollverein membership and find that joining the Zollverein had a substantial
causal effect on the integration of grain markets. Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First,
we provide a new theoretical framework that can be seen as a synthesis of these ideas but matters
beyond the specific historical context of the Zollverein. Second, we are the first to trace the specific
formation of the Zollverein back to the exogenous change in political borders at the congress of
Vienna in 1815.
We proceed in this paper as follows. In section a we introduce our historical example of the
formation of the German Zollverein. In section b we motivate our theoretical approach giving
descriptive evidence. In section c we present our theoretical framework. We start with a very basic
framework on the role of geography for a revenue maximizing state that is step by step generalized.
In section d we discuss our empirical strategy, describe our data and explain how we used historical
data and GIS data to calibrate and simulate the model. Section e. contains our main results on
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the fit and explanatory power of the model. We show how the model can capture the sequence of
events that led to the formation of the Zollverein. We also show that under counterfactual borders
the Zollverein would not have formed. We conclude in section f.
A. FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO THE
ZOLLVEREIN
We will apply our theoretical framework to the formation of the Zollverein. In a broader context, it
is well known that the success of some places is not only induced by their local characteristics, but
their position relative to others. In a recent study Michaels and Rauch (2013) show how network
effects mattered for city dynamics in the very long-run. German history after 1815 provides us with
a quasi-experiment on a similar type of network effects for sovereign states rather than individual
cities. First, we will outline why we consider the events at the Congress to be exogenous to
economic rationale, notably to trade. Second, we will explain why trade costs should be treated as
endogenous for the period under consideration. This includes a discussion on the role of tariffs
and transit trade for government revenues. Third, we will discuss the role of the Rhine. Forth, we
will discuss some of the dynamics that led up to the formation of the Zollverein, including failed
attempts to form alternative customs unions. In our empirical section we will use our model to
replicate these dynamics.
1. Great Power Politics at the Congress of Vienna
At the end of the Napoleonic wars 1792–1815 only Russia and Great Britain had emerged as major
military powers. Habsburg, Prussia and the defeated France attempted to consolidate their position
at the expense of the many smaller states that had survived the recent wars, notably the former
allies of Napoleon such as Saxony or Poland. A central object of the negotiations at Vienna was
the redrawing of the European map, especially the so-called Polish-Saxon question. Overall, the
negotiations were dominated by military-strategic considerations between the two great powers.
By hindsight, economic aspects and the position of Prussia were both of minor importance to the
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outcome of the congress. Alexander I. of Russia aimed for a double-monarchy of Russia and Poland.
This expansion of Russia to the West met stiff opposition from Britain and Habsburg. Britain’s
ambassador Castlereagh warned his Prime Minister that this “would have the colour of an attempt
to revive the system we all united to destroy, namely one colossal military Power holding two
powerful States in a species of dependence and subjection, and through them making her influence
in the remotest parts of Europe” (Müller, 1986).
Prussia’s chancellor Hardenberg, who led the Prussian delegation at Vienna, pursued predomi-
nantly military-strategic aims1: In order to ease the defense of its territory and capital, he intended
to finally annex the Kingdom of Saxony (Clark, 2007, p. 389). Castlereagh consented under the
condition that Prussia would support the British position in the Polish Question2, so does Met-
ternich3. Under the leadership of Castlereagh, the three formed an informal coalition against
Russia. However, Prussia left this alliance under pressure of Alexander, because Russian troops had
occupied Saxony (Burg, 1993, p. 12ff.). In a desperate move to secure the Saxon territory for Prussia,
Hardenberg offered in late 1814 to relocate the entire court of Saxony to the Rhine including “a
city pleasantly situated at the Rhine, suitable for a residence” for the Saxon king (Müller, 1986, p.
262). As this offer was rejected, Hardenberg, seeing the Prussian position decaying between the
Tsar’s plans and ‘British interest’, threatened with a new war. The response was a defense alliance
between Great Britain, Austria and France against Prussia and Russia and a serious risk of a new
war in late 1814 (Burg, 1993, p. 27).
Ultimately, the Congress ended as a big compromise, shaped very much by the attempt of Great
Britain to contain Russia’s westward expansion. Poland was divided (again) between Russia
(‘Congress Poland’), Prussia and Austria. Also, Saxony was divided in two parts. The Kingdom of
Saxony was shrunk to its southern part, while the northern part formed the new Prussian province
of Saxony. As compensation, Prussia was also given the Rhineland and Westphalia in the West, to
become the “warden of the German gate against France”(Clapham, 1921, p. 98). Figure 1 shows the
map of Germany after 1815.
1This military-strategic argument was already developed by Friedrich II (1712–1786), probably during the Seven Years
War (1756–1763). In his notes “par droit de bienséance”, he outlines the territory of Saxony as key for the defense of Berlin
(cited after (Mittenzwei, 1985, p. 209).
2Note from Castlereagh to Hardenberg, October 11th 1814 (Müller, 1986, p. 211).
3In his note, Metternich consents as long as Habsburg would keep its influence within Germany. Note to Hardenberg,
October, 22nd (Müller, 1986, p. 214 f.).
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Figure 1: Map of the German lands after the Congress of Vienna including the rivers and the 1820 road network.
Hesse-Darmstadt is the state just South of Hesse-Cassel.4
As Clark (2007, p. 389) concludes, “Berlin failed to get what it wanted and got what it did not
want.[...] The creation of a large Western wedge along the river Rhine was a British, not a Prussian,
idea.”. The German Bund was established as a loose federation of German countries under the joint
leadership of Habsburg and Prussia (Hahn, 1982, p. 127).
2. Transit Tariff, and Structure of Trade
While the Congress of Vienna settled the large geopolitical issues, most German states still faced
existential threats after 1815. To start with, after years of war and territorial changes back and
forth and indeed after financial difficulties inherited from the pre-Napoleonic era, state finances
were out of control Borchard (1968). What was needed was fundamental administrative reform
and new sources for revenue. Prussia, pressed very hard after the defeat in 1806, had started a
series of reforms, including a fundamental reorganization of the administration, agrarian reforms,
changes in the educational system and some first attempts to reform taxation. But still in 1821, six
125
ENDOGENOUS TRADE COSTS AND THE FORMATION OF A CUSTOMS UNION
years after the war, the ratio of Prussia’s government debt to total state income stayed above 400
percent (Mieck, 1992, p. 124). A major step towards a new financial system was Prussia’s tariff law
of 1818, which abolished all internal tariffs and established one common tariff along the external
border following the examples of France and Britain Onishi (1973). This and the introduction
of a class-wise income tax system helped to consolidate Prussia’s state finances in the following
decades and put other states in Germany under pressure to react. However, the main challenge
from a Prussian perspective was to connect the two separate territories in East and West for both
administrative and strategic reasons. In this Prussia faced resistance from smaller states who feared
to loose their independence. It turned out that the main asset of Prussia in this was her geographic
position for trade policy.
Trade policy was at center stage for government revenue at the time. In Central Europe, trade flows
had to pass often a dozen of tariff borders even on relatively short distances. This was considered
by many contemporaries to be a main disadvantage compared to politically unified territories such
as France or the United Kingdom. As shown in the theoretical section the fact that tariffs were
usually also levied on transit trade until the Barcelona Statute of 1921 (Uprety, 2006, p. 48ff) had
far reaching implications for tariff policy at large. Prussia’s tariff law of 1818 forced traders to
detour the large territory, or accept the tollage. As Clapham puts it, “The analogy between the
King of Prussia and some robber baron of the middle ages could not but occur to the least learned
pamphleeter.” (Clapham, 1921, p. 99). In turn, for states on the detour routes, such as the Hessian
states, this was a large source of income.
Traders were often willing to pay transit tariffs, because they lacked alternatives. In the early
19th century, these alternatives were mostly determined by geography. Transport on water was
much cheaper than transport over land. According to Sombart (1902), the average freight cost per
tonkilometer during early 19th century Germany on river was between 0.6 and 1.5 percent of the
average freight cost on country roads. The main instrument to improve the transport infrastructure
apart from building canals was to construct paved roads with a fully developed drainage system
(“Chausseen”) that made them usable even during bad weather conditions. This could bring down
average freight cost per tonkilometer to 25 percent of that on standard roads. Railroad construction
started in Germany only in 1835, where most lines were built in the two decades after 1848. But
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road construction was expensive and time-consuming, hence no option in the short-run.
The multitude of tariff barriers also had consequences for the type of goods that could be traded
over longer distances. In 1829, almost 80 percent of the value in exports from Amsterdam upriver
originated from only two goods: coffee, and sugar (Kutz, 1974, p. 341). Wine was another important
item. These three goods, sugar, coffee, and wine could be traded in spite of the high trade costs,
because their import demand was highly inelastic. First, they faced only limited competition
from local substitutes. Sugar beet production on a significant scale started only in the late 1830s
in Germany, and required initially government support. Domestic produce of wine and spirits
accounted only for a seventh of demand (Dieterici, 1846). Coffee, unlike tobacco that accounted for
half of domestic demand (Dieterici, 1846), could not be grown in Germany. Second, all these goods
are ‘drug-alike’, which suggests that demand should respond relatively little to variation in prices.
What Ferguson noted for the British Empire was similarly true for the German lands: “the empire,
it might be said, was built on a huge sugar, caffeine and nicotine rush – a rush nearly everyone
could experience.” (Ferguson, 2002). According to Onishi (1973) these three goods alone accounted
for more than half of Prussia’s revenues from tariffs in the 1820s.
3. The Role of the Rhine
Navigable rivers attracted the bulk of all trade flows due to their much lower physical transport
cost per ton-kilometer. However, river banks were historically fragmented. Adam Smith noted that
“the navigation of the Danube is of very little use to the different states [...], in comparison of what it
would be if any of them possessed the whole of its course till it falls into the Black Sea” (Smith, 1776,
p. 19). This is especially true when states maximize revenues. One single state can harm all others’
revenues, and credible commitment makes everyone better off—a classical prisoner’s dilemma5.
Wilson (2016, p. 469) views the inability to coordinate Rhine states as a major failure of the Holy
Roman Empire. Running through over 30 toll stations, much of the Rhine trade was eventually
rerouted overland, notably through the Hessian hills.
Napoleon’s unification of several Rhine states into Westphalia and the Rhineland was a first step
5See also Bagwell and Staiger (1999). An interesting note is that their theoretical debate on optimal tariffs is dependent
on the assumption of either a small or a large country setting tariffs, in terms of whether the tariffs will shift world prices. In
our framework, even the smallest state can affect prices in other states, depending of it’s geographical position.
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to address the problem of fragmentation. Soon after 1815 Prussia had gained control over much
of the Rhine, it was realized that the Rhine would be a substantial source of revenue, if the tariff
levels could be lowered and unified. Hans, Count of Bülow, minister of finance, noted in 1817
that “The long coast, the location of the Rhenish and Westphalian provinces between France, the
Netherlands and Germany, make this country very suitable for transito. The greater the freedom,
the more trade one will be able to seize.”6. This outlines a central motive of Prussia—exploiting
the geographic position to raise tariff revenues induced by, and not in spite of trade liberalization.
Central to this is an understanding that multiple taxation reduces overall revenue, because of
multiple marginalization. However, still after 1815 trade on the Rhine was subject to a multitude
of political trade costs such as tariffs and duties payable at Rotterdam or staple rights and the
requirement to use specific shipping companies for parts of the voyage (Spaulding, 2011). One
event that contributed to a further reduction in tariff fragmentation along the Rhine was the Belgian
revolution in 1830/31. The (prospective) independence of Belgium from the Netherlands and the
rise of Antwerp as a competitor to Rotterdam limited the bargaining power of the Netherlands and
helped the negotiations between the various riparian states to reduce tariffs along the Rhine. As a
consequence, after 1831 more traders used the Rhine and less trade was routed over land through
the Hessian states, notably through Hesse-Cassel (Hahn, 1984, p. 60).
4. Failed Unions and Agreements
The small German states’ debt called for immediate action after the Napoleonic Wars. The main
source of new revenue had to be taxation, given that the revenue from state monopolies and
state-owned farms or factories could not be easily increased at the time (Ullmann, 2005, p. 34).
However, smaller states must have feared that by joining the Prussian Customs Union, they gain
revenue at the risk of giving up sovereignty towards Prussia. The option to form a free trade
area rather than a customs union, which would have allowed states to set their external tariff
independently, was not viable at the time, due to difficulties to implement a rule of origin in the
fragmented German state system (Ploeckl, 2010). The perceived solution of this problem seemed to
be a customs union without Prussia. And indeed, the 1820s witnessed several attempts to form
6cited after (Dieterici, 1846, p. 64); own translation.
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such customs unions. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and two Hessian states signed already in
1820 a preliminary agreement to take up negotiations on a customs union excluding Prussia and
Austria alike. However, the negotiations did not succeed, mostly because it was unlikely to pay: the
interests of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt diverged too far from those of Bavaria and Württemberg.
Calls upon Austria in the early 20’s to lead a tariff union, prominently put forward by Friedrich List,
were turned down, as Austrian trade was mostly directed in the flowing direction of the Danube
(Hahn, 1984, p. 31). The only tangible result was the formation of a customs union between Bavaria
and Württemberg in January 1828.
In the meantime, the small state of Hesse-Darmstadt had started to turn to Prussia, which should
change the situation fundamentally. A look at the maps suggests why. The two Prussian territories
in the East and in the West were separated by the two states of Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel.
The financial situation of Hesse-Darmstadt was considered to be the worst among all German states
after 1815. The small state itself was divided into two territories and economically more dependent
than others on the neighboring Rhineland, now under Prussian control. A first push of Hesse-
Darmstadt in 1825 was rejected by Prussia on the grounds that only a simultaneous agreement
with both Hessian states would be attractive for the Prussian side. But Hesse-Cassel was much
less pressed and actually benefited from trade diverted away from the Rhine. In 1827 Prussian
negotiators started to realize that the desperation of Hesse-Darmstadt was a strategic opportunity.
In the negotiations during that year, Prussia was eager to be as benevolent as possible towards
Hesse-Darmstadt. In exchange to Hesse-Darmstadt’s agreement to adopt the Prussia customs law
of 1818, in February 1828 the two states formed a customs union between two equal sovereign
partners, where changes in tariff policy would have to be agreed unanimously (Hahn, 1984, p. 46).
The strategic value of this can be seen in the externalities of this Prusso-Hessian customs union on
other states, foremost on Southern Germany. As this was rightly considered as a first step of Prussia
to connect its two territories, the reactions across German states as well as in Vienna, London and
Paris were quick and desperate. In September 1828, Hanover (still in personal union with the
United Kingdom), Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the free city of Frankfurt, and the Thuringian
States signed a contract—on not signing contracts with anybody else (Hahn, 1984, p. 50). Also, the
governments of Bavaria and Württemberg tried to contain a further expansion of Prussian influence,
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because they realized their growing dependency on Prussian tariff policy. However, already in
late 1828 they gave up. The Bavarian government started to negotiate an agreement and eventual
merger between the customs unions of Bavaria-Württemberg and Prussia-Hesse-Darmstadt. The
reduction of tariffs on the Rhine in the wake of the Belgian revolution helped to convince the
government of Hesse-Cassel to join the union of Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt, which completed
the territorial link between the two parts of Prussia in August 1831. As this was a breach of the
treaty of September 1828, Habsburg in an Alliance with England attempted to sue Hesse-Cassel
over this on the courts of the German Bund in a last attempt to stop the Prussian victory. But
economic incentives proved to be stronger. In autumn 1833 the Southern Customs Union was
merged with the Prusso-Hessian customs union and enlarged by others, including Saxony and the
Thuringian states. Baden followed in 1835, Brunswick in 1841 and even Hanover joined in 1851,
Oldenburg a year later. Only states with direct access to the sea stayed out before the formation of
the German Empire in 1871.
Habsburg’s chancellor Metternich always considered the Zollverein as a tool to establish Prussia’s
dominance in Germany and tried to prevent its formation (Mieck, 1992, p. 163). By hindsight, he
was right. While we do not claim that the Zollverein determined Prussia’s way to become hegemon
within Germany, it was clearly instrumental in this process. The Zollverein helped Prussia to
consolidate its new territory and use the benefits from the industrializing regions in the West for
its rise as a military power. In the next section we show that our theoretical model can explain
many of these historical facts: how the customs union between Bavaria and Württemberg mattered
for Prussia, why the customs union between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt increased pressure
on the remaining states in Central and Southern Germany, why this pressure was more limited
for states closer to the coast. Crucially, the model also highlights that a different outcome of the
Congress of Vienna, one without British intervention, would have likely prevented the formation
of the Zollverein altogether.
6Abbreviations: ABB: Anhalt-Bernburg, ADE: Anhalt-Dessau, AKO: Anhalt-Köthen, HHE: Hohenzollern-Hechingen,
HHO: Hess-Homburg, HSI: Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, REB: Reuß-Ebersdorf, RGA: Reuß-Gera, RLS: Reuß-Lobenstein,
RSC: Reuß-Schleiz, SGA: Saxony-Gotha-Altenburg, SHH: Saxony-Hildburghausen, SCS: Saxony-Coburgurg–Saalfeld, SRU:
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, SSO: Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, SWE: Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach.
130
ENDOGENOUS TRADE COSTS AND THE FORMATION OF A CUSTOMS UNION
B. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the year the 34 German states that would join the German Zollverein
Dependent variable: Year the Zollverein membership was contracted in
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Transit Through Prussia -29.51∗∗∗ -14.74∗ -16.64∗∗ -16.98∗∗ -24.91∗∗∗ -12.92∗ -16.81∗∗ -17.00∗∗ -15.58∗∗
(4.023) (5.599) (5.337) (5.308) (6.103) (5.146) (5.469) (5.354) (5.494)
Std. Distance to Oceans -7.624∗∗ -7.935∗∗∗ -8.096∗∗∗ -11.46∗ -8.731∗∗∗ -7.897∗∗ -8.042∗∗∗ -8.273∗∗∗
(2.258) (2.130) (2.119) (4.890) (1.992) (2.170) (2.126) (2.174)
Std. Distance to Rivers -4.241∗ -4.519∗ -6.273∗∗∗ -4.069∗ -4.300∗ -4.379∗ -3.808










Std. Length of Border Per Area 1.188
(1.366)
Constant 45.83∗∗∗ 34.61∗∗∗ 35.26∗∗∗ 36.60∗∗∗ 49.48∗∗∗ 35.77∗∗∗ 35.53∗∗∗ 37.40∗∗∗ 34.29∗∗∗
(3.651) (4.595) (4.334) (4.449) (4.657) (4.077) (4.544) (4.617) (4.490)
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Adj. R2 0.615 0.710 0.743 0.746 0.906 0.781 0.735 0.746 0.741
AIC 247.4 238.8 235.5 235.9 208.0 231.7 237.4 236.8 236.6
Note: This table depicts the significance of the fact that a state’s imports from the Atlantic have to pass via Prussia on the
least-cost-path from London, assuming there would be no transport costs except to move the goods physically. All variables
indicated ‘Std.’ are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Summary statistics of all variables are provided in
table 5 of the appendix.
To motivate our formal analysis, consider table 1. Our dependent variable is the year that any of
the 34 German states signed a treaty to join the Zollverein. Using the standard Dijsktra algorithm,
we calculated least cost paths, assuming that there would be no political costs (e.g. tariffs) to ship
any good from the Atlantic economy (which we proxy with London) to any other region. We then
generate other variables from GIS using states and roads from Kunz and Zipf (2008), and rivers
from the European Environment Agency7. The variable Transit Through Prussia is then coded one
if the territory of Prussia is crossed on this least cost path, zero otherwise. This simple variable
7The data can be downloaded here: https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/
wise-large-rivers-and-large-lakes
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alone explains over 60% of the variation, and its negative estimate indicates that states whose transit
would flow through Prussia would join the Zollverein earlier. This finding is robust if we control
for other geographic indicators.
Keller and Shiue (2014) employ distance to oceans as an instrument. Distance to Oceans measures
the distance between 1,000 random points generated within the state and the closest ocean in
kilometer8. As all variables indicated ‘Std.’, this distance variable was then standardized to a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Regression (2) shows that states with better access to
the ocean would join the Zollverein later. As indicated by the smaller effect of the transit through
Prussia, these two measurements relate, but also have joint explanatory power. In this regression,
the fact that a state’s transit goes via Prussia is equivalent to almost a two standard deviations
change in the distance to oceans. This means that a state that differs from any other state just due
to the fact that the least cost path to the Atlantic Economy passes via Prussia behaves as if it was
about 250 km further away from the sea. The significant result for Distance to Rivers, calculated
analogous to its oceans counterpart using navigable rivers only, in regression (3) indicates that
water transport in general mattered for the question of joining the Zollverein, and that better access
to waterways would make states more reluctant to join. The effect of a standard deviation change
of this variable is about half the effect estimated for the ocean. On the one hand, river transport, if it
was downstream, was cheaper than ocean transport per ton-kilometer (see tab. 6 of the appendix).
On the other, it is limited to trading partners on the same rivers and connection to world markets
still dependent on sea harbors. The population of the states is not statistically relevant (column
(4)). To control for the fact that some states look back at different cultural traditions due to their
different heritages as Bavarian, Saxonian, Brandenburgian, or Hessian, we employ the 1150 map
of the Holy Roman Empire from Huning and Wahl (2017), which leads to a vast increase in the
model’s saturation. The estimate for the Prussian transit is however even higher. This could capture
the idea that the Saxonian and Thuringian states indeed could have found it easier to coordinate
their decision based upon their common backround. This might have shifted the individual states
joining by some years, however large alterations are unlikely. This map features 32 regions in
Central Europe and is included as control variable in column (5). It has been proposed (Onishi,
8This procedure makes this indicator robust against different sizes of states, as larger state by chance would have some
point very close to the ocean.
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1973) that the Zollverein generated revenues that passed parliamentary control. Therefore, the
political system should be relevant for the joining decision. Out of all categories for the political
system in the dataset by Kunz and Zipf (2008), only the dummy variable for absolute monarchy
shows up significant, suggesting that absolute monarchs would join earlier. Finally, we test the idea
by Dumke (1976) that the Zollverein was a tool to reduce the costs of tariff border protection. In
regression (7), the length of the state border in kilometer shows a very low estimate and is also
not significant. The same is true for the area of a state in square kilometers (column (8)) and the
division of border length and area as propounded by Dumke.
These results indicate a strong relationship between the relative geography of Prussia for the timing
the German states joined Zollverein. However, we have to invest in theory to understand why this
is the case, and we also have to realize that the sequence of joining is heavily endogenous. Many
states join in 1833, and states also do not join independent from each other. While we grasp that the
decision of one state is therefore not only dependent on Prussia, but on other states they trade with
or other states their trade has to transit.
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework explains the role of geography for revenue-maximizing countries, and
their benefits from cooperation. We start off with the framework by Irwin (1998). Free on board
(f.o.b.) prices are exogenous, such that tariffs9 are in the end paid for by consumers, demand is
linear and reacts to the tariff as part of the price.
Irwin (1998), as most common literature, limits his analysis on two countries where one country
is the producer and the second the consumer. We extend this and assume that all countries face a
given world supply, where one country’s imports are its neighbour’s transits. This induces room
for cooperation in customs unions. In our model, all transit countries face multiple trade-offs in
9Think of any costs that a country can set and adds to the price of the good. The framework captures not only costs
de jure codified as tariffs. Transit trade was subject to all kinds of taxes, tolls, and fees, which countries gained revenue
from. Larger countries, such as Prussia (Onishi, 1973) or Bavaria (Schlögl, 2002, p. 139), aimed at simplifying this structures.
Traders will account for non-monetary political costs of transport, such as staple rights, and include them into the price of
the good. An example here is Hamburg. While de jure tariffs are absent Dumke (1976), harbor fees and a variety rights
induce costs to traders, and therefore have a monetary equivalent.
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their attempt to maximize their tariff revenues, and their decisions depend on geography. We
introduce the concept of multiple marginalization known from industrial organization (see Church
and Ware (2000)) to the optimal tariff literature and the foundation of customs unions. Multiple
marginalization occurs when any product is manufactured by a revenue-maximizing producer
using raw-material (called upstream) from a revenue-maximizing supplier (called downstream).
In our context, if a country is an enclave of a second country, its tariff policy is like that of a
downstream producer facing an upstream monopolist. Decisions to join a customs union can be
analyzed in analogy to decisions about mergers & acquisitions.
We treat physical trade costs as exogenous, and concentrate on the effect of political trade costs,
tariffs 10. Migration occurred mostly towards Prussia and Northern German states, so that we
can neglect its effect—it would only strengthen our argument. Moreover, we simplify the analysis
assuming that state’s cannot discriminate between imports and transits and hence set only one tariff
rate for both. If states could discriminate tariffs, this would strengthen the position of upstream
states and again only strengthen our argument.
1. One Country
Consider a world of many small countries facing given world supply. With respect to the small
geographic scope of our analysis, assume similar preferences, uniform income distribution, and
equal price elasticity of demand across countries. Consider a representative good that does not
have any domestic substitute (historical examples would be coffee or sugar). Demand for this
imported good Mi ≥ 0 in any country i is linear and given by
Mi = Di − api (1)
10First, before the emergence of the railway, due to the vast technological advantage of sea and river transport, sea harbors
and river access were the most important geographic advantage. This implies that strategic building of infrastructure
before the 1840s as described in Thimme (1931), had only have minor effects. Recent research, for example Fajgelbaum and
Schaal (2017), has proposed general equilibrium frameworks with endogenous physical transport costs, which could be an
interesting extension for future work. Second, the existence of transit tariffs and therefore manyfold taxation of goods within
19th century Germany was evidently more important than even the high physical transport costs of that time Onishi (1973)
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Di > 0 stands for the size of the market in i, and a > 0 stands for the elasticity of demand w.r.t. price
at location i, pi > 0. Markets are perfectly competitive. Transport of the good from w to i comes
with positive per-unit cost costwi. These costs are specific (non-iceberg). Traders are fully informed
and cost-minimizing at no arbitrage. Assume there exists a route r which bears the minimum costs
out of all routes Wwi connecting w and i, which traders would use exclusively. This yields
pi = pw + min
r∈Wwi
(costr). (2)
There are two types of transport costs between w and any i: Physical transport costs and political
costs (tariffs). Physical costs φ > 0, the costs of actually moving one unit of good, are exogenous
and always positive. They need not to be symmetric, so that φwi ≡ φiw. Political transport costs
ti, which are costs associated with the crossing of any border of country i are endogenous to the
framework, and will be in focus later. To this point, just assume they are also specific, per-unit. The
list of countries on a route is given by r = (r1, .., r|r|). Assume that countries are just points in space
(bearing no area), and that these points are connected via different routes. For any two countries i
and j, the costs of any route r in Wij is the sum of all physical and political costs,








while r1 = i and r|r| is always j. There is no smuggling, so there cannot be any route around the
border of the destination country.
Following Irwin (1998), countries choose the tariff rate that maximizes their tariff revenues. This
case represents a country with direct access to the source of production, without any other countries
possibly interfering with its trade with world markets, and also without any other countries
downstream of it. Any such “island” country i can gain revenue by charging a tariff tIig such that it
maximizes revenue
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Figure 2: Two countries and the world. If the direct edge from w to j is more costly than via i, i gains potential revenue.










This revenue-maximizing tariff tIig, which we will call ”‘island tariff”’ is retrieved by inserting







pw + φwi + tIi
))]
∂tIi
= 0 ⇔ tIi =




Add a second country as in figure 2. Now it depends on the geographical parameters how the two
countries will set their tariffs, whether there will be transit trade or no transit trade, and how much
revenue countries gain from tariffs. In the most simple case, both countries’ have direct access to
world markets at the same costs (φwi + ti + φij + tj = φwj + tj). There is no upstream-downstream
relationship, and hence no transit trade—countries’ tariff revenue is only restricted by their own
import demand.
(i) Revenue-Maximizing Tariff With Two Countries
Now assume that φwj would be very expensive. For example, imagine i being located at the
sea, and j is landlocked and only connected to world markets via i. With this geography the
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optimization problem translates to a standard problem from industrialial organization literature,
multiple marginalization (see Church and Ware (2000)). Country j knows that its consumers will
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Country i would react to this setting the tariff allowing for transits to j, tji by setting up its revenue
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replacing tj from equation 6, and set its own tariff such that
[
tji




3 Dj − a
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Compare this tariff with the island tariff from equation 5. The resulting tariff can be higher, or lower
than the island tariff, depending on the relative size of the countries, and the transport costs φij.
The larger Dj is relative to Di, the higher the tariff t
j
i . Neglecting relative size (e.g. Di = Dj), the
larger transport costs from w to j relative to w to i (since φij > 0), the lower is t
j
i .
(ii) The Trade-Off of an Upstream Country
We understand in the absence of costs of a detour around i, there will be no transit trade, and if
it is infinitely expensive there will be either transit trade or no demand for imports in j at all. We
therefore established the detour costs as a central variable in the optimization problem. Let’s define
the difference between the least-cost-path including a set of countries, and the least-cost-path that
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Figure 3: The left sketch shows the stylized geography of two countries A and B, in which there is demand for products
from the world W. The blue line indicates a river that allows transporting one unit cheaper than via the land
road (indicated in gray). The optimization of country A is depicted in the graph on the right. A has initial
domestic demand (imports, dashed blue), indexed to one. Country B’s demand satisfied via A is depicted in
dashed red. With any one unit increase in tariffs, consumers react by demanding one units less. A can get
revenues from imports (solid blue), and transits to B (solid red). Overall trade, the sum of imports and transits,
is depicted in solid black. From our assumptions on geography, it follows that at any tariff above one, transit
trade will start detouring A. Therefore, the overall revenue (solid black) is retrieved at a tariff marginally
below one. Note that the revenue function is not differentiable.
detours the same set of countries, {i} in our case, as






















As in figure 3, the revenue of i is discontinuous at hj{i}. Any higher tariff implies the loss of transit
trade to j. Country i is confronted with a binary decision problem dijg ∈ {0, 1} and compares the
revenue from setting tig ≤ hj{i}, which would allow imports from j to transit i (dijg = 1), or setting
tig above h
j
{i} and force traders to detour i (dijg = 0). The maximization problem of i can hence be
spelled out as
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ti(Mi (ti) + dij Mj (ti))
)
s.t. dijti ≤ hj{i}. (10)
Proposition 1. Countries may have to give up revenue from transit trade when setting the island-tariff
Proof. If country i forfeits transit trade to j, the tariff rate ti is retrieved as in the island case, ti = tIi .
Consider the tariff that country i can set allowing for transit trade to j, tji . The condition dijti ≤ h
j
{i}
can be either binding or not binding, and tji ≤ h
j
{i}. Consider the case that the condition is not


















Consider the case in which this tariff would be too high too allow for transit. If country i wants
to allow transit from j, it has to set hj{i}. Else, if this tariff is lower than the detour costs anyway,





∣∣ hj{i} → ∞] if [tji ∣∣ φw → ∞] ≤ hj{i}
hj{i} else
(12)
Monotonicity of demand for each of the countries w.r.t. tariffs imposes that this is optimal. The











































Figure 4: Given that the direct route from w to j is very expensive, i and k compete over transits
(iii) Competition Between two Upstream Countries
This trade-off, which a potential transit country faces changes as we introduce a third country k
that can allow access to world markets to j.
Consider k as our third country, as in figure 4. There are three routes to j, Wwj = {(w, j), (w, i, j), (w, k, j)}.
Let the cheapest route go via i, the second cheapest route goes via k, and the most expensive route




φwi + φij + ti + tj (cheapest route via i)
φwi + φij + h
j
{i} + tk + tj (second cheapest, detour i, via k)
φwi + φij + h
j
{i,k} + tj (detour both i and j)
. (14)
Proposition 2. Two countries can engage in Bertrand competition over the least cost routes between world
market and a third country. The decision whether any country will find it beneficial to engage in competition
depends on their relative size and position
Proof. Consider the case that Dk is sufficiently large and transport costs φij and φkj are sufficiently
low, so that both i and k would find it beneficial to allow for transit trade to j. As long as ti is below
hj{i}, country k would have to set a negative tariff rate (which cannot be revenue-maximizing).
Additionally, country i can safely increase its tariff above the level of hj{i} to the point it expects k to
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k (15)
while i has to be aware that j will decrease its tariff rate below the island tariff to attract transit if
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Figure 5: A potential customs union between i and j would eliminate tariffs between i and j
Consider now a situation with many countries, and that countries are allowed to form customs
unions. Following Viner (1950), a customs union is a set of countries U that agree on a single
tariff rate (for imports and transits) tU , distribute the tariff revenues according to a distribution
mechanism so that any member i would receive a share πui of RU , and abolish internal borders. The
rules of this unions are given and non-negotiable, and defined as followed.
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(i) Benefits of a Customs Union
Conditional on geography, the foundation of a customs union can create revenues otherwise wasted
due to multiple marginalization.
Proposition 3. The decision to join a customs union depends on the world market price of the good (it has
to be high enough), relative size (countries have to be sufficiency unequal), relative position (the union must
have a sufficiently better position than the independent country), the slope of the demand curve (which has to
be flat enough), the relative level of physical transport costs (which have to be low enough), and the absolute
level of transport costs (they have to be either sufficiently large or sufficiently small, as this relationship is
convex).
Proof. We have to show under which conditions the sum of independent revenues is smaller than
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Import volume Mu can then be calculated by solving equations 1–3 in reverse order. Multiplying
this volume with tu as in equation 4, yields the union’s revenues Ru. We set up the revenue function
of independent j by inserting equation 8 into equation 6 to retrieve tj, solve for Mj from equations
1–3 (as pictured in figure 2), and insert tjig and Mj into equation 4. This yields optimal tj, the
resulting imports Mj, and finally Rj. Revenue Ri can then be calculated by inserting the tariff from
8, transit Mj, and imports Mi (from equations 1–3 reversely) into the revenue equation 10.
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We spare the reader the complete formula for the customs union effect11 and rather employ some
comparative statics to understand it. To understand the effect of relative size (relative demand), we
express Dj in terms of Di. This yields Dj = Di − δ, while δ ≶ 0 is just the difference, so that δ can
proxy relative size. Replace Di − δ, and consider first and second derivatives of the customs union
effect w.r.t. δ. This shows that the relationship between the customs union effect and the relative
size is convex. With increasing inequality in sizes, the customs union effect becomes positive.
Focus on the effect of physical transport costs, in absolute and relative terms. Assume a negative
shock on the absolute level of physical transport cost, e.g. through technological progress. Replace
φwi by φwi − τ, and φij by φij − τ. First and second derivative w.r.t. τ reveal a convex link.
The first and second derivative of the customs union effect w.r.t. φij yield a concave function. The
effect is smallest at either extremely low or extremely high costs φij. Consider the extreme case of
no physical transport costs, then there would be no gain from cooperation. As physical transport
costs approach infinity, shortest paths and detours converge in relative terms.
(ii) Negative Effects of a Customs Union for an Upstream Country
States such as the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen, Germany’s trade entrepôts, remained outside
of the customs union even after the foundation of the German empire in 1871, almost half a century
after other German states had joined into a customs union. The prime reason is that revenues
within the German customs union were distributed relative to population shares, neglecting their
geographic position.
Proposition 4. A country can loose from joining a customs union, depending on its promised share of
the unions revenue (if too small), market size relative to other members (if too different in sizes), relative
geographic position (if too advantageous before joining), world market prices (if too high), and level of physical
transport costs (if too high)
Proof. A customs union u = {i, j} would distribute revenues as follows
11Please find the algebra for all revenues, and the following comparative statics, in the technical appendix.
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Compare figures 2 and 5. Consider the case in which state i has a strong geographic advantage over
j, so that h{i} > t
j











We set up the revenue function12 from independent i and the union u, and undertake some
comparative statics as in proposition 3. The intuition is the following. The country gives up its
geographic position, and control over transit trade. It receives a share of union’s revenues that is
independent of the income when independent, as transit trade is neglected. The control the country
gives up when joining is higher when physical transport costs (hence the detour costs) are high so
that transport costs represent a considerable share of the price to the consumer.
(iii) Why Countries Join a Customs Union




Figure 6: Countries i faces a trade-off between control and customs union-effect
We established that the decision whether to join a customs union depends on the sizes of customs
union effects and the control over trade routes countries give up.
Theorem. Revenue-maximizing countries trade off geography-induced positive customs union effects from
joining a customs union with their loss of control over a advantageous geographic position.
12Please find the algebra in the appendix.
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Proof. Consider figure 6. There exists a customs union U = {j, k}. Country i can decide whether
to form a customs union U′ = {i, j, k}. From equation 17 it follows that i faces a binary decision
between the revenue from staying independent, Ri, and it’s exogenous determined share πU
′
i of the
customs union’s revenue πU
′
i RU′ .
We established that there is a positive effect from joining the customs union (proposition 3). In
contrast, if a country is in total control of access to world markets, there is a loss from joining the
customs union 4. As outlined in the two country case, there is also Bertrand competition over routes
that limits the tariff rates.
With increasing world market price, the network effect grows faster than the control effect. To proof
this, set up first derivative of network effect and the control effect w.r.t pw. The first derivative of
the difference between customs union effect and control effect can never be negative under the
assumption that all variables are positive and there is demand in all countries. Therefore with
increasing world market price, the union becomes more attractive.
D. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We cannot match the trade flows and trade costs of all Central European countries. The main
problem is the lack of data. The German state archive in Berlin has official tariff on many German
states on file, as exchanging such information was part of diplomatic exchange. However, the
majority of political trade costs has never been recorded. The German states were just in the making
of the tariff system, so that various systems of tariff collection were applied simultaneously. For
example, the Northern harbor cities, like Bremen and Hamburg, for many years had an official tariff
rate of zero. It is of course wrong to assume this implied the absence of political costs. Handling
fees and non-monetary regulations created state revenue paid for by consumers in the hinterland.
Other examples include Central German states’ staple rights, road and river tolls, which added to
the notoriously complicated tariff landscape.
We face the same data restriction concerning trade flows. Important trade hubs, such as Hamburg
and Bremen did not bilateral trade data until the 1890’s, when their statistical offices have been
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integrated into Imperial Germany (Onishi, 1973). There are indeed some exemplary route maps
and notes kept by traders of the time that allow us understanding the cost structure of trading
in our time period. We can such such sources as anecdotal evidence that traders were indeed
minimizing trade costs as assumed in the theoretical model. But we cannot aggregate this to actual
trade flows.
We can also not use the available data of single countries and interpolate for all others. Any small
change in the transport framework can change the outcome for all other states. For example,
small changes in the tariff of a single central country can have consequences for another country
hundreds of kilometers away due to re-routing. Any missing data point, any wrong assumption
in reconstruction of such data can destroy the whole picture. Second, tariff rates, trade flows,
and even import figures are endogenous outcomes of our model, and have to be interpreted
simultaneously.
The only truly exogenous variables we have in our model is the geography of the states, including
their borders, rivers, roads (which are exogenous in our small time window), and physical transport
costs (which are exogenous under the assumption of perfectly competitive transport- and retail-
sectors), and consumer’s preferences and demand elasticity. It is safe to concentrate on those goods
that created the bulk of the tariff revenue (see Onishi (1973)) and did not have a significant domestic
competition: Sugar, coffee, and alcohol. For these goods, we fitted linear demand curves. For these
goods, preferences were common, and their consumption was not restricted to elites but already
standard in large shares of population Ferber (1829). All these parameters (see table 2) can be used
to quantify the environment in which state rulers set revenue-maximizing tariff rates. The outcome
would be the tariff revenue that all states could have gained from tariffs, given their geography. If
these figures can explain why some states joined the Zollverein either sooner or later, then we can
simulate counterfactual changes in the geography to predict their consequences.
Physical transport costs φ are calculated using GIS, employing maps by Kunz and Zipf (2008),
per-kilometer rates from Sombart (1902) and the algorithm by Dijkstra (1959) 13.
We calculate the demand for any region j using table 2. We weighted the price of coffee, sugar, and
13We are grateful for the contributors of the free and open source projects PostgreSQL (postgresql.com), Post-
GIS(postgis.org), PgRouting (pgrouting.org), and QGIS (qgis.com), which were used exclusively.
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Table 2: Parametrization of the Simulation
Parameter Letter Description Source
World market price pw Average London prices 1822–1831a Clark (2010)
Market size D Population data 1820b Kunz and Zipf
(2008)
Elasticity of demand η Pfister (2012) reports an elasticity of −0.5 using Ham-
burg prices for 1736-1798. Ewert and Pfister (2017)
estimate a lower elasticity for the 19th century. Elas-




Physical transport costs φ GIS map of central Europe 1820c, including harbors,
rivers, roads, and country shapes. Per-kilometer
ratesd are constant per weight, discriminated by
transport mode. These are (in the order of increasing
per-kilometer price) river transport with the stream,
sea freight, river transport against the stream, land
transport on paved roads, and land transport else-
where. Switching transport modes is possible any-
where they cross. Transportation costs are indepen-
dent of the quality and/or category of the good. The
transportation costs of a liter is assumed to corre-










aValues were standardized using reported prices in grams of silver.
bTo account for the variation in the size of states, larger territorial states are split into their first geographical subdivision
to analyze demand: Prussia (9 parts), Austria Hungary (9), Bavaria (8), Hanover (7), France (6), Baden (6), Saxony (5)
Wurttemberg (4), Hesse-Darmstadt (3), Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach (2), Oldenburg (2), Saxony-Coburg-Saalfeld (2), and
Sachsen-Gotha-Altenburg (2). A region’s demand is assumed to be concentrated in it’s capital.
cRivers were turned into floating direction. Roads were added from own maps. Sea harbors were included.
dValues were converted using currency’s silver content.
alcoholic beverages, using per-capita consumption in Prussia 1820–1830 from Dieterici (1846) and
Ferber (1829). Price data uses the exogenous London price data from Clark (2010). We assume that
all imports that states use show an elasticity of −0.85. The price consumers in j have to pay for a
kilogram of this import basket pw, the physical transport costs φ on the least cost path Pwj and the
sum of the tariffs t of all states on this least cost path SP. Demand elasticity is constant and given by
ε. Assuming there is only that one bundle of import goods, any consumer would have a potential
demand of DPCj.
DPCj = β(pw + φPwj + ∑
i∈SP
ti)ε (20)
To retrieve the regions demand, we multiply by its population pop, assuming uniform income
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Figure 7: Network graph of 1820 Germany and surrounding countries. Note the centrality of Prussia and
the Hessian states. Abbreviations: ABB=Anhalt-Bernburg, ADE=Anhalt-Dessau, AKO=Anhalt-
Köthen, AUT=Austria, BAD=Baden, BAY=Bavaria, BRE=Bremen, BRS=Brunswick, CHE=Switzerland,
FRA=Frankfurt, FRC=France, GBR=Great Britain, HAM=Hamburg, HAN=Hanover, HDA=Hesse-
Darmstadt, HEH=Hessn-Homburg, HEK=Hesse-Kassel, HHE=Hohenzollern-Hechingen, HOL=Holstein,
HSI=Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, KRA=Cracow, LAU=Lauenburg, LID=Lippe-Detmold, LIE=Liechtenstein,
LUE=Luebeck, LUX=Luxemburg, MSC=Mecklenburg-Schwerin, MST=Mecklenburg-Strelitz, NAS=Nassau,
NEU=Neuenburg (Neuchâtel), NLD=Netherlands, OLD=Oldenburg, POL=Poland, PRE=Prussia,
RAL=Reuß Greiz, REB=Reuß-Ebersdorf, RGA=Reuß-Gera, RLS=Reuß-Lobenstein, RSC=Reuß-
Schleiz, RUS=Russia, SAX=Saxony, SCS=Saxony-Coburg-Saalfeld, SGA=Saxony-Gotha-Altenburg,
SHI=Saxony-Hildburghausen, SLI=Schaumburg-Lippe, SLW=Schleswig, SME=Saxony-Meiningen,
SRU=Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, SSO=Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, SWE=Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach,
WAL=Waldeck, WUE=Wurttemberg.
distribution. In order to allow for an optimal tariff below infinity, we enforce a choke quantity of
DPCC below the regions demand falls to zero (the intuition being it does not pay to ship anything




popjDPCj if DPCj > DPCC
0 else
(21)
This demand function is known to all states, so is geography. While we take all variables except
the quantity at which demand is choked DPCC from the literature in table 2, this parameter needs
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careful examination. A prohibitively high quantity of necessary imports would reduce the number
of states that can generate any tariff revenue. A two low number generates unrealistically high
tariff rates for some states. States which mostly generate income from import tariffs would find
it beneficial to raise their tariff rate further since their own population cannot react to an increase
in the tariff except by reducing the quantity of imports consumed. Therefore, we can assess the
quality of the assumed choke quantity best looking at states without transit revenues.
To initiate a simulation, the following steps are necessary:
1. Load the geography of states at the historical period in question given their positions, sizes,
and transport networks as given in table 2.
2. Group all states that should form one or many customs unions. These states will then take part
the simulation as a single player, and can set only one tariff. All other states are independent
players.
3. Initiate all tariffs with zero.
To simulate the fact that all states react to all other states’ tariffs, as their revenues and their possible
revenues might be affected, we run a large number of rounds with the following steps.
1. Shuffle the order of players so that all players have exactly one turn. Start with the first player
in line.
2. Retrieve the current players tariff and save it to t. Solve for the demand of all regions that
would trade via the current player given all tariffs of other states do not change, and given t.
Calculate the player’s revenue. Store this result in a.
3. Generate a small random number r > 0.
4. Repeat step 2, but now given that the player sets tariff min(0, t − r). Store the resulting
revenue in b.
5. Repeat step 2, given the player sets tariff t + r. Anticipate that an increase in the current
player’s tariff rate might motivate other players to reduce their tariff in the next round by
assuming that this other player would immediately do so. Store the resulting revenue in c.
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6. Choose the maximum of a, b, and c, and inform everyone that the current player’s new tariff
is unchanged if the maximum is a, min(0, t − r) if the maximum is b, or t + r if the maximum
is c.
7. The next player starts with step 3. If all players had their turn, start a new round with step 1.
The outcome of the simulation yields an approximation of the optimal tariffs and the overall tariff
revenue from the three goods for all the states and simulated unions S, given that the number of
rounds is sufficient.
Introducing some randomness into the decision room of states (step 3) comes with several advan-
tages for the simulation. First, concerning the number of steps we have to simulate. An alternative
would be to name a discrete accuracy for the simulation. Let’s say we would like the optimal
tariff level to be accurate at a tenth of a gram of silver. Due to the kinks in the revenue function,
we cannot stop the algorithm, for example if revenue starts decreasing while trying the effect for
stepwise increasing of the tariff. This simulation would therefore give us a very exact, but incredible
computer intensive solution. Using random steps, given the amount of steps is sufficiently large, the
players make rather large changes in the beginning but the number of adjustments slows down (as
r might be to to large by chance) until a stable solution is reached. Secondly, and most importantly,
this randomness reflects the nature of the historical process. Dieterici (1846) reports that tariff
adjustments were agreed upon and announced in rather small steps. Tax administration had a
general idea if the current tariff was rather to high or to low or should not be adjusted, but they
could not try out their decision to know exactly which changes their decisions would create. We
argue that states, like the modern Federal Reserve most of the times, adjusts their decision variable
in steps of equal size, and it is therefore reasonable to restrict their decision space to three options.
Third, it would be unrealistic to assume, given different local currencies, and weights, that all states
would use the same steps for the optimization.
The outcome of this simulation is a tariff that all states would set, their revenue, and demand by
their respective consumers.
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E. RESULTS
In this section we use our calibrated model to replicate the course of events that led to the formation
of the Zollverein in 1833. Our model implies that any change in tariffs of any change will affect
all others. To get around this problem of simultaneity, we proceed under the assumption that
Prussia as by far the largest state was an agenda setter in the spirit of Ploeckl (2010). Instead of
exploring all possible strategic interactions we limit our attention to the observed chain of events
and several alternative options as discussed in the contemporary debate. The results are shown in
table 3.
We assume for all states follow only the goal of tariff revenues maximization over an infinite time
horizon that is captured in the model, except Prussia and Bavaria. The Prussian finance minister
Motz, in office since 1825, saw as the main long-run challenge of Prussian finance to connect the
two separate territories. The expected income of achieving this connection, due to a more efficient
provision of public goods and also by combination of natural resources to foster development, in
his eyes justified short run reductions in tariff revenue, if not too substantial. The same was true for
Bavaria, which after the acquisition of the Rheinpfalz, which was also separated from the core, most
prominently by Hesse-Darmstadt (see figure 1).
We start with the situation in late 1827, with a Prussian Customs unions that included the major
enclaves. As shown in table 3, column 1, the Prussian Customs Unions generates substantial
net-revenue per capita, higher than those in Bavaria or Wurttemberg, but lower than those in
Hesse-Cassel, which benefits from its excellent location as a transit state between the eastern and
western parts of Prussia and between Southern and Northern Germany, as the Rhine was still
blocked due to high customs. Column 2 shows the situation in January 1828, after the Kingdom of
Wurttemberg and the Kingdom of Bavaria had agreed to form the Southern German customs union,
the first modern customs union in Germany, where two sovereign partners agreed to set a common
external tariff. Apparently, this union was more beneficial to Wurttemberg than to Bavaria, reflected
in the fact that the initiative to this treaty came from Wurttemberg (Hahn, 1984, p. 41). Bavaria
was eager to integrate the small state of Hesse-Darmstadt into this Southern-German customs
151








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ENDOGENOUS TRADE COSTS AND THE FORMATION OF A CUSTOMS UNION
union, which was the missing land-bridge to the Bavarian Palatinate (Rheinpfalz). We see that this
customs union was slightly harmful to both Hessian states, as it limited their bargaining power
with respect to a now larger united hinterland. But Hesse-Darmstadt was more oriented towards
Prussia, as its main markets were in the Prussian Rhineland. Attempts by Hesse-Darmstadt to
find a customs agreement with Prussia in earlier years had been rejected. Prussia had been so far
reluctant to make any concessions to the tiny Hessian state, because it expected to benefit very little
from this. The Prussian position until 1827 had been that any negotiations would have to include
the larger Hesse-Cassel as well. This was because the territory of the latter provided the missing
land-connection between the eastern parts of Prussia and its western provinces of Rhineland and
Westphalia. Consider columns 3 and 4 in table 3: in our simulation Hesse-Darmstadt benefitted
from a customs union with Prussia but not from a customs union with the Southern Zollverein.
In contrast, it would have been beneficial for the latter. Moreover, a comparison between column
2 and column 4 shows that the treaty with Hesse-Darmstadt was not beneficial for Prussia. Why
then, did Prussia agree? A main strategic aim of Prussia was to get a land-bridge between its
eastern and western parts. The Hessian states, and notably Hesse-Cassel were the missing link.
After the formation of the Southern Customs Union, Prussia immediately saw the possibility to
exert pressure on Hesse-Cassel via and union with Hesse-Darmstadt and an agreement with the
southern states. But this was possible only if Prussia could signal to Bavaria and Wurttemberg
that a customs union would not put their sovereignty at risk. The treaty with Hesse-Darmstadt
signed in February 1828 was remarkable in the sense that the small Hessian state was treated as
an equal partner by Prussia. Notably, it was agreed that all tariffs required the consent of both
partners. At the same time, the southern states realized that they could benefit hugely from a
union with Prussia, given their unfavorable geography. In May 1829, Bavaria and Wurttemberg
signed an agreement with the now enlarged Prusian customs union a preliminary treaty to prepare
their future merger. Comparing columns 4 and 5 we see that this had the effect on Hesse-Cassel
that Prussia had hoped for: the Hessian state would have suffered a very substantial decline in
tariff income if both customs unions would have merged. But the negotiations continued, and
the electorate of Cassel Wilhelm II tried everything to avoid a customs union with Prussia. In
September 1828 he had formed an agreement with Saxony, Hanover and several other states to fend
off what was seen as attempts of Prussian expansions with the Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein. At the
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same time, the economic situation of Hesse-Cassel deteriorated and many citizens demanded a
change in policy and an agreement with Prussia. In September 1830 enraged citizens destroyed
customs offices in Hesse-Cassel (Hahn, 1984, p. 60). Maybe more importantly, the situation of
the Rhine changed fundamentally. Since the start of the Belgian revolution, the Netherlands had
been under pressure to give in to long-standing demands from upstream states, notably Prussia,
for lower tariffs and a liberalization of shipping rules. The independence of Belgium with the
London Conference in December 1830 and with it the emergence of a trade competition for the port
of Rotterdam. After many years of negotiations, the Netherlands gave in and the riparian states
on the Rhine signed in March 1831 the Mainz Convention to liberalize trade on the river. This as
the last blow for Hesse-Cassel, as it essentially eliminated overland transit as its main source of
income. In August 1831 Hesse-Cassel signed an agreement to join the Prussian customs union, in
Electorate Wilhelm II resigned in favor of his son Frederick William I. in September 1831. Consider
columns 5, 6 and 7 of table 3. After Hesse-Darmstadt had joined the Prussian Customs union and
the Southern Union had signed an agreement to join later, Hesse-Cassel had already suffered a
decline in tariff-revenue. This turned negative in our simulation after the liberalization of the Rhine,
and this with or without a de facto merger between the Prussian and the Southern Customs Union.
Hence, after 1831 Prussia was at the height of its influence. It finally exerted control over large
parts of the Elbe and the Rhine and could use it to enforce the unification of its two territorial parts
in terms of tariff policy. Moreover, it now had substantial influence over Southern Germany and
used it to create the Zollverein in 1833 in separate negotiations with the Southern Customs Union,
with Saxony and with the Thuringian states. We see from a comparison of columns 8 and 9 that
the Zollverein was not immediately beneficial for Prussia, but it was for Southern Germany and
Hesse-Cassel. However, by then the expectation in Prussia was that an enlarged market would
facilitate an expansion of economic activity and trade that would pay of in the course of several
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years. Data from Onishi (1973) indeed suggests that this was the case.
Table 4: Simulated tariff revenues of selected states per capita given a counterfactual geography of a Prussia that includes
the whole of the Kingdom of Saxony, but excludes the Rhine Province and Westphalia, which act as an independent
territory
Independent



















48.45 22.98 56.85 18.43
Bavaria 8.45 22.98 13.2 18.43
Wurttemberg 8.45 22.98 13.2 18.43
Hesse-
Darmstadt
92.29 22.98 13.2 18.43
Hesse-Cassel 100.7 22.98 13.2 18.43
Rhineland-
Westphalia
37.68 33.01 13.2 18.43
These simulations are based upon the GIS maps of the European geography and calibrated demand functions
as depicted in table 2. The counterfactual is based only upon relabeling of terroritories in the factual historic
borders. The two Prussian provinces Rheinprovinz and Westfalen where relabeled as not part of the Prussian
state but act as an independent player. The kingdom of Saxony was relabeled as part of Prussia. The
changes due to the Belgian revolution are included by replacing the shapes of the Netherlands 1820 by the
Netherlands 1831 and Belgium 1831, each provided with population data of 1831.
How important was the westward expansion of Prussia as it was enforced by Britain in 1815?
Consider the results in table 4. We focus our attention to four cases, each under the assumption of a
counterfactual political geography, where Prussia is extended southwards to include the entire king-
dom of Saxony, while Rhineland-Westfalia constitutes a new sovereign political entity. Moreover, to
ease comparisons with the results above, we only consider situations where a Southern Customs
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Union has formed and with an independent Belgian state that competes with the Netherlands for
trade, thereby limiting tariffs on the Rhine trade.
The main finding from table 4 is that all relevant states are better off if they set their tariffs indepen-
dently, except the Southern German Customs Union, due to their hinterland position. Comparing
col. 1 and 2 we see that a sovereign Rhineland-Westphalia would have had little incentive to join a
customs union around Prussia that would include the Hessian states and the Southern German
Customs Union. But such a union would likely not have formed in the first place, because the
Hessian states had no incentive to join, nor would a counterfactual Prussia have had an interest in
such an arrangement. More surprisingly, a West-German customs union similar to the boundaries of
a West-German state as it formed after 1945 would also rather not have formed, unless the northern
states, notably Bremen and Hanover would have been part of this (not shown here). Finally, a
counterfactual Zollverein that would merge the tariff systems of Prussia, the Hessian states, the
Southern customs union and a sovereign Rhinleland-Westphalia would have been only for southern
Germany attractive, not for anyone else. To summarize, under a counterfactual geography, the
most likely outcome would have been a landscape of several smaller customs unions around a
Prussian state including Saxony, possibly with a Southern German Customs Union but assuming an
independent state on the Rhine and independent Hessian states. Without the westward expansion
of Prussia, it would have been less attractive and more difficult for Prussia to use tariff policy as a
means of increasing its political influence on states in central and southern Germany. Put differently,
we conclude that Britain’s strategy to install Prussia as a watchdog on the Rhine to keep France and
Russia out of Germany indeed had a remarkable side-effect: unintentionally, Britain put Prussia
into a position that it could force other states into an enlarged customs union around Prussia, the
Zollverein. Indeed, Britain helped to unify Germany.
F. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the factors behind the formation of the German Zollverein as an
example of a customs union, and thus endogenous borders. We have argued that the rise of Prussia
to dominate German tariff policy can be traced back to a change in “second nature” geography,
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namely the redrawing of the European map at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15. Due to the
intervention of Britain, Prussia gained large territories in the West. While this was against Prussia’s
intention, who wanted to gain the rich and densely populated Kingdom of Saxony, this had far-
reaching consequences as Prussia was now in control of a large part of Germany’s trade routes.
Over time, for more and more states the gains from cooperation with Prussia started to outweigh
the costs of losing sovereignty. Our argument is closely related to the literature on the size of
nations following Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997), who emphasize a
trade-off between benefits of cooperation from economies of scale and the costs of loosing political
control. We argue that a change in borders can trigger a cascade of changes in both dimensions. The
intuition for this result was a basic trade-off between prospective gains from joining a large customs
union with network effect and control over revenues. In 1815 all the German states that still existed
as sovereign entities after the Napoleonic wars were in financial difficulties, including Prussia. All
of them attempted to increase their state revenues, reduce costs, while keeping as much of their
political sovereignty as they could. Notably they were eager to stay in control over their revenue.
With the formation of the Prussian Zollverein in 1818 states had to weigh the potential gains from
higher tariff revenue net of costs after joining into the Zollverein against the loss of control over
these revenues, hence a loss of political sovereignty. The fact that Prussia controlled large parts of
the German river system after 1815 considerably reduced the control that other German states had
over their own tariff income, because much of their trade had to be routed over Prussian territory.
Moreover, after Hesse-Darmstadt decided to join the Zollverein, all other German states are forced
to follow suit. We used detailed GIS data on population, state boundaries, infrastructure and
transport mode specific transportation costs to calculate first cheapest cost paths and next expected
volumes of trade and transit flows between a set of 106 regions across Germany and neighbouring
territories. Based on this we calculated expected changes in tariff revenue, tariff collection costs and
changes in control over revenue for each sovereign state if he decided to join Prussia into a customs
union compared to the situation outside the customs union. We use a calibrated GIS model to test
whether these expected changes in revenue and revenue control can explain the pattern of joining
decisions and find that this fits the observed data extremely well. Finally, we run a counterfactual
using the estimated coefficients together with a counterfactual map of Germany in 1815: would the
Zollverein have formed if Prussia would have gained Saxony instead of the Rhineland? We find
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very clearly, that the answer is no. While certainly unintended, Britain unified Germany.
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APPENDIX
A. TABLES
Table 5: Summary statistics of the exercise in chapter “Descriptive evidence”
Mean SD Min Max
Transit Through Prussia .7774498 .4228409 0 1.095041
Distance to Oceans 247.139 129.2661 13.75594 477.2779
Std. Distance to Oceans 0 1 -1.805446 1.780349
Distance to Rivers 20.58066 14.39199 3.113955 78.0745
Std. Distance to Rivers 0 1 -1.213641 3.99485
“Cultural Heritage” FE 17.02128 8.771221 1 32
Absolute Monarchy .3469388 .4809288 0 1
Constitutional Monarchy .2857143 .4564355 0 1
Length of Border 984.3847 1546.424 74.10594 9487.874
Std. Length of Border 0 1 -.5886346 5.498807
Area 19183.48 50658.91 105.8058 275099.7
Std. Area 0 1 -.3765908 5.051752
Length of Border By Area .3229386 .260623 .0183537 1.125486
Std. Length of Border By Area 0 1 -1.16868 3.079344
N 49
Table 6: Estimates for per-kilometer freight rates from (Sombart, 1902)
Type Cost [Pf/tkm]
Country road 120
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